Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

277. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 6, 1980

SUBJECT

• Olympics, Iran, Indochina

PARTICIPANTS

• AUSTRALIA

  • Foreign Minister Andrew Peacock
  • Ambassador Sir Nicholas Parkinson
  • Minister Robert Birch, Australian DCM
  • John McCarthy, Private Secretary to Minister Peacock

• US

  • Secretary Muskie
  • Assistant Secretary Richard Holbrooke
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary Evelyn Colbert
  • Frank C. Bennett, Director, EA/ANZ

The Secretary opened the conversation by welcoming Foreign Minister Peacock. Peacock thanked Mr. Muskie for his invitation to come to Washington and noted the fruitfulness of the close working relationship that exists between the Department of State and the Department of Foreign Affairs. Peacock then went on to say that he and Prime Minister Fraser were very disappointed in the Australian Olympic Federation’s (AOF) Executive Committee decision to go ahead to the Moscow Olympics. He emphasized that the vote had been very close, 6–5, and that the government would continue its pressure on the AOF and on federations and individual athletes not to go to Moscow. In discussion, it was noted that the fact that the New Zealand Olympic delegation had dwindled to 4 sportsmen is helpful to the GOA position, but the decision of the British and French Olympic teams to go to Moscow is a disadvantage. Peacock explained that the issue was a matter of individual conscience and, while continuing to speak out forcefully in favor of a boycott, the GOA would not deny passports to those who wanted to participate and is allowing an Australian FSO on the fencing team to take regular annual leave to attend the games.

Peacock went on to say that Australia has sought to back USG efforts on Iran and, in so doing, has implemented the UN Security Council sanctions resolution vetoed by the USSR.² He said that despite some adverse economic impact on Australia, only one member of the Cabinet had advocated following the British decision to limit the retroactivity of the embargo. Secretary Muskie said that he was aware of this decision and that the US was very grateful for the consistent support it had received from Australia.

Foreign Minister Peacock next raised the question of Kampuchea, particularly the impending credentials fight in the UN General Assembly over whether Pol Pot’s Democratic Kampuchea (DK) or the Heng Samrin’s Peoples Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) should be seated. The rest of the conversation dealt with this subject.

The issue of continued support in the United Nations for the Pol Pot regime is a very difficult one in Australian domestic politics, the Foreign Minister said. It has been hard for the GOA to resist arguments that it should switch recognition to the Heng Samrin regime. Nevertheless, after careful consideration, the Cabinet has agreed to continue to support the position of the ASEAN countries that the DK is the legitimate government of Kampuchea. However, the GOA is thinking of seeking a dialogue with the Vietnamese through the SRV Embassy in Canberra. The main topic would be the possibility of a SRV withdrawal from Kampuchea. The way the SRV responded would have a bearing on the way the GOA votes on UN seating. Also, Peacock continued, a joint ANZUS policy on this issue and close coordination with the five ASEAN countries will be necessary to ensure adequate consideration of the credentials question.

He, Peacock, was very impressed when SRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach indicated that he was going to discuss the possibility of a withdrawal from Kampuchea with the Thais. However, within minutes of the announcement of this by Malaysian Premier Hussein Onn, the possibility was withdrawn by the SRV. It seemed to him, Peacock said, that the Vietnamese were contemplating a long drawn out process of negotiation over the withdrawal as a tactical move to lower resistance to their presence in Kampuchea, but, when this was prematurely made public, they were forced to withdraw their proposal.

To be able to speak with one voice, the Foreign Minister said, would be a great advantage to all three members of ANZUS. The GOA will be sending a senior officer, Dr. Robert Merrillees, to Washington the week of June 16, Peacock noted, to meet with State Department officers and New Zealand Deputy Secretary of Foreign Affairs Malcolm Templeton to work out a common policy on Kampuchea.

Secretary Muskie asked what we could do politically if the SRV agreed to withdraw. Peacock replied that he didn’t believe it would do so. If the SRV does change, however, we could move relatively quickly, Peacock commented, but he felt that we would have to vote to seat the DK in the UNGA at least one more time. Assistant Secretary Holbrooke said that he felt we would have to go to the SRV first, to urge it to be more conciliatory toward the Chinese. If we did so, could we expect a clear-cut answer, the Secretary asked. The answer might be fuzzy, Holbrooke replied.

With regard to seating, Holbrooke continued, the sine qua non is that we must let the ASEAN governments and the PRC know in advance what our position is. He thought, however, that we should not tell the ASEAN countries until the last minute, say the second or third week in July, and we should do this through Ambassadors since these attract less attention. Foreign Minister Peacock agreed that letting the ASEAN governments know our position on seating at their Kuala Lumpur meeting would be too early.

Secretary Muskie raised the possibility of abstaining on the UN vote. Peacock said that it is theoretically possible but not for Australia. We will, he thought, have to stick with the ASEANs and back DK presence in the UN for six to twelve more months. How would the ASEANs react to abstention, the Secretary asked. Abstention would be tantamount to a vote “for” the Heng Samrin Government, Peacock answered; it would probably precipitate an erosion among the 91 countries who voted against seating Heng Samrin last fall and would lead to an empty seat for Kampuchea. Holbrooke said that for the US, Australia and New Zealand to abstain would be tantamount to a break in our policy of support for ASEAN leadership on this question, but we also cannot give China and the ASEAN governments a blank check. The Secretary remarked that if we want ambiguity in our position, we must lay the groundwork by abstaining. If we move from a pro-DK vote to abstention, Holbrooke contended, we will be giving up our one bargaining chip for withdrawal. Abstention would also upset the ASEANs and the PRC, he said.

At this point, a short private meeting took place, before the Secretary and Foreign Minister Peacock went to the 8th Floor for the luncheon in Peacock’s honor, reported in a separate memcon.³ The subject of Kampuchea did not come up at the luncheon.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Records of Edmund Muskie, 1980–1981, Box 2, Memoranda 1980–1981. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Frank C. Bennett (EA/ANZ) on June 16 and concurred in by Holbrooke.
2. See footnote 5, Document 275.
3. No memorandum of conversation of the private meeting has been found.