35. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Castro Appeals to the Cuban-American Community
Castro’s interview with Cuban-American newsmen on September 6 offered the strongest evidence to date of a Cuban tactic which has been gathering momentum for several months: a play to the some 600,000 Cuban-Americans and Cuban exiles in the U.S. in hopes of reducing their support for anti-Castro terrorism and eventually of persuading them to exert pressure on us to lift the embargo and take other steps sought by Havana.2
This marks a sharp change of pace on Havana’s part. As of a year ago, when the interests sections were opened in the two capitals, Cuban officialdom regarded the Cuban-American community here as their worst enemy and consistently described it as composed of “counterrevolutionary worms.” Exiles who had the temerity to apply at the Cuban Interests Section for authorization to return to Cuba to visit families were often rebuffed abruptly and without explanation.
That Castro has shifted away from such pointless attitudes and tactics is a tribute to his political acumen. For some months now, Havana has been permitting an increasing number of Cubans resident here to return to Cuba for family visits. Contact has been established with various representatives of the community and a dialogue begun on release of prisoners and several other issues.
What Havana has in mind was seen clearly in the remark of a Cuban diplomat here some months ago; he expressed admiration for and interest in the Israeli government’s success in utilizing the American Jewish community as a pressure group. The direction in which Havana would wish to channel such pressures is indicated by the fact that exiles applying to visit families in Cuba are often now politely [Page 82] refused with the statement that all could travel back freely if only Washington would lift the trade embargo. Cuban diplomats here have also commented that the more the Cuban-American community becomes involved in family reunification, etc., the less they will be disposed to support the exile terrorist organizations.
Castro’s play to the Cuban-American community may convince an increasing number of its members to call for new steps toward normalizing relations between Washington and Havana. Neither ploy nor effect is necessarily antithetical to our own objectives and interests, however; on the contrary, the new channels of communication which have emerged in the process are useful, and the actions which Castro offers as enticement to the Cuban-American community—release of prisoners, increased family visits, etc.—fulfill our objectives as well as theirs. Castro may say he is releasing prisoners as a gesture to the overseas Cubans, rather than as a result of President Carter’s human rights policies, but the results are the same. And controlling exile terrorism is an objective we share with Havana.
Nor would there seem to be any real danger that Castro could carry things so far as to turn the Cuban-American community into a pro-Castro force against us. The animosities of almost 20 years will die hard, if indeed they ever die. If certain of the Cubans here are now willing to deal with Castro, that does not imply any fondness for him or acceptance of the system he has imposed; rather, it reflects a pragmatism on their part which is typically Cuban. They have concluded that if families are to be reunited and prisoners freed, it will only come about through a dialogue with the present government. Their opening to Havana, then, is predicated on considerations similar to those which motivated our own. The time may come when they will want to move ahead faster than will suit our purposes. The Cubans here are interested in visiting their families and getting them out of Cuba, not in Castro’s troops in Africa or in compensation for nationalized U.S. property. But even should they begin to get ahead of us, this should not prove a serious problem. As a pressure group, the relatively small Cuban-American community has definite limits. We moved ahead in opening the normalization process despite their objections; we should be able to control its pace even should they urge a faster one.
In the final analysis, a muting of hostilities between Havana and the Cuban community here should benefit all sides.
Executive Secretary
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P780158–1095. Secret. Drafted by Smith on September 11; concurred in by Vaky.↩
- In telegram 2692 from Havana, September 7, the Interests Section reported that Castro gave an interview to 25 Cuban-American media representatives. During the interview, Castro stated that he had come to appreciate the concerns about Cuban exiles, and declared that the exiles would no longer be referred to as “worms,” but instead as the “Cuban community abroad.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780364–1135)↩