Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

172. Telegram From the Embassy in Mexico to the Department of State¹

Mexico City, August 21, 1980, 1722Z

13617. Subj: Meeting With President Lopez Portillo and Foreign Secretary Castaneda.

1. (C—Entire text.)

2. Ambassadors Nava and Bowdler met with President Lopez Portillo (JLP) at Los Pinos morning of August 19 for an hour and half (much longer than we had expected). Foreign Minister Castaneda accompanied the President.

3. The conversation focused primarily on Cuba, Bolivia and El Salvador. JLP said that his trip to Cuba had gone well. He found Fidel Castro sobered by 21 years in power and more pragmatic about his problems.² Castro realized that he had carried his revolution about as far as it would go and now had to work on readjustments. JLP thought the supreme accomplishment of the Cuban revolution is to have produced as near an egalitarian society as possible. JLP noted that the levelling process is visible and palpable. We commented that while the reduction of serious economic and social disparities is a commendable goal, the system imposed in Cuba is hardly a model that commends itself to others. JLP seemed to give inordinate importance to the achievement, saying that the Mexican revolution had been at work for 60 years and still had not succeeded in closing the gap between rich and poor as it should. Is it not preferable, we asked, to maintain an open society and seek to raise the lot of the poor than pursue a model which has produced a forced egalitarianism that is an economic failure? JLP said he, of course, prefers the Mexican revolution but is concerned that it has not met its goals. He acknowledged that the essential difference is personal liberty, the granting of which carries complications and risks. In this exchange JLP seemingly argued with conviction but his reasoning was not credible, leaving us with the impression that he was trying to rationalize a relationship. He recognizes Castro as a powerfully charismatic figure who appeals strongly to revolutionary groups in the area. We are inclined to believe that JLP’s fascination with Castro, while having elements of genuine admiration, is largely a calculated defensive mechanism to maintain contact and influence in Havana and tranquilize the left at home.

4. JLP raised the issues involved in U.S.-Cuban relations but did not press any particular point or course of action. He brought no explicit message from Castro. He accepts that our elections inhibit dialogue at this time but clearly hopes that after these are over, efforts will be resumed toward normalization. He is apprehensive that if improvement is not continued, retrogression will set in with serious risks of confrontation. JLP brought up return of Guantanamo, lifting of the embargo, and resumption of tourism as areas that need to be explored. We commented that Castro has his agenda and we have ours. At some future time the two sides might examine both lists. For the moment the Mariel and Interests Section problems, now further complicated by Castro’s refusal to allow persons who have recently departed to return giving rise to the skyjackings, should be resolved. JLP observed that from a Cuban standpoint these questions have to be considered in the broader context.

5. Regarding Central America JLP said he saw no fundamental change in the situation since we had met last month. He thinks Costa Rican democracy is strong enough to resist foreseeable pressures. The Nicaraguan revolution is gradually working out its problems. He believes the junta has no chance of success in El Salvador and the conflict can only degenerate. He declined use of Mexican influence to encourage a moderate solution. He sees no hope in Guatemala as long as President Lucas is in power. We took issue with him on El Salvador, pointing out the failure of the general strike, changing attitudes in Europe, prospects for improved economic support and performance, and firmness of the junta in resisting the strike. He remained fixed in his view that the level of violence reached and the hatreds generated foreclose any kind of reasonable settlement. We made clear we do not accept that assessment and continue to believe that the junta offers the best alternative which democratic countries should support. He was again critical of our backing of the junta but acknowledged that the Frente was also receiving help from the outside and expressed equal criticism of that help.

6. On Bolivia JLP and Castaneda (the only subject in which the latter intervened) insisted that the democracies should go for an MFM. They acknowledged that there are only 15 votes at present but believed that the other three could be picked up by forcing a meeting. Even if it does not work out this way and we fall short of a majority, the democracies, JLP contended, need to stand up and be counted against the military dictatorships among which he counted Brazil. To our argument that failure to achieve a majority would be a blow to the OAS and play into the hands of the military regime in Bolivia, he said the OAS is dead anyway and a 15-democracy vote against Bolivia would be a severe blow to the Garcia Meza regime in any event.³

7. At a dinner with FonSec Castaneda in his home in which Under Secretaries Alfonso Rosenzweig Diaz and Manuel Tello also participated (an unusual event since Castaneda rarely entertains foreign officials in his home) we had an opportunity to review some of the foregoing points. On Cuba Castaneda declined to recognize that Cuba is intervening in Central America and the Caribbean in any significant way. He admitted to no serious internal problems confronting Fidel, although he seemed to agree that under a controlled socialist system such as Cuba’s there are difficulties in motivating people and maintaining acceptable levels of productivity. We also discussed the high degree of dependency of Cuba on the Soviet Bloc and the restrictions this imposes on Castro’s freedom of action. Castaneda’s response consisted of a mixture of acknowledgment of these facts combined with an effort to justify Cuba’s actions in terms of U.S. policies which quote forced unquote Castro to turn to the Soviets. Bowdler admitted to mistakes in the past but also pointed out historical instances where Castro moved in that direction from choice.

8. On Nicaragua we urged Castaneda to use Mexico’s not inconsiderable influence with the FSLN to counsel maintenance of an open, pluralistic system, diversification of advice and support from abroad, and caution in defining its positions on international issues. We stressed the sensitivity of American public, press and congressional opinion to events in Central America and the importance of keeping this in mind in terms of our ability to continue to be of assistance in Nicaragua. Castaneda got the point although he made the usual protestations about Mexico not interfering in the affairs of other states.

9. With respect to Bolivia we reviewed the country alignment, particularly where three more votes might be picked up. Castaneda thought Honduras was a possibility. Trinidad and Dominica are the other more likely possibilities. We urged GOM lobbying in capitals to obtain these votes. Castaneda showed no great enthusiasm but said that he and his colleagues would look into the possibilities for diplomatic action.

10. During the course of the dinner which took place in a most cordial atmosphere, the Mexicans told us that they had spent part of Sunday afternoon together listening to a tape recording of Ambassador Nava’s August 15 press conference (where comments on Mexican-Cuban relations were misquoted and criticized in the press)⁴ and had expressed satisfaction both with the formal statement and the responses to questions, lamenting the inaccurate and distorted coverage by some newspapers.

Comment: Discounting the occasion and the friendly atmosphere surrounding it, it nevertheless seems clear that Foreign Secretariat reaction to the press conference was much more positive than that of the press. In this connection it is our analysis that the sharpest criticism concerning the conference came from leftist writers and media.

Nava

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 49, Mexico, 2/80–1/81. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis.
2. See footnote 6, Document 171.
3. No OAS Meeting of Foreign Ministers regarding the military coup in Bolivia took place.
4. During his August 15 press conference, Nava commented that U.S. fears about the strengthening of ties between Mexico and Cuba were “not false” and that there was a “certain confusion or lack of understanding among various sectors of the American people about this intimate friendship between Mexico and Cuba,” adding “I do not fully understand it either.” (Telegram 13628 from Mexico City, August 21; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800399–0498)