264. Letter From Australian Prime Minister Fraser to President Carter1
I was very glad to have your letters on the situation in Indo-China,3 confirming the strength of your commitment to secure an early end to the fighting in the region and to bring about a withdrawal of Vietnam [Page 865] ese and Chinese forces. I remain strongly of the view that we must continue our efforts to find an early solution to this dangerous situation.
Jim Callaghan has been in touch with me over the weekend about the suggestion he is canvassing with your Government and other permanent members of the Security Council to hold a conference with a membership based initially on that of the 1954 Geneva Conference.
I have told Jim that I welcome his initiative which seems to me to meet the need for swift action if the situation in Indo-China is to be prevented from getting out of hand.
In proposing a conference there is obviously a difficulty in determining membership, and this as I understand it is why Jim has gone to the membership of the 1954 Geneva Conference. I think this is useful as a starting point.
I do not underestimate, however, the obstacles which will need to be overcome if an attempt to convene a conference on the Indo-China situation is to succeed. I have offered Jim one or two preliminary thoughts which have occurred to us on smoothing the way for such a conference.
Much has changed since 1954. There has been a major shift in power groupings and it may be that these would not be fully reflected in the original membership of the Geneva Conference. I have suggested that it might help, in terms of better balance, if the original members of the International Control Commission were also included.
An obvious difficulty would be Kampuchean representation: which regime should be invited to participate? A possible solution could be to involve both, either officially or otherwise.
I think we must accept that the prospects for achieving a settlement through the Security Council, at least in the immediate future, now seem very slim. The British proposal offers an alternative which, I think, should have our full support.
The attitude of the other major powers is, of course, crucial. It is here, I am sure, that your support will be most valuable. While we may not be able to expect an enthusiastic response from them, initially at least, they will no doubt be considerably influenced by the degree of support that your Government gives.
With the continuing risk that the fighting in Indo-China may broaden into a wider conflict, it is most important that every effort continue to be made to bring about a settlement. Even if the fighting were to end now there would be a danger of continuing Russian involvement in Vietnam, of access to bases and of severe disturbance to the strategic balance. As we know, Russia has recently moved logistic elements into Vietnam. There can be no doubt that the longer the conflict goes on, the greater are the chances that the Soviet Union [Page 866] will become increasingly committed and involved. For this reason in particular, whatever the difficulties encountered, I think the British Government should be encouraged.
I have told Jim that he has my strong personal support and that we stand ready to assist in any way we can. I hope that you too will feel able to support his proposal, which could ease tensions at this critical time.
My warmest personal regards,
Yours Sincerely,4
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 1, Australia, Prime Minister J. Malcolm Fraser, 1–12/78. No classification marking.↩
- Fraser handwrote the salutation.↩
- See Document 262. Carter wrote again on February 18 to update Fraser on U.S. efforts to contain the widening conflict in Indochina. The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 43142 to Canberra, February 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790078–0546) On February 18, Chinese forces crossed the Sino-Vietnamese border. See Documents 43–45.↩
- Fraser handwrote the last two paragraphs.↩