335. Telegram From the Embassy in the Philippines to the Department of State1
52. Department pass CINCPAC also for POLAD. Subject: Holbrooke Meeting With Defense Minister Enrile. Ref: Manila 0045.2
1. (C–Entire text.)
2. Summary: Defense Minister Enrile joined Assistant Secretary Holbrooke and Ambassador at residence for breakfast meeting Dec 31. Discussions were wide-ranging and frank on implications of terminating martial law and future of politics in the Philippines. Enrile recalled several occasions when Marcos had tried to name him in the line of succession in the event that President was unable continue and explained why he had resisted getting involved. Enrile presented image of a man completely loyal to his President. He claimed to be uninterested in remaining in politics after Marcos. End Summary.
3. Holbrooke outlined to Enrile accomplishments of and improvements in U.S.-Philippine relations over the past four years. Enrile replied that the relationship was indeed closer and agreed with Holbrooke’s assumption that relations with the new administration should be close. Enrile reacted with surprise to Holbrooke’s statement that the President had indicated in conversation the previous day that Enrile opposed the end of martial law. He then smiled and stated that he had opposed ending martial law only were it to be abandoned hastily. He asserted that for a long time he had favored its gradual disappearance. He touched on some problems attendant to its ending, just as the Marcoses had done (reftel), stemming from the fact that the people were used to the security that martial law provided them. Pursuing a theme of his recent public speeches, Enrile emphasized detrimental effects on national character should martial law be prolonged.
4. In answer to our questions, he said he did not believe the military would oppose the windup of martial law but his subsequent comments on this subject indicated his concern over the issue of the military in politics. Enrile observed that there could be problems. He said that in his current position he had come to know the military well and was aware of their predilection for quick solutions. He emphasized it was [Page 1080] important for the military not to have the “taste” of political authority for too long but maintained that the younger officers, who logically might be expected to form the nucleus for opposition to martial law’s termination, themselves argued for its conclusion. Enrile added that there were no prominent military figures with sufficient power or prestige to try to seize power—largely as the result of the President’s deliberate rotation of command and balancing of the forces.
5. Asked what he viewed as the most significant achievement of martial law, Enrile stated that he thought people would henceforth value more highly their exercise of freedom and democracy as they reflected on the martial law period. They would realize that abuse of these rights would lead to reimposition of martial law or utilization of Presidential emergency powers. He did not try to estimate, however, how long he thought this moderating or tempering realization would act on the occasionally volatile Filipino political temperment. Enrile said he believed from his talks with various groups that there would be some “testing” of the limits of political activity once martial law is dropped. He saw the students as a greater potential danger in this regard than labor, whose leaders he has already cautioned not to overstep what he implied were understood limits. He was optimistic that the students would be more restrained than they were in the last year just prior to martial law.
6. His general comments on opposition leadership produced no new insights but he did single out several younger politicians who might play more prominent roles in the future. He cited in this regard Mayor Pimentel of Cagayan de Oro and Governer Homobono Adaza of Misamis Oriental Province as well as Reuben Canoy (Mindanao Alliance) and former Minister of Information “Kit” Tatad. Enrile said that Aquino would have to come back to the Philippines fairly soon or face loss of his political influence. He revealed that he had advised the President not to grant Aquino amnesty when he first departed for abroad, but to save that step for his return. He also said that Aquino suffered from a lack of direction at this point and predicted that he probably would be willing to join the President, if he could figure out an acceptable formula.
7. Contrary to Marcos’ stress on foreign Communist involvement in the labor movement in the Philippines, Enrile stated that there was no activity by the Chinese and relatively little Soviet subversive activity, and that only in connection with the NPA. Even with the NPA his estimate of the level of Soviet financial support—dols 100,000 annually—he noted hardly amounted to a major Soviet effort. Enrile asserted that there is a special Moscow funding arrangement being handled through a Tokyo bank to support the NPA. He felt it would be difficult to prove the connection but stated the government was watching the [Page 1081] situation closely. He indicated, asking this be closely held, that there was evidence to link [less than 1 line not declassified] with the Moscow payment scheme. For this reason [name not declassified] had been denied permission to travel abroad earlier in the year.
8. Enrile predicted that economic issues would prove more unsettling to the GOP than the ending of martial law. He mentioned the difficulties caused by the slump in world market price of coconut oil but said that he felt the price support levels would continue to be manageable. Sugar, on the other hand, Enrile described as improperly managed since an artificially low price was being offered while the international price was rising.
9. Enrile indicated that he was uncertain how a legitimate opposition could be mobilized since many bright leaders would automatically be attracted to the President’s party because of its ability to provide money and influence. (He noted some IBP members were now proposing adoption of the U.S. system of government financial assistance to election campaigns.) He said he has favored the idea of legalizing the Communist Party but retreated from this position when we pointed out that the Communists would have to agree first to abandon their weapons and that they were not likely to consent to do so.
10. Succession: Enrile talked at some length of the President’s longstanding concern about the problem of succession and asserted that there is considerable discussion going on about how to create a proper structure. He recalled that as far back as 1971, prior to the imposition of martial law, the President had signed a document designating Enrile as Deputy Commander in Chief, effectively giving Enrile authority to take over should anything happen to Marcos while martial law was being instituted. Enrile subsequently returned the paper to the President telling him that he did not wish to be involved further in the issue of succession. In 1973, the President again approached Enrile to discuss the question of succession. Enrile declared that he told the President he did not want to assume any responsibility for succession arrangements because of the political intrigue which would engulf him if it became known he was to play a role. He stated, however, that if he were still in a position to be of service to the President at such time as the President might be incapacitated, he would carry out whatever succession order Marcos had signed and left with Mrs. Marcos. A year later in Malacanang, Marcos again approached Enrile but Enrile stuck to his earlier position.
11. At present, Enrile said the Cabinet is considering a number of possibilities about the succession structure and examining various models. Enrile mentioned that there could be a Vice President who would be concurrently speaker of the Assembly rather than a Deputy Premier, particularly if the Constitution is revised to give the President [Page 1082] more than ceremonial powers. Enrile seemed to retreat from this idea when Holbrooke questioned its applicability. Nonetheless, Enrile did appear interested in the possibilities of a system along the lines of the French Fifth Republic.
12. Questioned about Mrs. Marcos’ opportunities and abilities to succeed the President, Enrile remarked that it might be possible for her to do so, particularly because she now had a widespread network of supporters. He believed the people generally looked at the President and the First Lady “separately” and that she had her own following. He noted the President’s own favorite description of Mrs. Marcos as his “secret weapon.” However, Enrile would not commit himself as to whether or not Mrs. Marcos could long hold onto power and did not seem to give her much chance for succeeding in her quest. He stated that many would be unwilling to see a woman in the top leadership position in the Philippines. At the same time he acknowledged her ambition saying that he thought she wanted to be like Mrs. Bandaranaike3 and said that it was her unwillingness to consider the appointment of someone other than herself as Deputy Premier that was restraining the President from filling this position.
13. On his own ambitions and interests, Enrile was as always self-effacing. He indicated that he would probably run again for the Assembly in 1984 but he would do so only in connection with his service to the President. Aside from his aforementioned commitment to carry out any written succession formula of the President, Enrile stated that he did not want to continue in politics in a post-Marcos era. Noting that he was already 57, Enrile remarked that what he would really like to do is read law for about two years at Harvard and then go back to being a lawyer.
14. Comment: These past few months we have noted a reawakening of Enrile’s interest in his job as Defense Minister and in Philippine politics generally. This meeting confirmed such a trend. We therefore take with more than a grain of salt his denials of any interest in his own political future, if the President should pass from the scene. He was unusually frank about the long-standing problem of succession and Mrs. Marcos’ ambition. Yet all in all we did not detect a clear decision of what he wants for himself in terms of future political power. He has served Marcos loyally for many years and undoubtedly intends to continue to do so. He will probably continue to try to avoid getting caught up in the buzz saw of succession politics.
[Page 1083]15. Note: Enrile has previously spoken of Soviet assistance to the PKP, the Moscow oriented Philippine Communist Party, but never about Soviet aid to the NPA.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 64, Philippines, 1/80–1/81. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that was received in the White House Situation Room.↩
- In telegram 45 from Manila, January 2, the Embassy summarized Holbrooke’s meeting with the Marcoses. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D820298–0545)↩
- Sirimavo Bandaranaike, Prime Minister of Ceylon and Sri Lanka from 1960 until 1965, and again from 1970 until 1977.↩