Attached is a copy of the conclusions of the Caribbean Chiefs of Mission
Conference, together with the President’s comments. Please note his
observation that “this is a narrowly focused and inadequate
approach—‛more federal government money and staff.’” (S)
Additionally, the President took issue with the implication of the first
paragraph that the only alternatives for attaining our objectives are
economic assistance and military force. He noted, “These are not the
only two options.” (S)
Attachment
Paper Prepared in the Department of
State2
Caribbean Chiefs of Mission Conference December
3–4, 1979
CONCLUSIONS:
The Chiefs of Mission agree that we can best attain our objectives by
economic assistance programs to meet the needs of its people, rather
than by attempting to dominate the region by military force. Display
of military strength is useful but must be carefully calibrated to
ensure positive impact.3
In policy statements, ideological pluralism should be defined as
embracing a commitment to democratic processes, human rights, and
economic development in the country concerned. We should recognize
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that USG credibility is on the line by our
own declarations of U.S. interest in our Caribbean “third border”,
commitment to economic development, etc.4
The Chiefs of Mission agree that the Cuban challenge reflects an ad hoc and alert Cuban response to perceived
opportunities in individual countries, rather than a fully-developed
strategy of Caribbean subversion. The U.S. must counter these
tactics by providing an alternative answer to Caribbean development
needs. Both for visibility and as a gauge of our intentions,
quick-disbursing, flexible development funds are needed for
visibility projects which meet basic needs. In addition, we need
economic assistance programs for middle-income countries. Our
assistance policy should avoid rewarding our enemies while denying
our friends. The Chiefs of Mission underline recipient countries’
desire for improved export markets and for foreign private
investment. They conclude:
—that a contingency fund be established for meeting short-term
developmental needs of high political priority;
—that development programs be made more visible and bilateral
programs be considered for the English-speaking Caribbean. These
programs are essential to our security interests because they
provide an alternative to the Cuban model. They should be tailored
to need, absorptive capacity and the recipient country’s desire to
respond to the needs of its people. Close monitoring will be
needed;
—that a study be undertaken on the feasibility of arrangements
similar to the Lome Convention of the European Communities.5 A multi-year
agreement might be negotiated with interested Caribbean countries
involving the whole range of economic, cultural and social
relations, including developmental loans and grants and possibly
trade preferences;
—that private efforts be stimulated to meet short and long-term
developmental needs and to facilitate private foreign investment.
The efforts of private voluntary organizations should be encouraged
and AID should strengthen its
leadership role with these organizations;
—that multilateral efforts continue to be a major element in
developmental policy and programs. The Caribbean Group should be
supported and strengthened, especially in the fields of
transportation, communications and energy. The Group also serves as
a useful framework for consultations between the U.S. and the
Caribbean countries;
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—that stepped-up programs be supported by additional personnel in
certain posts who should be provided on a priority basis. The
increased backstopping planned by ICA
is welcomed, particularly expanded exchange programs and radio
broadcasts on the medium bands; and
—that emigration is depleting essential human resources and creating
complications in the United States. The Select Commission on
Immigration and Refugee Policy should focus on Caribbean immigration
and examine the feasibility of a temporary worker program as a
possible element of control.
