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  4. Document 205

205. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting1

Washington, March 26, 1980, 11:40 a.m.–12:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Jamaica, El Salvador and Suriname (S)

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • John A. Bushnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
    • Richard Cooper, Under Secretary for Economic Affairs

  • OSD

    • Rear Admiral Gordon Schuller, Director of Inter-American Region
    • Franklin Kramer, Special Assistant to Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs

  • JCS

    • General John Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman
    • Lt Colonel Edward Cummings, Western Hemisphere Division, J–5

  • DCI

    • Frank Carlucci
    • Jack Davis, NIO for Intelligence

  • AID

    • Edward Coy, Acting Assistant Administrator

  • OMB

    • Randy Jayne

  • White House

    • David Aaron

  • NSC

    • Robert Pastor

Summary of Conclusions

1. Jamaican Economy: Decision on IMF. The Jamaican Cabinet just rejected any further cooperation with the IMF, concurring in the decision made by the Executive Council of the PNP (Manley’s political party). Two leading, moderate economic ministers resigned, and one was replaced by an extreme leftist. Rejection of the IMF program means that Jamaica will not receive the $175 million allocated from the IMF for this year, and it will probably lose substantial aid from other governments like Venezuela, whose grants were contingent on an IMF agreement. Manley will be announcing an alternative set of policies soon, [Page 501] but there appears little he can do with regard to Jamaica’s external debt except perhaps seek more help from sources like Venezuela and Libya. There is likely to be a major increase in social and political unrest, and many of the radicals in the PNP may try to postpone elections or even seize power. The recent vote on the IMF indicates that the radicals have taken control of the PNP, and Manley has come increasingly under their influence. (S)

2. Political Situation in Jamaica. It is possible that Manley may call for an early election, and it was the consensus of the group that this would be more desirable as delay could play into the hands of those who want to undermine Jamaica’s democratic institutions. If elections occur soon, Edward Seaga and the Jamaican Labor Party (JLP) would probably win, and if it were a landslide, it is possible that Seaga could restore confidence in the Jamaican economy and encourage needed investment. US and other foreign assistance would still be required, but at least such aid could contribute to a solution to Jamaica’s economic problem, rather than just serve as a stop-gap. It is not clear what the reaction of Jamaica’s military or police would be to an attempted coup by the radicals. (S)

3. US Policy to Jamaica. There was a consensus that our Ambassador should engage in a dialogue with Prime Minister Manley, Seaga and other leaders in Jamaica as a way to indicate our continuing concern about the maintenance of democratic institutions in Jamaica. US aid policy should proceed as usual; we should not seek any additional money, or actively reduce our levels for the time being. We should [1½ lines not declassified] undertake a higher level briefing with the Venezuelans to encourage them to talk to Manley about early elections.2 We should also talk to the Canadians and encourage them to play an active role in Jamaica. [2 lines not declassified]3 CIA should undertake a review of Jamaica’s military and police and their possible reaction to an attempted coup.4 State should examine the impact of events in Jamaica on the rest of the Caribbean, and should do some contingency planning on how the US should respond to the possibility of a coup or any other extra-constitutional development in Jamaica. (S)

[Omitted here is discussion of El Salvador and Suriname.]

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Pastor, Country, Box 26, Jamaica, 3/80. Secret. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room.↩
  2. On April 10, Luers planned to meet with Venezuelan officials to urge them to continue aid to Jamaica and support free elections there. (Telegram 3313 from Caracas, April 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800183–0860)↩
  3. On April 3, Warne met with Canadian officials to discuss the situation in Jamaica. The Canadian officials pledged to continue aid to Jamaica and to support free elections. (Telegram 88905 to Kingston, April 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800168–0169)↩
  4. In its subsequent report, April 4, the CIA concluded that prospects for a leftist coup in Jamaica were small. (Memorandum from Pastor to Brzezinski and Aaron, April 17; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 23, Folder: Jamaica, 1980)↩