278. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in New Zealand, Australia, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan, and Malaysia1
174008. Subject: Secretary’s Meeting With New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Talboys.
1. (C–Entire text).
2. Secretary Muskie met with New Zealand Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Talboys in Minister Talboy’s suite on June 28. The discussion focused entirely on recent developments in Southeast Asia, particularly the implications of the June 23 Vietnamese attack inside Thailand.2
3. Foreign Minister Talboys opened the conversation by noting that UNHCR had stopped the voluntary repatriation of Khmer refugees and, according to Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi, the FAO had stopped distributing food in Phnom Penh. Secretary Muskie added that food shipments across the border were also halted because two civilian [Page 916] workers had been captured. More disturbingly, he said, there were indications that the Vietnamese are moving barbed wire to the border and may try to seal it. Minister Talboys said that Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi yesterday told him that the Vietnamese probably did not intend to stop the refugee flow. Secretary Muskie reiterated that several signs point to the conclusion that the Vietnamese were in fact positioning themselves to seal the border and recounted how quickly the Berlin Wall was constructed.
4. Talboys said that Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi had also spoken of the possibility of Sihanouk joining the DK coalition. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke noted that indirect reports from Korea suggest that Sihanouk is confused and in despair. The significant point, Holbrooke added, is that the Thais recently agreed to receive Sihanouk in Thailand. Neither Minister Talboys, Secretary Muskie nor Assistant Secretary Holbrooke believed Chinese efforts to push Sihanouk into an alliance with the DK would have much success.
5. Discussion then turned to the Vietnamese-Soviet relationship. Secretary Muskie noted that the Soviets were getting military access very cheaply in Vietnam and that the Vietnamese currently appeared to have little choice but to accept. Minister Talboys asked if there was a limit to Vietnamese willingness to accommodate the Soviets. Mr. Holbrooke said that in the long run he believed the Vietnamese want the Soviets out, but were willing to put up with a Soviet presence until Vietnam’s flanks were secure. This was several years away, he added, and until that time we would be faced with serious problems in the region. Secretary Muskie noted that in this situation there was very little hope for a political settlement to the Kampuchea problem—it would be getting Vietnam to turn on a dime.
6. Secretary Muskie said that the U.S. was accelerating FMS deliveries to Thailand in response to the Vietnamese attack, but he also expressed worry about creeping into a dangerous situation. He asked Talboys what the U.S. and other allies should do if Vietnam invaded Thailand. Talboys did not venture an answer. Mr. Holbrooke then noted that it was unlikely that Vietnam would now invade Thailand. It was overextended in Kampuchea and on the Chinese border. In addition, such an invasion would require explicit Soviet support, which Holbrooke believed unlikely because the invasion would bring the U.S., China and the USSR into a very explosive confrontation.
7. Minister Talboys asked the Secretary’s opinion about timing of the Vietnamese attack. Secretary Muskie said he was not certain. Indonesian Foreign Minister Mochtar had said it was timed to keep the Indians away, while others linked the attack to the start of the voluntary repatriation program. Yet, he added, he was unsure why the Vietnamese had not waited until the ASEAN meeting had passed. [Page 917] Mr. Holbrooke said that one needed to consider the possibility that the Vietnamese Government had been split on the question, noting that Vietnamese Foreign Minister Thach appeared ignorant of the attack when Ambassador Abramowitz talked with him on June 26.3 Minister Talboys agreed that there was great strain on the Vietnamese.
8. Secretary Muskie said that with 600,000 troops on the PRC border and 200,000 in Kampuchea, the pressures were great but wondered about pressures on Vietnam’s neighbors. Minister Talboys said that his discussions with the ASEANs suggested that they were relaxed about Vietnam’s intentions and that Vietnam itself was feeling most of the pressure. Agreeing, Secretary Muskie said that that could be Vietnam’s reason for sealing the Kampuchean border. Minister Talboys suggested that sealing the border could hurt Vietnam by cutting off needed relief supplies. Secretary Muskie added that it would also cut off supplies to Pol Pot’s forces. Secretary Holbrooke explained that Vietnam had lost a great deal of international support over Kampuchea, in part because of the endless flow of refugee population across the border. Sealing it would allow them to attempt to create a new political reality to present to the world.
9. Minister Talboys asked if the U.S. had heard of a Chinese offer to guarantee Kampuchean independence on the condition of a Vietnamese pullout. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke said that the U.S. had heard a similar story from [less than 1 line not declassified] Peking, but he speculated that it was only a trial balloon as neither the Chinese nor Thai Foreign Minister Sitthi has mentioned the idea to the U.S.
10. Secretary Muskie explained to Minister Talboys the idea of the five visiting Foreign Ministers joining the ASEANs in an appeal to UN Secretary General Waldheim on the exacerbation of refugee relief problems created by the Vietnamese attack on Thailand. Minister Talboys noted that the Secretary General was very reluctant to involve himself in the refugee problem and wondered if the statement would have an effect. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke agreed that there were drawbacks but said that the only way Waldheim would act is under pressure, and the statement would create pressure. Mr. Holbrooke added that if the border is sealed in combination with a renewed flow of refugees in search of food, everyone would be faced with an extremely serious problem.
11. Secretary Muskie then explained that once agreed to the joint communique would be presented by the Permanent UN Representatives of the ASEAN Five and of the five non-member signators (United [Page 918] States, New Zealand, Canada, Australia and Japan) directly to Secretary General Waldheim in New York.4
12. Mr. Billings suggested that the ASEANs wanted publication of the five plus five joint communique delayed so that it would not drown out coverage of the ASEAN’s own conference communique.5 Mr. Holbrooke added that there may have been a disagreement within ASEAN on the issue, with some wanting the five non-member Foreign Ministers to endorse ASEAN’s communique too, in order to avoid the impression that the non-member countries disagreed with the ASEAN paper. Secretary Muskie said that the U.S. could not endorse the ASEAN communique because it had not participated in the drafting.
13. After reading the draft five plus five appeal to Waldheim, Minister Talboys said that New Zealand would participate fully in the effort.
14. Accompanying Secretary Muskie were Assistant Secretary for East Asian Affairs Richard Holbrooke, Executive Assistant Leon Billings, and S/S–S Officer Earl Wayne (note taker). Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Talboys was accompanied by MFA Deputy Secretary Templeton, New Zealand High Commissioner Mansfield, and MFA Asia Division Director Brady (note taker).
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Edmund Muskie, 1980–1981, Box 2, Memoranda 1980–1981. Confidential; Immediate. Drafted by Earl Wayne (S/S); cleared by Holbrooke and Leon Billings (S); and approved by Seitz (S/S).↩
- See Documents 90 and 91. Muskie and Talboy, along with the Australian, Canadian, and Japanese Foreign Ministers, were in Kuala Lumpur to meet with the ASEAN Foreign Ministers after their June 25–26 Ministerial session.↩
- See Document 92.↩
- This joint communiqué has not been found.↩
- Reference is to the communiqué of the 13th ASEAN Ministerial meeting. Excerpts of the communiqué are in telegram 4198 from Kuala Lumpur, June 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800308–0286)↩