57. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter1
SUBJECT
- Kampuchean Relief (U)
(S) As requested, the Joint Staff has prepared a plan for a one-time airdrop of supplies to needy refugees in western Kampuchea (Cambodia). Details are provided in the appendix and DIA assessment.2
(S) The plan envisages staging three USAF MC–130 Combat Talon aircraft (especially designed for sensitive operations) out of Utapao airbase. The concept would be to conduct a night drop of 30–36 tons per night for two or three nights, flying at low altitude to minimize the risk of enemy detection. This would provide a total drop of 70–100 tons—a total which could be increased by deployment of additional aircraft from CONUS or by conducting two flights per aircraft each night.
(S) DIA has identified several drop zones along the southwestern Thai-Kampuchean border which they believe would meet the objectives of the airdrop. They believe there are significant numbers of Cambodians in these areas, but cannot be precise about numbers. Drops in these [Page 201] locations would pose fewer risks of direct Vietnamese military counter-measures than would drops farther north where Vietnamese military forces are currently operating. In addition, since refugee concentrations are higher in the northwestern border area, DIA is continuing to search for alternative drop areas there which would avoid Vietnamese forces.
(S) While the Joint Staff assesses the military risks of this plan as minimal, such risks are not negligible, and they must be weighed against anticipated benefits. It is not at all clear that airdrops within a narrow zone (10nm) along the Thai-Cambodian border will substantially augment supplies already being provided at distribution points along the frontier. Given the logistic expenses of air drops, the same funds spent on more conventional relief efforts would probably provide more food in the mouths of the starving. More serious, I believe, is the danger that such an operation might be misconstrued by the SRV as an effort by the Thais with our connivance (or vice versa) to supply Pol Pot. In that case it might precipitate Vietnamese retaliation in Thailand; it would probably provoke strong criticism of U.S. actions from international relief agencies; and it might enable Hanoi to shift the focus of international attention away from their genocidal policies to allegations of U.S. intervention in Cambodia. Needless to add, loss of any aircraft would have significant intelligence and operational costs as well.
(S) These reservations notwithstanding, if a decision is reached to initiate such airdrops, we are prepared to commence the operation within 72 hours after an execute decision, assuming State can make the necessary arrangements for use of and delivery of foodstuffs to Utapao.