60. Telegram From the Embassy in China to the Department of State1
7014. Subj: Meeting With Sihanouk. Ref: State 258992
1. C–Entire Text.
2. I met with Prince Sihanouk October 4 at his residence to present the positions outlined in reftel. I also told him that I had hoped to see him immediately after the Mondale visit3 but that unfortunately he had left Beijing before I returned from Tokyo.
3. I said that I wanted to ensure that there was no misunderstanding between him and the U.S. Government regarding our position on the UN credentials issue. I outlined what had happened within the Credentials Committee and drew on Ambassador Petree’s statement for an explanation of why we had done what we had.4 I emphasized that the American vote was not given in support for the Pol Pot regime or its atrocious practices. However, if we had abstained within the Credentials Committee the Heng Samrin government would have been seated. I noted that U.S. policy was to support neither Heng Samrin nor Pol Pot. We called, instead, for withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Kampuchea in the context of an overall political settlement. We were certainly not acting within a PRC-ASEAN-Japanese bloc.
4. I also noted that Secretary Vance and Assistant Secretary Holbrooke had stated many times that the Prince could have a very constructive role in the solution of the Kampuchean problem.
5. It was unfortunate that political events would have to await the results of the offensive that was just now unfolding. No one was sure, I noted, how this would turn out and the U.S. was extremely concerned about famine in Kampuchea and the need for rapid relief. I said that we were doing all we could to try to alleviate the situation and that [Page 209] he could play an effective role in getting international pressure so that aid might flow unhampered to the Kampuchean people.
6. In response Sihanouk launched into a rather emotional criticism of our UN stand. He said that in referring to a Sino-U.S.-ASEAN bloc he only meant it appeared as if there was a de facto alliance between these groups within the UN to try to prevent the Heng Samrin government from being seated. Sihanouk said that he approved of the decision not to recommend the Heng Samrin government as the legitimate government of Kampuchea, but that on the other hand the Pol Pot regime was in no way either the government of the Kampuchean people. As a matter of fact, Sihanouk said, the Kampuchean people said that their number one enemy was the Pol Pot gang and the Vietnamese colonialists and Heng Samrin was only the “number two” enemy. Pol Pot was responsible for the genocide of millions of Khmer people. At least the Vietnamese despite their colonialist invasion of Kampuchea allowed the people to survive and did not try to kill them. People were dying of starvation but it was still not the same as the terror and genocide experienced under Pol Pot.
7. In view of the mass murders committed by Pol Pot Sihanouk said that he could not understand why some countries had been able to vote in favor of seating the DK delegation. The French had abstained and the Indians had said they wished to leave the seat vacant. It was less immoral, according to the Prince, to abstain. Frankly, seating the Pol Pot delegation was equivalent to saying that the United Nations despises its own Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In the West after the Nuremburg trials leading Nazis were hung. That was a moral act, the Prince said. Now this latest move favored the Asian Hitlerians. The West was tough on white Hitlers, said the Prince, but not so tough on yellow Hitlers. This was racism.
8. I told the Prince that I didn’t want to get into an argument with him over the issue but that we had thought the seating of the Heng Samrin people would give sanction to the invasion by the Vietnamese.
9. Sihanouk interjected that Kampuchea used to be a French colony but that they had gotten rid of the French peacefully. Now although they hoped for peaceful solution to the situation it was not realistic to expect one. The people of Kampuchea did not want a Vietnamese brand of Communism or a Chinese brand. Least of all did they want a Khmer government pushing the genocide of their own people.
10. Sihanouk then said he had something new he wished to discuss with me. He said that while in Pyongyang he had met with refugee representatives from the U.S., France, Belgium, Germany, Australia and Thailand. They wished to unite under Sihanouk’s exclusive leadership and had decided to establish a Khmer Nationalist Confederation. The Prince said that he had reached a common political program in [Page 210] discussion with these representatives. Although some of them had opposed his peaceful approach to the Khmer question, he had persuaded them to let him try to negotiate a solution with the SRV. He would open peace talks at a conference in either Pyongyang, Hanoi or Prague.
11. The Prince said he would propose summit talks in a little while to Pham Van Dong. He fully expected the SRV to reject this proposal. There would be no direct answer; they would let the world know through other means. If they answered him directly, it would be tantamount to a confession that they were guilty of colonialism and had assumed responsibility for the invasion. Also it would undermine Heng Samrin’s position and would show that he is merely a puppet. The Vietnamese would say that Sihanouk should go to Phnom Penh to talk to the only legal government of Kampuchea.
12. After the first rejection, Sihanouk said that he would try four more times over the next two months to show that he was a peace-loving leader. He said that if one day they were forced to make war on the Vietnamese it could be shown that he had done his best to get a peaceful solution. He thought that the dry season offensive would be successful because of the Vietnamese military strength. Ninety percent of Pol Pot’s forces would be destroyed. This would lessen SRV interest in talks with Sihanouk.
13. After his proposal had been rejected five times, as he fully expected it would be, Sihanouk said that he would be ready to go to war. He said that there were still many young Khmers who would rather die fighting the Vietnamese than continue as Vietnamese subjects. Small groups sponsored by the confederation could operate against the Vietnamese inside Kampuchea. Young men could be recruited from amongst the refugees in Thai camps. The Chinese and many others might be willing to fight and equip these forces.
14. According to the Khmer Constitution, Sihanouk said, if unable to defend against foreign aggression with its own resources Kampuchea could call for foreign assistance. Friendly volunteers could be asked to come just as Chinese volunteers had gone to Korea, Tanzanians to Uganda and the French to Chad, Zaire and Central Africa. The Prince said it was really very moral to interfere with internal affairs in this matter. This was a concept accepted by international tradition.
15. Sihanouk thought that the Chinese would be sure to support him even if he refused to cooperate with Pol Pot. He would not be the chairman of a united front with Pol Pot nor serve any so-called Democratic Kampuchean government. His forces, however, would not attack those of Pol Pot. He would instead create a second front. Accordingly, he thought that the Chinese would be willing to support him with money and military equipment. There would be a problem in [Page 211] getting his forces and their equipment to Kampuchea. There would have to be some help from Thailand. He said that he wanted to study with other countries, including the U.S., how to transport his forces through Thailand or by sea into Kampuchea.
16. I asked the Prince what he thought the chances were for cooperation with Kriangsak. He said that Kriangsak remained hostile to him because of long-time differences over the temple on the Thai-Kampuchea border.5 Sihanouk said that for his survival he needs help from Thailand, China and the U.S. The Khmers cannot be hostile towards Japan, ASEAN and other countries.
17. I asked him if he had any objection if I reported all of the above to the Department. He said that he had already given the story to the Washington Post and that he always hoped to maintain the best of relations with the U.S. press.
18. Finally, he said that he was short of money. He was not begging, but hoped to be able to sell his latest movie “Rose of Bokor”, in which he plays a Japanese army officer and Monique a Franco-Khmer beauty, to Japanese and American distributors. He invited me, our staff and the local American press corps to come view the film.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Far East, Box 13, 9–11/79. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis.↩
- Not found.↩
- Mondale traveled to China, Japan, and Hong Kong in late August and early September.↩
- Petree presented the argument that although the U.S. Government did not condone the human rights violations of the Pol Pot regime, the Vietnamese-imposed government of Kampuchea had no more legitimate claim. See Bernard D. Nossiter, “U.N. Assembly, Rebuffing Soviet, Seats Cambodia Regime of Pol Pot,” New York Times, September 22, 1979, p. 1. The United States voted in favor of General Assembly Resolution 34/2 A, adopted on September 21, which approved the seating of the Pol Pot regime. See Yearbook of the United Nations, 1979, pp. 291–293 and 302.↩
- Reference is to the Preah Vihear Temple. In June 1962, after a lengthy dispute between Thailand and Cambodia, the International Court of Justice ruled that the temple belonged to Cambodia.↩