Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean

164. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 28, 1979, 11:20 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Bilateral Issues and President Lopez Portillo’s Energy Proposals

PARTICIPANTS

• U.S.

  • The President
  • The Vice President
  • Secretary Vance
  • Secretary Duncan
  • Dr. Brzezinski
  • Assistant Secretary Jules Katz
  • Assistant Secretary Viron Vaky
  • Robert Krueger, Amb. at Large-Des.
  • Ambassador Patrick Lucey
  • Ambassador Henry Owen
  • Jerry Schecter, NSC Staff
  • Guy F. Erb, NSC Staff
  • Everett Briggs, State

• Mexico

  • President Lopez Portillo
  • Jorge Castaneda, Secretary of Foreign Relations
  • Jorge de la Vega Dominguez, Secretary of Commerce
  • Jose Andres Oteyza, Secretary of Patrimony and Industrial Development
  • Alfonso de Rosenzweig Diaz, Under Secretary for Foreign Relations
  • Jorge Diaz Serrano, Director of PEMEX
  • General Miguel A. Godinez Bravo, Chief of Staff, Pres. Gen. Staff
  • Rafael Izquierdo, Advisor to the President
  • Jose Antonio Ugarte, Advisor to the President
  • Dr. Robert Casillas Hernandez, Private Secretary to the President
  • Rosa Luz Alegria, Under Secretary for National Planning and Budget
  • Andres Rozental Gutman, Director General of North American Affairs, Secretariat of Foreign Relations
  • Hugo Margain, Mexican Ambassador to the United States
  • Jose Ramon Lopez Portillo, Director of Analysis, Secretariat of Programing and Budget
  • Abel Garrido, Director of Bilateral Trade Relations, Ministry of Commerce

President Carter opened the meeting by saying he was delighted, pleased, and honored to meet again with President Lopez Portillo in the White House. Lopez Portillo thanked him. President Carter suggested that they take up bilateral issues at this meeting and international issues on the next day. Lopez Portillo agreed. (C)

The President said he had read President Lopez Portillo’s speech to the United Nations.² He understood it had been well received. It was beautiful in tone and language. Energy was indeed a key problem. If you would permit me, he said, I would like to comment on it before the American people in my toast this evening.³ Lopez Portillo smiled and nodded. (C)

President Carter said that he was pleased that our negotiators had reached a tentative agreement on natural gas sales, which he hoped would soon be final. It could be a precursor of other agreements. President Carter thanked Lopez Portillo for his agreement and his patience. President Lopez Portillo acknowledged this remark with a smile.⁴ (C)

President Carter invited Lopez Portillo to open the discussion. He would then respond and a general discussion could follow. Lopez Portillo thanked the President and said the structure for the two-day discussion was fine. (C)

Lopez Portillo thanked the President for the kind words about his speech. He said he wanted his concepts to be interesting and useful. He would like to repeat the themes of his speech at some point during the discussions. Energy was a bilateral and a multilateral affair and we could discuss it either Friday or Saturday. (C)

With regard to bilateral questions, President Lopez Portillo said that the Consultative Mechanism and its subgroups had made good headway on some issues. On others, studies were underway and conclusions pending. (C)

Lopez Portillo said the two countries had made substantial progress with regard to gas. There had been some misunderstandings. What was important to him was the principle on which our dealings would be based. We now had a permanent basis and it was worth the long discussion. Now we had established a principle and had a pattern to follow in our negotiations. He was happy with the outcome. It gave us a structure that can be taken to any other field. (C)

President Lopez Portillo said he might begin by talking of undocumented workers. He understood that groups in each country were gathering information. Once these data were complete we would be able to draw conclusions from them. In the meantime, some things upset us, Lopez Portillo said. With all due respect, he would like to bring them up and leave them for your consideration. Both in Mexico and New York he had met with Chicanos and they had brought some concerns to him.⁵ These issues were not in his competence and perhaps he didn’t have the right to bring them up, but he had promised to do so. The Chicanos were preoccupied over changes in Federal laws that would withdraw Federal assistance and support from undocumented workers. They believed, and they were right, that such withdrawals would be inconvenient. They were concerned that such changes might be applied across the country. With all respect, he wanted to share this issue, and would appreciate it if it were considered in some detail. (C)

In due time, said Lopez Portillo, our Foreign Ministers could give us a summary of the progress that had been made in the Consultative Mechanism. It was our political will that led to its creation. He did not want to bore the President with detailed statements of all the work of the Mechanism, but he would comment on some issues. There were commercial and monetary aspects, and we have a way of dealing with them. On financial relations we had reached some of our best moments, with regard to both the government and the private sector. Trade matters were brought up, energy had been mentioned. In general we were following the right road. We could ask our collaborators to give us a summary of progress. Should Secretary Vance or Castaneda comment first? He suggested that Castaneda speak. President Carter agreed. (C)

But first, said President Carter, he would respond briefly to Lopez Portillo’s comments. The President said that he had met frequently with Chicano groups. In fact, he and his wife had recently lunched with the head of LULAC.⁶ He had listened carefully to their expressions of concern. After the February meeting in Mexico he had sent a letter to the Governors and had also instructed Heads of Federal Departments and Agencies to be mindful of the human rights of undocumented workers.⁷ He had instructed them to administer existing laws with sensitivity to the civil rights of undocumented persons and to interpret the laws in a generous fashion. But he would look into this further to see if there were some aspect that needed further attention. He would ensure that Chicanos were able to contact him directly so that Lopez Portillo would not have to bear this burden. (C)

Secretary Castaneda then began to present a summary of the work of the Consultative Mechanism. In February, the Presidents had agreed to restructure the mechanism.⁸ There were now eight groups. The Mechanism had been strengthened. Its report to the Presidents showed that progress had been made. Rather than reading that document in detail. . .

President Carter interrupted to say that he had read it that morning.⁹ There were items or problems they might be worked on by the two Secretaries or by him and Lopez Portillo: could we accelerate this meeting by referring issues to the two Secretaries, he asked. (C)

Secretary Castaneda began his review of the Consultative Mechanism report with the subject of undocumented workers. He said the Mechanism had agreed that the two countries would be better able to agree on how to treat this important matter when data on the magnitude and the nature of the problem had been assembled. Data were being collected on the number of crossings and the contributions which migrants made to the American economy, including their salaries. Data would be worked out before negotiations commenced between the two countries. We needed details; then we could deal jointly with this issue. Castaneda referred to the creation of the Select Commission on Migration and said that it was due to report in 1981.¹⁰ President Carter said that it would report to him and to the Congress. Castaneda said he understood that legislative proposals would be based on its report. The President said yes. (C)

Castaneda said Mexico had mounted a gigantic effort. Its Department of Labor and Welfare had a survey in hand of 56,000 Mexican families. The survey had not yet been completed, but would be next year. It would be an excellent basis on which to understand the real problem. (C)

President Carter said that if the American people, including Hispanic people, and the Congress, used data from the Mexican survey it would make the acceptance of legislative proposals more likely on the Hill. There had been some doubt about the closeness of our consultations on this point in the past. An open door and cooperation on data and information would help us resolve the problem. The public and Congress should know that we are cooperating. (C)

President Carter said we recognized the importance of this issue. We are not putting the full responsibility on the Commission. He, the Secretary of State, and the Vice President were directly involved in finding solutions. It would be a great achievement if we could resolve it satisfactorily for the people and countries affected. It was an important theme. We welcomed frank and forceful discussions. You need not be reticent in putting forth your views. We would not be reticent in expressing ours. The more honest we were, the more likely that solutions would be found. He appreciated President Lopez Portillo’s willingness to share views. Exchanges would help us achieve legislation. (C)

Castaneda said the two groups had met recently with the objective of making the information more trustworthy. They had achieved good results. Consultations were helpful. The Secretary of Labor wanted the type of legislation that would help both countries. There was great concern over the withdrawal of Federal funds for assistance, medical care, and education to undocumented workers. This issue was connected with human rights. (C)

On energy, Castaneda said that there had been an agreement on gas. It was well received and he was well satisfied. Mexico sold 500,000 b/d of crude petroleum to the United States, 80% of their crude oil exports. Sales of electric energy were promising across the California and Texas borders, particularly in the San Diego area. There was a possibility of selling electrical energy generated through geothermal facilities. This could take place by 1983. (C)

President Carter said this was all very encouraging. There was no need, he said, to repeat our frequent statements that how Mexico develops and sells its energy was your decision. We wanted to be reliable customers and good trade partners, that was our goal. Mutual analysis of energy programs had good prospects. He and his government had expressed their willingness to explore new ways to sell energy across the border. (C)

President Carter said he was also eager to solve other trade problems. With the appointment of Governor Askew, he expected these matters to be taken up promptly. He believed that the tomato issue could be solved.¹¹ Other agricultural problems and other products could be helped by the Consultative Mechanism. For example, Secretary Miller would soon meet with his counterpart on tax and monetary matters. (C)

President Carter said that the prisoner exchange program had posed some problems. He cited the case of a Connecticut court decision where a release of prisoners had occurred, against the Administration’s wishes.¹² He said that the Attorney General felt we could win that case on appeal. He didn’t want to see the prisoner exchange program endangered. The United States was seeking similar agreements with other countries. It was a good program that had been satisfactory to both sides.

President Carter suggested that Secretaries Vance and Castaneda seek an agreement on fisheries and report tomorrow. This matter affected us and other countries and we wanted to progress on it.¹³ (C)

Tourism and air travel and the new processing center at Otay Mesa were all important issues. He was determined to expedite the processing center. (C)

The President also referred to a number of Americans who had been held in Mexican jails for more than a year without trial or sentence. This had created a disturbance in the U.S. Congress. Perhaps President Lopez Portillo could look into this matter and let us know if there were a problem. (C)

President Carter said that Governor Askew was from a State that is related to the tomato question.¹⁴ He had a special interest in resolving this matter (laughter). (C)

Lopez Portillo said that the Mexican government was preoccupied by the issue that had arisen because of a sentence passed by Connecticut courts. That sentence broke the principle of the Prisoner Exchange Treaty itself. He understood that it was a local decision. He said we would be very grateful for your efforts to respect the terms of the treaty as it was signed. This was important as it involved a matter of principle. (C)

President Lopez Portillo said that he was greatly concerned over the problem, which President Carter had just raised, of Americans that had been held in Mexico for more than one year. He would instruct his staff to look into this matter and he would take the necessary decisions. (C)

President Carter said that the U.S. government would appeal the Connecticut decision to the Federal District Court and, if necessary, to the Supreme Court. The Attorney General believed we had a case and that we would win. If not, we would seek a legislative remedy. We share your concern. (In a side conversation with President Carter, Secretary Vance informed him that he would give a list of American prisoners to Secretary Castaneda in the afternoon.) President Carter informed Lopez Portillo that Secretary Vance would give to the Mexican government a list of alleged cases where prisoners had been in jail too long. He had known that President Lopez Portillo would be concerned, he said. Sometimes our laws were not administered as we intend. A resolution of this problem would alleviate an issue for us.

President Carter said he was pleased with the joint work on farming of arid lands. He considered this work to be of great benefit to our countries. Lopez Portillo said we were very interested in that subject. It was one of the more interesting prospects that we have before us. Much of the productivity of our land is in natural rainfall areas and in semi-arid lands. President Carter said that we had a lot of land with the same possibilities. (C)

President Carter hoped that we could conduct our bilateral relations through the Consultative Mechanism. (C)

President Carter said that he was very interested in Lopez Portillo’s energy plan and he suggested that he discuss it.¹⁵ (C)

President Lopez Portillo said he would like to underline two things. The problem was that we were in transition between two eras. If this were so we must face other problems. Give or take a decade, in forty years, he said, petroleum would no longer be the principal energy source for the human race. Humanity was moving at an accelerated pace. The stone age had lasted thousands of years, the iron age much less, the petroleum age might last no more than 100 years. We were living at the end of an era. His first appeal was that we understand this situation. Our generation would witness the end of the petroleum era. The objectives of our energy plans should be clear: to prepare the transition from one era to another and to introduce the use of other resources. In this transition we must explore, conserve, produce and rationalize use of petroleum. We must use it in a more satisfactory manner. By doing this we would be able to make the change to the next era. (C)

A universal body should prepare the substance of the solution of the energy issue. This in itself required a strategy. That was the thrust of his proposal to the United Nations General Assembly: to plan the transition between two eras, to lay out a program, to establish a Working Group which would encompass the industrialized countries of both East and West, oil exporters, and the oil consuming developing countries. Mexico had consulted with all these groups and was ready, in general, to sit around the table and discuss this. If we were to establish this group we could take up both broad and narrow issues. The Working Group could make proposals that could be studied and considered by others. (C)

The energy problem affected the entire world. Lopez Portillo was especially concerned with the situation of developing countries. Rich countries could find substitutes for petroleum. They had the ways and means to do so. Developing countries had no such possibilities. He always gave two specific examples that moved him, he said: Costa Rica and Jamaica. Both had democratic governments, very respectable democratic governments. Their problem was that more and more of their GNPs was devoted to the purchase of oil. He had met President Carrazo of Costa Rica before the oil price rise. At that time 27% of Costa Rica’s GNP was used to buy oil. Perhaps it was 30% now. This caused him great anxiety. Costa Rican democracy was running a great risk because of this problem. A similar reflection, not so dramatic perhaps, was made by Manley at the Non-Aligned Movement meeting in Cuba. That was why, while proposing long term measures of transition, he also sought immediate solutions. Developing countries said that they were not interested in the long term. What were we going to do in the short term? (C)

One of his great concerns, he said, and Mexico was a potential oil producer, was to look for ways out for these countries, not for tomorrow but for today. And this must include supply, prices and conditions of purchase, avoidance of speculation, and a mechanism to transfer real resources to the developing countries. That was why he had proposed a fund, or several funds, which would finance the long-term and the anxiety-creating problems of developing countries that import oil. The oil exporters should recognize that we had a special commitment to them. (C)

This had been set out in general terms. He would give an example of what he meant by rationalization of the management of oil while we enjoyed that product. Between Mexico and Guatemala flowed the Usumacinta River. It was the largest river in Central America and could generate a great deal of electric power. To do this we needed funding, equipment and a political agreement because the lands threatened by the dam would be Guatemalan. We had not yet reached an agreement with Guatemala that would provide power to all Central America. Under his proposal the global community would make it necessary to come to an agreement, said Lopez Portillo. It was not right not to use potentially available electricity. It was a case of what he meant by rationalization, that is, the use of a parallel source of energy. This project could solve the energy problems of Mexico and Central America and would make it possible to save oil. (C)

Lopez Portillo said that if we explored in each country in the world, we would discover sources that had not been tapped because of a lack of funds, technology, or equipment. It should be possible to organize mankind in such a way that energy was wisely used. The only substitute today for oil is the oil we discover tomorrow. It was our responsibility to discuss this problem. (C)

The developed countries only wanted to discuss the price of oil in their conversations with oil exporters, as if this were the only issue between them, said Lopez Portillo. The exporters would not discuss this point in isolation from others. They wanted to discuss the entire economic order. That was where things stood. In the meantime other things were happening. If we reflect on this impasse, it was not a matter of principle but of methodology. We should agree on methods. President Carter nodded his agreement. President Lopez Portillo said that he believed that his method was appropriate. We had determined that energy, not only oil but alternative sources, was the principal problem of mankind. We should determine long-term and short-term solutions. He believed that with political will we would be able to make the best use of the world’s last oil opportunity. (C)

Disorder could not continue, said Lopez Portillo. Either we put order into the situation or else it would be imposed on us by the party that won the struggle, which itself would consume energy. Order would come in one way or another. He believed that the rational way was best. (C)

President Carter said that Secretary Duncan, the State Department, and the National Security Council Staff were studying the proposal and its bilateral and multilateral aspects. He asked Secretary Duncan and Henry Owen to report to him tomorrow.¹⁶ He said he had thought it would be useful to hear the remarks of President Lopez Portillo so that we could prepare our response overnight. (C)

President Carter said that he looked forward to seeing President Lopez Portillo that evening. Tomorrow they could discuss international issues and meet alone as well. President Carter said that the American people had been excited about the visit and were hopeful of beneficial results. He knew he shared a desire not to disappoint them. (C)

Lopez Portillo thanked him and said he looked forward to the meeting tomorrow with great pleasure. (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron, Box 30, Mexico, 10–12/79. Confidential. Drafted by Erb on October 3. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room. Lopez Portillo visited Washington September 28–29.
2. In telegram 4012 from USUN, September 27, the Mission transmitted the text of Lopez Portillo’s speech. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790443–0483)
3. For the toasts of the two Presidents at the State Dinner, see Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, pp. 1781–1784.
4. In telegram 16281 from Mexico City, September 20, the Embassy reported that the Mexican and U.S. Governments had reached an understanding on a framework for the sale of 300 thousand cubic feet per day of natural gas by PEMEX to U.S. purchasers, with an initial price of $3.625 per million BTU as of January 1, 1980. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790175–2419) For the September 21 U.S.-Mexican announcement of the agreement, see Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, pp. 1703–1704.
5. In telegram 10008 from Mexico City, June 16, 1978, the Embassy reported that a group of Chicanos held a press conference in New York and planned to meet with Lopez Portillo. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780257–0139)
6. President and Mrs. Carter had lunch with Ruben Bonilla, National President of LULAC, on August 5. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)
7. The letter to State Governors, dated May 4, is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, pp. 806–807.
8. The February 16 joint communiqué includes language on strengthening the Consultative Mechanism and calls for recommendations in 4 months on “ways the mechanism can more effectively solve problems.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book I, p. 288) On June 22, Carter appointed Robert Krueger as Special Coordinator for Mexican Affairs and U.S. Executive Director of the Consultative Mechanism. (Ibid., pp. 1134–1135)
9. A U.S.-approved draft of the report is in telegram 247691 to Mexico City, September 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790431–0565)
10. The Select Commission issued its report on March 1, 1981.
11. In telegram 9175 from Mexico City, June 2, the Embassy reported that Mexican officials refused to consider an agreement on the sale of Mexican tomatoes in the United States. U.S. farmers had accused Mexican farmers of “dumping” their vegetables in American markets. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790250–0274) Carter nominated Askew to be U.S. Trade Representative in August. Askew took office in October.
12. In an October 20 memorandum to Brzezinski, Tarnoff stated that the U.S. District Court for Connecticut released three prisoners transferred from Mexico, on the justification that the prisoners had not consented to the transfer. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790165–2035) In January 1980, the extradition treaty with Mexico that included narcotics offenses entered into force. (31 UST 5059; TIAS 9656)
13. In his October 20 memorandum to Brzezinski, Tarnoff stated that Vance and Castaneda met on September 28 regarding the tuna negotiations and planned to hold another round of talks on October 30 and October 31 in San Diego. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P790165–2035)
14. Askew was the former Governor of Florida.
15. In his address to the UN General Assembly (see footnote 2 above), Lopez Portillo proposed a “World Energy Plan.”
16. No record of this report has been found.