Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

270. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 25, 1980, 9–9:25 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of Dr. Brzezinski’s Meeting with the Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand

PARTICIPANTS

• Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Brian Talboys, Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand
• Merwyn Norrish, New Zealand Ambassador
• Frank Corner, New Zealand Secretary of Foreign Affairs
• Bryce Harland, New Zealand Assistant Foreign Secretary for Asia
• Hugo Judd, New Zealand Deputy Chief of Mission
• Donald Gregg, NSC Staff Member

After an exchange of greetings, Minister Talboys stated that New Zealand’s primary interests lie in the South Pacific area. He noted that New Zealand has to keep on fighting agricultural protectionism, which limits New Zealand’s economic strength. Talboys noted that New Zealand shares with Australia an interest in developments in Southeast Asia and China. He said that New Zealand will do all it can to reduce chances for the Soviets to move into the area, either seeking bases, or via political infiltration. Talboys said that New Zealand shares the US concern for developments in Indochina, particularly with regard to the development of Soviet bases. Talboys noted that although Afghanistan is far away from New Zealand, developments there are a potential threat to New Zealand’s oil sources. Talboys said that New Zealand is full of admiration for what the US does, and that they hope to play a part. Talboys said that New Zealand is particularly grateful that the US is trying to establish a balance of forces in the Indian Ocean area. (C)

Talboys said that New Zealand is interested in political relations with the Moslem world, and that they hope to be able to exploit anti-Soviet feelings which have developed out of the Afghanistan affair. Talboys noted, however, that the Moslem world does not seem to want to be too close to the west. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski replied by noting the value which the US places on its ties with New Zealand. He said that there is an “automatic” feeling for the closeness between the US and New Zealand, and Australia as well. He said that these feelings have roots in our shared World War II experience where we fought side by side. Dr. Brzezinski said “We expect you to be with us, and we expect to be with you.” (C)

Turning to US relations with the Soviets, Dr. Brzezinski said that we are trying to show to the Soviets that their move into Afghanistan is costly for them. We do not want the impact of these costs to be diluted or weakened by actions which our allies may take. Dr. Brzezinski predicted that the Soviets will approach New Zealand with requests designed to weaken what the US has done. Dr. Brzezinski asked that such overtures be turned away. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski stated that the US has two major objectives in mind as it responds to the Soviet move into Afghanistan. First is to provide a chance for the development of an increased sense of identity in the Moslem world. Dr. Brzezinski said that this growing sense of identity must not be interfered with or exploited too openly by the West. We need, for example, to move carefully as we seek to establish bases or facilities in the area. Dr. Brzezinski noted that during his visit to Algeria, a nominally pro-Soviet regime, many anti-Soviet sentiments had been voiced to him by individual Algerian officials. Dr. Brzezinski reiterated that the West needs to be subtle in exploiting these anti-Soviet feelings. (C)

The second major US objective is to shore up the region near Afghanistan, which is subject to political intimidation. Dr. Brzezinski said that he did not anticipate a direct Soviet thrust to the Straits of Hormuz. He did believe that the Soviets may try to dominate the region, and that the Soviets may try to turn Pakistan and Iran into “Middle Eastern Finlands.” These two countries, in particular, need shoring up, both militarily and politically. In Pakistan, the first aid will come from the Islamic world, and then from a Western aid consortium. For the US to aid Iran will be more difficult, particularly as it comes out how our hostages have been treated. This objective will be pursued, Dr. Brzezinski said. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski added that the US is also building up its military presence in the area, in a low-key way. Dr. Brzezinski believes that we could match anything the Soviets could put into Iran for up to thirty days. After that, the balance would become unfavorable, due to the closer proximity of the USSR. Dr. Brzezinski indicated that the US could respond to a Soviet thrust into Iran in other parts of the world, in ways designed to show the Soviets the costs of their actions. Dr. Brzezinski quickly added that he does not expect such a showdown to develop, particularly if we are steadfast, and if our allies support us. (C)

Talboys responded first by going back to Dr. Brzezinski’s first point on the closeness of our two countries. Talboys said he believed it to be “inconceivable” that the US and New Zealand would not stand together on major issues. Talboys then said that New Zealand’s ability to help the US is limited by its access to markets for its exports, mainly beef and butter. Talboys said that New Zealand encounters protectionism both here and in Europe. Talboys said that New Zealand had been forced to develop a market in the USSR, due to limitations elsewhere. Dr. Brzezinski quickly responded by saying that New Zealand would not be asked by the US to give up its Soviet market, but that we would ask that New Zealand not expand sales to the Soviets in such a way as to undercut US actions. (C)

Talboys asked if we saw future “mobilization” of the Moslem world to take place along Western or nonaligned lines. Dr. Brzezinski replied that a genuinely nonaligned Moslem world is fully satisfactory to the US. He added that a truly peaceful world must be pluralistic, and that such a world would be an extension of our own pluralistic value system. Dr. Brzezinski said that we saw Yugoslavia as a genuinely nonaligned country, while Cuba is not. He said that our objective in Afghanistan is to have a nonaligned country emerge, not anti-Soviet, but at least neutral. (C)

Talboys asked if Brezhnev’s speech had contained any hopeful signs.² Dr. Brzezinski replied that there was not much in it, except for one sentence which talked about “guarantees”. Dr. Brzezinski said that Soviet accusations of US support to internal opposition is a canard. He said that he does not feel that the Soviets are now considering a withdrawal from Afghanistan, but that they may be driven to do so if world opinion stays firmly opposed to what they have done. (C)

Talboys asked about the effects of recent events upon Pakistan. Dr. Brzezinski replied that what the Pakistanis want is the restoration of the buffer which a neutral Afghanistan used to represent. Dr. Brzezinski said that the long Western border of Pakistan is thinly defended and very vulnerable. Dr. Brzezinski said that a neutral Afghanistan might have its security guaranteed by 40,000 troops from such Moslem states as Algeria, Syria, or Jordan. He said that such a development is not likely, but worth a try. Dr. Brzezinski stressed that the US must be steadfast and reliable, and that we must not overreact to ambiguous signals such as the recent Brezhnev speech. Talboys said that the Soviets must be “baffled” by what they are encountering in Afghanistan. He asked if they might consider withdrawing. Dr. Brzezinski said that they would not withdraw as a defeat. He said that once summer comes, the Soviets’ weaponry and troop strength will make it very hard for the opposition to continue in any large force. The mountains have little or no cover, and units of over 20 men will not be able to operate effectively against Soviet helicopters. Dr. Brzezinski said that the only thing that might cause the Soviets to consider a withdrawal from Afghanistan would be a recognition that the political effects of their move have been totally negative. (C)

Talboys asked about Mrs. Gandhi. Dr. Brzezinski replied that she is a realist, and that he expects her to see that the restoration of an Afghan buffer state, leaving Pakistan as it is, is vastly preferable to a disintegrating Pakistan. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski reiterated that three factors are key to getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan:

—US consistency and the support of its allies

—An aroused and united Islamic world

—Continued resistance inside Afghanistan

Both Talboys and Dr. Brzezinski agreed that the second point will be the key factor. (C)

Talboys asked about Israeli policy, with particular regard to the rights of the Palestinians.

Dr. Brzezinski replied that the current policy is a “contradiction,” which works against a unified Moslem response to the Soviet aggression. Dr. Brzezinski said that the US will place major emphasis on the continuation of the Camp David process, to gain for the Palestinians what they are entitled to. (C)

The meeting ended at 9:25, with an exchange of pleasantries.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Brzezinski, 1–6/80. Confidential. The meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office.
2. In his February 22 speech in the Kremlin, Brezhnev said that the need for Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan would cease if the United States and Afghanistan’s neighbors would guarantee that outside support of the rebels would end. (Craig R. Whitney, “Brezhnev Links Afghan Pullout to U.S. ‘Guarantee’,” New York Times, February 23, 1980, p. 4)