Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

327. Telegram From the Embassy in Barbados to the Department of State¹

Bridgetown, August 6, 1979, 1842Z

3149. Subject: Barbados as Safeguard for U.S. Interests in Caribbean.

1. (C)—Entire text.

2. Summary. Many of Barbados’ foreign policy goals coincide with our own, including containment of Cuban ambitions in area. Yet, U.S. relations with Barbados are not as good as they should be. There is a lingering, bitter aftertaste following closure of the U.S. naval facility.² Barbadians see the United States as a skinflint too ready to convert the reality of superior strength into contempt for Barbados’ claims for more compensation for past use of the facility. They say we used Barbadian infrastructure in support of a U.S. naval facility for sixteen years before paying a cent. No legal facts, logic, or ability on our part to show that the Barbadians should have demanded something earlier will diminish their conviction that we have treated a friend poorly. An irony is that while Barbados is a paradigm of what we would like most countries to be, we have not yet been able to find a way to put this issue behind us and look to the future. We believe it important to find a face-saving emolument for this small nation which points out frequently that we have rewarded Jamaica and Guyana whose governments are profligate and much less friendly than Barbados. We believe we must find a formula for dealing with Barbadian resentment before we can move confidently to a constructive, future relationship. End summary.

3. During negotiations for naval facility when Barbados was basing its demands for compensation on tendentious legalistic grounds, it was perhaps right for USG to resist, since to have caved in to ersatz and unworthy legal arguments would have made USG look gullible and been bad precedent for other negotiations. Written agreement did not provide for rent. For years Barbados never attempted to revise agreement despite possibility for doing so. That Barbados might have been successful had it made effort is indicated by fact that for year 1978 during which we tried and failed to renegotiate another lease for the facility, which by then was becoming obsolete anyway, we paid U.S. $750,000 to cover rent plus a pro-rated share for the phase-out months of early 1979. We also paid U.S. $250,000 to cover past use of the airport and any specific damage to roads. We were willing to continue using the facility at U.S. $750,000 per annum rent.

4. Having made our legal point and vacated the facility rather than pay more, we are concerned over the evolution of our relations with Barbados and the Eastern Caribbean. The latter is an area destined to become nettlesome because of economic and social pressures—doubly so if Castro intervenes beyond extent he has already. Meanwhile, Barbados is a fortress of parliamentary democracy, respect for human rights, and belief in sound economic management. As the largest, most developed, and most stable of the countries of the Eastern Caribbean, Barbados is respected by neighboring countries and has a potential—if not actual—leadership role to play in this increasingly troubled area. Island leaders heed the eloquent Barbadian voice of Henry Forde calling for restoration of democratic values and regional cooperation, reinforced by the test of good example. Barbadians are therefore as concerned as we are about political turmoil in the region. They are particularly concerned about the destruction of constitutionality by the March 13 coup in Grenada and by a growth in Cuban interest in the EC, especially the development of ties to elements in Dominica and St. Lucia, among other EC countries.

5. We believe that Barbados is a key to stability in the EC. We further believe that sound US-Barbados relations will be an important element in the protection of U.S. interests in this area. We think it would be extremely useful to find a “face-saving” solution for Henry Forde, who will continue for foreseeable future to be a major shaper of Barbados’ foreign policy, and for the GOB. As Department aware, Forde has been an important spokesman for region in meetings of Caribbean Group for Cooperation in Economic Development. Barbados’ new PermRep to UN has indicated Barbados is giving thought to joining NAM, where it could provide voice of moderation. Barbados generally plays larger role in international councils than its size would indicate.

6. As to what we could offer Barbados as a restorative of pride and as a balm to hurt feelings, Embassy strongly recommends an additional ex gratia payment of U.S. $250,000 on grant basis on top of the U.S. $250,000 already paid to cover past use of airport and any possible specific damage to roads. We recognize that there will be resistance to this recommendation in some quarters but we urge interested parties to consider substantial benefits which would accrue to USG over long-term by the offer of an additional U.S. $250,000 to Barbados. This amount, which we are convinced will be accepted by GOB and will put to rest once and for all Barbadian demands for additional funds, will go far towards eliminating residual bitterness. Barbados will recognize large-mindedness when it sees it. We believe this will be an important gesture towards a potentially staunch friend in a world where such are as scarce as hen’s teeth.³

Shelton

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 45, Korea, Republic of: Pres. Park Assassination, 5/79–10/27/1979 through Latin America, 1–9/79. Confidential; Immediate. Repeated for information to Georgetown, Kingston, London, and Port of Spain.
2. See Documents 308 and 311.
3. Habib and Vaky presented Shelton’s proposal to Vance. Vance approved the additional $250,000 on August 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790130–2122)