Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

43. Minutes of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, February 18, 1979, 9–9:35 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Sino-Vietnamese Conflict

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Secretary Cyrus Vance
  • Dep Sec Warren Christopher
  • Under Sec David Newsom
  • Asst Sec for EA & Pacific Affairs Richard Holbrooke
  • Asst Sec Harold Saunders
  • Asst Sec Hodding Carter

• Department of Defense

  • Deputy Secretary Charles Duncan
  • Dep Asst Sec Michael Armacost
  • Commander Kelley

• JCS

  • General David Jones
  • General William Y. Smith

• White House

  • Vice President Mondale
  • Asst to the Pres for NSC Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Press Secretary Jody Powell
  • Dep Asst to the Pres for NSC David Aaron

• NSC

  • Colonel William Odom, Military Asst
  • Michel Oksenberg, Staff Member
  • Gary Sick, Staff Member

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • Deputy Robert Bowie

MINUTES

Dr. Brzezinski outlined the agenda—a situation report, including a report on the political situation; a report on the U.N. discussion of the advisability of additional public statements; analysis of Congressional reaction; and discussion of bilateral relations with the PRC. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski also noted that henceforth at the meetings on this subject, attendance would be limited to principals plus one. (S)

Situation Report

Admiral Turner gave the situation report. Information remains fragmentary. Thus far, we have been able to identify two Chinese divisions as having penetrated ten kilometers into North Vietnam. The remainder of the conflict seems limited in scope and is closer to the border. Chinese intentions at this point appear to be limited, with Chinese forces under strict central control and under discipline as to how far they should penetrate. There has been some confusion among Chinese forces in the early stages of the battle, particularly in identifying the enemy—as Vietnamese uniforms and designations make them nearly indistinguishable from Chinese forces. The Chinese have been quite active in the air, including some use of IL–28 bombers from Hainan Island. (S)

Secretary Vance asked how deep the air intrusions have been to date. Admiral Turner replied only 20 to 25 kilometers. One report of Vietnamese use of SAMs in the Northwest would place Chinese air penetration deeper than that. (S)

Turner noted that thus far we have intercepted relatively few communications, which prompted a question as to whether we could do more to intercept Chinese signals. Turner said that he could look at the USS HORN, to see if we could send it closer in. (S)

Vance asked where the deepest penetration had occurred. Turner replied in the Northeast salient, where Chinese forces had advanced about ten kilometers. The rough judgment is that the Chinese had halted this thrust. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether the Chinese may hold at a shallow penetration. Turner replied that this could be the case. (S)

Dick Holbrooke asked whether it was true that no divisions had yet been moved from Hanoi to the north. Turner said that was correct. (S)

Discussion then turned to the Sino-Soviet situation, and Turner indicated that there are no changes, though we have just discovered that an airborne division is missing from Leningrad. (S)

Vance asked whether there was any indication of Soviet aircraft movement, to which Turner replied that the CIA has not seen any. General Jones added that there had been an alert of some SS–20 units, and DIA had noted that the Soviets were palletizing equipment of an airborne division near Leningrad. (S)

Brzezinski asked whether it was true that the Chinese had evacuated civilians from some cities along the border. Turner said that civilians had been removed from Urumchi. (S)

Brzezinski asked what the situation was in Cambodia. Turner replied that, while there was no heavy combat, there was no retrogression in the ability of the Pol Pot forces to hold their own. (S)

Brzezinski asked whether there was any indication of Vietnamese withdrawal from Cambodia. Turner answered no. (S)

Vice President Mondale noted that one scenario for the Chinese invasion was that Peking would accompany their military effort with an effort to change the leadership of the guerrilla forces in Cambodia—bringing Ieng Sary and Sihanouk into a position of prominence. After this, they would couple their own withdrawal from Vietnam with an effort to establish a new coalition leadership in Cambodia. The Vice President asked whether the Chinese were making any headway in altering the leadership of Cambodian resistance forces. Turner noted that there had been no change in this area. (S)

Political Aspects

Vance reported that if anything happens in the U.N. immediately, it probably will be the Chinese trying to bring the Cambodian issue to the General Assembly for debate. (S)

Vance noted that the Soviets did not have their Ambassador to the U.N. in New York, though he predicted that Troyanovsky will soon come back. (S)

Ambassador Young thinks that the Sino-Vietnamese issue will be broached by Tuesday.² Our people are prepared in New York to carry out instructions as given. (S)

As far as the Soviets are concerned, they have only issued one bland statement. (S)

Statement to the Chinese

Brzezinski thought that we should prepare a formal statement for the Chinese. Vance agreed and thought that perhaps he should talk to Ambassador Ch’ai Tse-min tomorrow. Holbrooke, Armacost, and Oksenberg were assigned to prepare those remarks to be discussed at a formal SCC meeting tomorrow. (S)

Statements by Others

Brzezinski asked what statements had been made by our allies. Holbrooke said that the Japanese had issued a statement similar to ours. Brzezinski read a TASS statement giving strong Soviet support of the Vietnamese, but also indicating the Soviets were confident the Vietnamese could handle the situation on their own. (S)

Congressional

Vance reported that in widespread discussions with the leadership yesterday, all supported the position that we were taking. They supported a position of non-involvement and of condemnation both of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Chinese attack on Vietnam. (S)

Brzezinski reported on his talk with Nixon yesterday,³ whom he called on instructions. Nixon counseled that we should be careful not to repeat the mistake of 1956 during the Suez crisis by giving the Soviets an opening to make gains. While we should criticize the Chinese, we should not create a situation in which we adversely affect our bilateral relations or through our criticism give the Soviets a justification for harming our interests. (S)

Vance reported that Kissinger was supportive of our policy, and said that he would talk to Baker⁴ to make sure that he supports us. (S)

Vance reported that Baker is supportive. Holbrooke reported that Senator Glenn will be on “Meet the Press” and that he will talk to him. (S)

Brzezinski reported that George Meany⁵ believes the whole thing was instigated by the Soviets and that we should go after them. (S)

Public Statements

Brzezinski asked whether we should make any additional public statements. Powell and others thought that the initial press response was good. Holbrooke thought that the six points which Vance used for his briefing of Gwertzman⁶ yesterday was quite effective. Powell thought we should now brief the wire services and the networks. (S)

Powell asked whether we should reveal that the President had communicated with Brezhnev via the Hotline yesterday.⁷ Brzezinski said that we should neither confirm nor deny. (S)

Soviet Involvement

Brzezinski asked what if the Soviets make a threat against China. What would our response be? Vance stated that his concern is that the Soviets might send volunteer pilots to Hanoi. Brzezinski thought it possible the Soviets would seek a position at Cam Ranh Bay. (S)

David Aaron thought that in that case, we would have to reevaluate our security relationship with the Soviet Union. (S)

Brzezinski ordered a study to be prepared for tomorrow’s SCC meeting identifying the range of possible Soviet reactions to the Sino-Vietnamese conflict and listing possible U.S. responses for each possible Soviet action. Oksenberg, Armacost, and Odom were tasked with preparing that report. (S)

Miscellaneous

Jones observed that Marcos was obsessed with the idea of Vietnam becoming a Cuba of the Far East. He recently and quite incessantly asked what we would do to inhibit South Vietnam from moving into the Soviet camp. Mrs. Marcos appears to have a different view from her husband; she feels that China, and not the Soviet Union, poses the major danger to Southeast Asia. (S)

Brzezinski scheduled another SCC meeting on the Sino-Vietnamese conflict for tomorrow morning, to focus on two issues; our bilateral relations with Peking; and an assessment of likely Soviet reactions. Brzezinski wondered if the Soviets develop a major threat by Monday or Tuesday⁸ how we would respond. (S)

Mondale noted that we must have a program for consultations with the ANZUS and the ASEAN states. Turner asked whether we should improve our reconnaissance capability for keeping abreast of the tactical situation in Vietnam. Two options may be available to us: placing a cruiser in the Tonkin Gulf with a monitoring capability, or using the SR–71. Brzezinski directed Turner to present a report on these options for tomorrow’s meeting. (S)

Hodding Carter noted that any increase in surveillance activities or any actions on the U.S. part in response to the Sino-Vietnamese conflict would depart from our public assertion that we have “no interest” in this conflict. (S)

Holbrooke asked about the situation on the Hill with respect to normalization legislation. Christopher reported that conversations with Javits and Church revealed no indications that the recent events would affect either the Omnibus Legislation⁹ or the resolutions to be attached to it. Vance reported that Church was prepared to go ahead and to separate himself from Javits. The situation is different in the House, Vance reported, where Zablocki appears determined to push an amended Omnibus Bill and a resolution that would undercut normalization. Wolff intends to stick with the Kennedy/Cranston resolution. Vance told Zablocki that the Administration would be prepared for a direct confronation with him, if he persists on his course. Zablocki is inclined to seek postponement for 90 days, but we have indicated that we are committed to the March 1 date. (S)

Holbrooke reported that the most immediate and troublesome issue is securing funds for the American Institute on Taiwan. Reprogramming is being held up by Senator Hollings, who chairs a committee consisting of Deconcini, Garn, and Weicker. There is no chance to secure reprogramming prior to passage of the Omnibus Legislation. This means that all operations on Taiwan may close down on March 2. (S)

Brzezinski noted that this was not an issue to be discussed in this meeting, but an immediate meeting would be held with the appropriate Congressional liaison people to develop a strategy for handling this issue. (S)¹⁰

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 14, SCC Meeting #141, Held 2/19/79, 2/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The Summary of Conclusions of the meeting is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Document 218. The SCC also met on February 17 to discuss the Chinese-Vietnamese fighting; see ibid., Document 217.
2. February 20.
3. No memorandum of conversation of this discussion has been found.
4. Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker (R–Tennessee).
5. President of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO).
6. New York Times reporter Bernard Gwertzman.
7. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 172.
8. February 19 or 20.
9. Reference is to the Taiwan Relations Act. See Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Document 213.
10. Brzezinski initialed below the last paragraph.