59. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1

SR M 79–10125CX

SUBJECT

  • Vietnam’s Military Posture and Perceptions of Chinese threat [portion marking not declassified]

1. Over the past six months or so, Vietnam apparently has increased the number of combat troops in its ground forces from some 800,000 to well over one million, largely as a consequence of the Chinese invasion last February. In the northern part of the country, the Vietnamese have increased the number of mainline divisions from about 13 to at least 19 and perhaps as many as 28, apparently in anticipation of future Chinese military operations. Preliminary analysis suggests that many of these divisions are upgraded provincial units, but a few are regular force outfits withdrawn from Kampuchea. [2½ lines not declassified] [portion marking not declassified]

2. Recent intelligence reports indicate that the Vietnamese are augmenting their 21 or so divisions in Kampuchea with a few thousand more troops. This limited reinforcement could be the first indication that the Vietnamese are preparing to launch an offensive against Pol Pot’s forces in southwestern Kampuchea when the dry season begins in November. With Chinese material assistance and military pressure applied along their border with Vietnam, Pol Pot’s guerrillas are expected to survive this Vietnamese push and continue their fight into next year. Since last spring’s offensive against Pol Pot, most of the 150,000 or so Vietnamese troops still in Kampuchea have been involved in protecting major cities, towns, and ports, as well as attempting to keep open the rail lines and key road networks. Last week, Vietnamese forces helped the Heng Samrin government to reopen the deep water ports at Kompong Som and soon hope to renew rail service between Phnom Penh and Kampong Som. [portion marking not declassified]

3. In Laos the Vietnamese recently deployed an additional 1,000 troops to reinforce their nearly 40,000 combat troops already operating there. There is also from evidence that the Vietnamese have deployed some troops to positions along the Lao-Chinese frontier. [less than 1 line not declassified] the Vietnamese are now actively conducting reconnaissance against Chinese forces near the Sino-Lao border. In southern [Page 207] Laos, the Vietnamese are moving troops for the first time along the Lao-Kampuchean frontier—another possible indicator that Vietnam is preparing to move against Pol Pot. [portion marking not declassified]

4. The Vietnamese apparently are concerned about a second Chinese invasion later this year and have deployed their forces accordingly. In the past week, Vietnam has stepped up its public charges that China is conducting almost daily incursions into Vietnam and is positioning major forces along the border for use in another invasion. [less than 1 line not declassified] Vietnamese officials have confided that they expect a major Chinese thrust through Mon Cai and the coastal plain and secondary attacks through Laos and Lang Son. In anticipation of this invasion, Vietnamese forces are positioned all along the border and are believed to be deployed in considerable depth in the coastal plain. Although Chinese officials have begun to speak more openly of teaching Vietnam a second lesson, no major troop movements have been detected yet that would indicate that China is forming a major new invasion force.2 [portion marking not declassified]

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81M00919R: Executive Registry Subject Files (1977–1979), Box 12, Folder 31: C–309 East Asia. Secret; [handling restrictions not declassified]. A note on the first page indicates that this memorandum was prepared by Asian Branch, Regional Analysis Division, Office of Special Research.
  2. Telegram 238556 to all East Asian and Pacific posts, September 11, transmitted the text of a briefing memorandum from Holbrooke to Vance that discussed the possibility of a second Chinese attack on Vietnam. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Document 270.