111. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officer for Latin America (Davis) to Director of Central Intelligence Turner and the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Carlucci)1
SUBJECT
- Mini-SCC Meeting on Cuba, 3 July 1980
This follow-up to the meetings of 30 June and 1 July continued the process of refining US options for preventing the movement of Cuban refugees to the US on large “mother ships”, such as the “Blue Fire”.
• Paragraphs 1–3 present some background on White House definition of the problem.
• Paragraphs 4–6 describe some of the diplomatic initiatives to force Castro to desist.
[Page 242]• Paragraphs 7–10 describe the military measures under consideration.
• Paragraphs 11–14 address the implications for the CIA.
The Problem
1. It is assumed—probably correctly—that the Castro regime intends to use the “Blue Fire” and other ships of like size obtained by Cuban-Americans as a means for ferrying large numbers of refugees to the US at a time. This is in response to the fact that the Coast Guard has very largely shut off the movement of small boats from the US to Mariel.
2. There is no evidence that the “Blue Fire” is being loaded, perhaps because of yesterday’s representation by the Panamanian government that the ship is under Panamanian registry and it does not want Cuba to use it as a ferry to the US.2 If the Cuban intention had been to have the boat arrive in the US as a “July 4 present”, this timetable has been thwarted. But the Cuban strategy of using relatively large ships as ferries remains a threat to the US.
3. The White House defines such a Cuban policy as an aggressive act against US sovereignty, specifically our immigration policy. Dr. Brzezinski has described it as “an invasion of the US”. The President wants it stopped—by diplomatic measures if possible; apparently, by military measures if necessary.
Diplomatic Measures
4. The US has made a closely-held diplomatic approach to Cuba for bilateral discussions on refugees.3 The Cubans have refused to discuss the refugees unless the US also discusses revision of the Guantanamo treaty. The President considers this linkage as blackmail and it has been rejected.
5. Secretary Muskie has sent a strongly-worded message to the Cubans stating that the US views the use of ships such as the “Blue Fire” as intolerable. The message stopped short of threatening the use of force. But the signal of possible use of force is being made through the deployment of additional USN ships in the Florida Straits. The message was to be delivered by Wayne Smith at 1330 on 3 July.4 [1½ lines not declassified]
6. Among the other diplomatic moves under consideration:
[Page 243]—A second message from Secretary Muskie, this time threatening the use of force.
—A message from the FRG to the Soviets for the latter to bring pressure on Havana.
—Approaches to NATO and to the UN on the Cuban threat to peace.
Military Moves
7. The Coast Guard and DOD insist that there is no way to stop overloaded ships in international waters, without near certainty of large numbers of refugee casualties.
8. Two military alternatives are being considered to stop the “mother ships” (see Coast Guard options paper, attached).5
—US military personnel board a “mother ship” at sea, sail it onto Cuban atolls, and disable it there.
—The US establishes a blockade three miles off the Cuban shore, initially off Mariel, and interdicts suspected “mother ships” from reaching Cuba to onload refugees.
9. DOD and Coast Guard believe that either of these measures is likely to draw a military response from Cuba. DOD in particular (Kramer of ISA) showed lack of relish for these actions. Both ISA and JCS representatives requested time to build up US forces in the area.
10. Coast Guard and DOD were tasked with refining these plans and developing the cost estimates for effecting them.
Implications for CIA
11. There almost certainly will be additional meetings on the subject, possibly cabinet-level meetings.6
[1 paragraph (1½ lines) not declassified]
[1 paragraph (1½ lines) not declassified]
[1 paragraph (1½ lines) not declassified]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 16, Folder 16: (SCC) Cuba. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Turner initialed the memorandum on July 17.↩
- In telegram 176862 to Havana, July 4, the Department reported on the July 3 statement by the Panamanian Government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800322–0257)↩
- See Document 108.↩
- See Document 112.↩
- Dated July 2; attached but not printed.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 110.↩