109. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Halting More Cuban Refugees
David Aaron and Gene Eidenberg chaired a special Situation Room meeting on a report that there is a large vessel in Mariel Harbor in Cuba ready to bring up to 2,000 refugees to the States, possibly July 4. This vessel is unique in that it is not American but formerly British and now stateless. The Coast Guard and the other agencies represented are deeply concerned that if this vessel is permitted to land in the United States, there will be another wave of Cuban immigrants on such stateless vessels which number in the dozens in the Caribbean.
As a first step, we are contacting the British to see if they will tell the Cubans that the vessel is still legally British and that it should not be loaded with refugees to go to the United States. We don’t know if this will have any effect.
Everybody agreed that the key is to prevent the ship from arriving in the United States but that to do so will require either the use or threat of force. However, they further agreed that we do not wish to use force against the refugees themselves. With these two points in mind, the group discussed a wide range of options and developed the following concept for possible consideration:
—The Coast Guard would halt the vessel as it emerges from the Cuban 12-mile limit, turn the ship around and escort it back into Cuban territorial waters close enough to shore so that it can be anchored.
—The Cuban Government would then be told that it is responsible for the ship which is anchored in its own territorial waters.
—The Cuban Government would also be told if it takes hostile action against the Coast Guard ship escorting the stateless ship, the United States would retaliate.
—This operation would be accompanied by a show of U.S. navy and air power.
The purpose of this action would be to place the responsibility on the Cubans for initiating any use of force. However, it should be recognized that while boarding the vessel could probably take place [Page 238] without incident, disabling it could result in violence, although the Coast Guard would seek to do it surreptitiously.
There are obvious risks in any such operation. It could lead to a serious military confrontation or clash with the Cubans. However, without such a step, it is likely that the Cubans will find ways, such as using stateless ships, to continue sending large numbers of Cubans to the United States.
I recommend that this alternative be given high-level consideration tomorrow in an SCC meeting in which we would get the judgements of your senior advisors on the risks and desirability of attempting such a response.
RECOMMENDATION
That you get the advice of an SCC on this option.2
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 14, Cuba, 6/80. Secret; Sensitive. Carter wrote “Zbig” at the top of the page.↩
- Carter checked the approve option, initialed, and wrote at the bottom of the page, “Advise me today—We should move early & publicly to prevent the confrontation, but face it if it comes—J”↩