102. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter1

SUBJECT

  • Mini-SCC on the Cuban Refugee Issue (U)

David Aaron chaired a Mini-SCC meeting on Wednesday, April 30, 1980, to discuss an international strategy for dealing with the Cuban refugee problem.2 The group approved press guidance to be used in announcing the transformation of Solid Shield 80 to a humanitarian rescue mission to deal with the crisis caused by the irresponsibility of the Cuban government.3 The Pentagon already released a statement on the subject yesterday. (Tab A).4 (S)

In addition, the group reviewed a six-part strategy for maximizing international pressure on the Castro regime, and for seeking an international solution to the problem, perhaps through an international conference. (S)

1. International Conference. We will send an urgent message to President Carazo5 of Costa Rica, informing him of the change in the Solid Shield Exercise, and asking if he would call an international conference (perhaps including those nations which have already pledged to take Cuban refugees) to fashion an international response to the crisis caused by Castro.6 At the minimum, the conference ought to aim for a resolution, perhaps modeled on the Andean Pact Resolution, clearly fixing responsibility for this crisis on Castro. In addition, the conference could: (a) deal with the numerous problems created by Cuba, and manifested in the refugee problem; (b) encourage the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to investigate charges of human rights violations [Page 223] in Cuba and against the Cuban refugees; and (c) establish a five-nation planning group to consider negotiations with Cuba. (We will try to keep the conference secret until we can be assured it will be launched.)7 (S)

2. Human Rights Violations. The Mini-SCC agreed to informally contact the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to see whether they might be interested in interviewing several of the Cuban refugees who have charged the Cuban government with physically abusing them when they were trying to leave. This approach and the IAHRC visit would be in a very low-key manner.8 (S)

3. Public Affairs Program. An interagency group, including ICA, State, NSC, and DOD, will meet daily and provide guidance and direction for VOA programs on the Cuban issue. DOD will assign one PSYOPS to VOA to assist in getting the message out. In addition, the group will consider whether to broadcast a special extra one-hour program each day on the Cuban refugee issue, and whether to engage journalists in the Cuban/American community in such an operation.9 (S)

4. Naval Assistance for Rescue Missions. DOD and JCS will coordinate with the Coast Guard and report on how the naval vessels, which were supposed to have been assigned to Solid Shield, will be used in the rescue missions. The group considered whether to obtain the cooperation of other Latin governments in these missions, e.g., the Venezuelan navy, but rejected the idea as too difficult at this stage. DOD and State will work out the funding arrangements for these rescue missions.10 (S)

5. Reaching the Cuban/American Community. The group agreed that to obtain the cooperation of the Cuban/American community, we will [Page 224] need more carrots (related to the numbers we will accept) and more sticks (enforcement). Jack Watson will assume responsibility for our contacts with the community.11 (S)

6. Negotiations with Cuba. We are currently exploring with the Cuban government whether they might be interested in talking about the Cuban refugee issues, but the preference of the Mini-SCC would be to try to approach the Cubans within an international framework.12 (S)

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office, Country Chron File, Box 9, Cuba, 5–6/80. Secret. Sent for action. Gregg initialed for Brzezinski. Carter initialed at the top of the page. Attached is a covering memorandum from Pastor to Brzezinski.
  2. A discussion paper for the meeting is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800867–1669.
  3. For the White House statement issued on May 2, see the Department of State Bulletin, June 1980, p. 69.
  4. Attached but not printed. Carter underlined the phrase “released a statement” and wrote in the margin, “went well.”
  5. Carter underlined the words “President Carazo” and wrote in the left margin, “good response.”
  6. The Department transmitted the letter on May 1. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Box 105, 5/80)
  7. A conference held in San Jose, May 8–9, was attended by representatives from 20 nations. The nations pledged to “join their efforts in an international program for the resettlement of those wishing to leave Cuba and to offer material and financial support for the effort.” (Telegram 2596 from San Jose, May 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800229–0387)
  8. In the margin to the left of the paragraph, Carter wrote, “ok.”
  9. In the margin to the left of the paragraph, Carter wrote, “ok.”
  10. In the margin to the left of the paragraph, Carter wrote, “Probably needs minimal effort.”
  11. Carter underlined the words “Jack Watson” and wrote in the left margin, “good.” On May 14, President Carter spoke at length to reporters, announcing and explaining in detail the administration policy toward the Cuban refugees. See Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 912–914. The White House issued a statement later the same day. See ibid., pp. 914–916.
  12. In the margin to the left of the paragraph, Carter wrote, “changed For Pol breakfast.” See footnote 4, Document 105.