58. Telegram From the Embassy in Laos to the Department of State1
640. For Holbrooke From Chargé. Subject: Objectives, 1979–1981: Indochina—a Policy of Differentiation.
1. (Secret–Entire text)
2. Summary: Building on a West German and Australian suggestion, I recommend we adopt a policy of differentiating between our treatment of the Lao and the Vietnamese. The objective is to hasten the day when the Vietnamese come to their senses and drop the policies which, as you pointed out to the Secretary, could lead to the disaster of a large war. We should try to help the Lao through the Mekong Committee,2 we should try to resolve our human rights differences with the LPDR, and we must do what we can to alter Lao misconceptions of the U.S. By doing so, we would try to show Hanoi that there is an advantageous alternative to what they are now doing. End Summary.
3. As my tour in Vientiane comes to an end, I can only say “amen” to your estimate that the principal strategic challenge we face in East Asia is the potential for regional instability created by the current Indochina situation. Failure here would indeed be disastrous, and I do not doubt that it could lead to a large war.
4. The fundamental problem is Hanoi. The SRV is an unlikely amalgam of military strength combined with economic and diplomatic weakness. Their formidable military machine is backed by a collapsed economy and an almost pathological inability to get along with most of their neighbors. Added to this strange mixture is perhaps the most dangerous ingredient of all: the Vietnamese leadership’s unshakeable belief in its own rectitude. They have the “correct line,” as they tell themselves and the world over and over again, and the proof they present is their conquest of South Viet Nam in 1975.
5. Coping with this self-righteous, militarily strong, but economically and diplomatically feeble nation in a region as weak and divided as Southeast Asia is a major challenge. Direct confrontation either by us or by the Chinese will not work. It only increases Hanoi’s self- [Page 203] righteous stubbornness, as we found out during the war. We must continue to stress this point in our contacts with the Chinese.
6. We must thus look for ways to hold firm, wear the SRV down, and wait for the day when the current Lao Dong leadership is gone. It is not unreasonable to expect that like the Chinese, the Vietnamese will ultimately come to realize that they have been left behind by the rest of the world, that they must “modernize,” and that they have not been following the “correct line” after all. Like the Chinese, they will probably never admit the latter, but what they will be doing will be obvious to all concerned.
7. The U.S. task must thus be to hold firm and do what we can to hasten the day when Viet Nam comes to its senses. I am therefore particularly attracted to the tactic recommended by both the West Germans (Vientiane 615)3 and Australia’s Nick Parkinson (Vientiane 0618).4 This is a policy of differentiating to as great an extent as possible between the way we treat the Lao and the way we treat the Vietnamese. The differentiation would be done in a way which would strengthen Thai-Lao ties as much as possible.
8. The object of this policy is to show Hanoi as quickly and as clearly as possible that their current policy line is hurting only themselves but that there is an alternative available. The policy would also hopefully open up at least this part of Indochina to the more open, more humane, and undoubtedly more sucessful forms of social, economic, and political organization found in Thailand. This could also have a beneficial effect on such short term problems as the refugee outflow from Laos.
9. There are real roadblocks to carrying out a Lao policy which is different from our policy toward Viet Nam. Direct aid is still against U.S. law, the LPDR is still so weak and incompetent that it is next to impossible to expect significant developmental results from U.S. aid. Lao human rights practices leave much to be desired. The Lao attitude toward the U.S. is still clouded by doctrinaire foolishness and war-formed misconceptions. On the other hand, we can work with the already existing differences between our relations with Laos and our relations with Viet Nam. Indirect aid to Laos is possible, and we have nearly normal diplomatic relations with the LPDR, and, as my Thai colleague recommended (Vientiane 602),5 we do not have to be in any [Page 204] hurry to make moves toward the Vietnamese which will remove these differences.
10. This is why I find the West German suggestion of working through the Mekong Committee so interesting. Mekong Committee aid, especially if it is handled through the US and has a substantial Thai component, might be considered indirect for purposes of our law. It helps strengthen the region, and it provides a mechanism which is accepted by the Lao and which might be able to circumvent some of the more serious Lao administrative and organizational weaknesses. Some of the Committee’s proposed projects could also have clear developmental benefits.
11. The human rights problem is a serious one. Drawing the Lao closer to the Thai can have a beneficial long-term effect, and in the short run, our pointed presentations to them on the Hmong gas issue (Vientiane 594, 595, and 616)6 will hopefully be helpful. I would hope that two moves in this area could be made: First, that either I or my successor be authorized to give the Lao what evidence we have on this problem, and second, that we do what we can to lay to rest the “genocide” canard. The LPDR’s campaign against the dissident Hmong is not particularly nice—no war is—but it is not directed against Hmong as a racial group and it is supported by many Hmong. Loose use of the “genocide” shibboleth weakens our real human rights case and interferes with broader policy aims.
12. We also need to continue to work on the Lao attitude toward the U.S. The objective must be first to convince the Lao and ultimately the Vietnamese that they are not following the “correct line” and that they can be better served by freer, more sensible, and more humane policies. We must thus be careful not to make differentiating moves toward the Lao which could serve to convince them and their Vietnamese patrons that they had worn us down and that we were now ready to support their disastrously inappropriate “new system” with all its potential for domestic and regional instability.
13. This is one reason I am sorry we seem to have decided to overlook an opportunity in connection with my departure (State 223219).7 As someone who is leaving, I was in a position to do things which my successor will probably find difficult to do for some time to come. I had hoped to be able to draw on the bank account of good [Page 205] will—or at least open mindedness—which the Embassy has been able to build up with the Lao over the last 21 months to try to bring them to see that their distorted view of the United States and their invective against us were inaccurate and hurt only themselves. I had orginally thought that such an effort would be worthwhile in and of itself, but after my conversations with the West German Ambassador and Parkinson I now see that a frank statement such as the one I had planned to make could have been a useful base on which to build a new policy of differentiation.
14. I think that many Lao were ready for such a message. I have in mind the repeated and almost plaintive remarks of Khamphay, Soubanh, Plantana, and Chanpheng8 that the LPDR was truly independent and only wanted to have good relations with all countries of the world (Vientiane 594 and 616). I also have in mind the amazingly frank comments about Lao-Vietnamese relations made to me by Planning Minister Ma (Vientiane 632).9 I had hoped to be able to deliver my message as part of a program which, after the message had sunk in and after the Lao had hopefully moderated their attitude toward us, would be followed up by a move to nominate my successor as Ambassador. This would be the first step in a policy of differentiation ultimately intended to have a beneficial and regionally stabilizing effect on Hanoi.
15. Regrets are a waste of time, and other opportunities will come along. As I leave Vientiane, I would hope that EA, Embassy Vientiane, and Mr. Moser will continue to look for ways in which we can capitalize on the extremely helpful West German and Australian suggestion. Fostering Thai-Lao links via the Mekong Committee under carefully prepared circumstances is a constructive do-able method of differentiating between the way we treat the Lao and the Vietnamese. It could serve our humanitarian and developmental interests while at the same time holding out some hope of avoiding the potential disaster in Indochina which you highlighted for the Secretary.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Far East, Box 13, 9–11/79. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis.↩
- Established by the United Nations in 1957, the Mekong Committee, composed of representatives from Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, convened to manage the resources of the Lower Mekong Basin. The Mekong Committee is now known as the Mekong River Commission.↩
- Telegram 615 from Vientiane, August 24, addressed West European support for Lao independence. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790389–0155)↩
- Telegram 618 from Vientiane, August 29, described Australian policy to encourage Lao independence. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790390–1226)↩
- Telegram 602 from Vientiane, August 22, outlined the Thai view on regional balance in Southeast Asia. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790384–0149)↩
- Telegrams 594 and 595, August 20, and telegram 616, August 27, all from Vientiane, described Roberts’s farewell calls on Lao officials, during which he raised the alleged use of chemical agents against Hmong refugees. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790379–0166, D79037–0253, and D73090–1160)↩
- Telegram 223219 to Vientiane, August 24, discussed the content of Roberts’s farewell speech. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790387–0988)↩
- Soubanh Sithilath, Secretary General of the Lao Foreign Ministry; Platana Choulamany, Lao Chief of Protocol; Chanpheng, Chief of the Lao Press Department.↩
- Telegram 632 from Vientiane, August 30, summarized Roberts’s meeting with Ma. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790400–0709)↩