Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XXII, Southeast Asia and the Pacific

134. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Jakarta, April 24, 1979, 0845Z

6493. Subject: Conference of U.S. Ambassadors to ASEAN. Ref: (A) State 95706 (Notal), (B) Jakarta 6144 (Notal).²

1. (S–Entire text).

2. U.S. Ambassadors to the ASEAN nations conferred in Jakarta April 17–18. Discussions were dominated by the situation in Indochina, particularly Kampuchea, and urgent recommendations on that subject have been transmitted to the Department in Ref B. Other topics discussed include ASEAN, refugees, pan-Islamic activities, human rights and narcotics. Ambassador Dick Clark joined the group on the second day for a discussion of the refugee situation. Following is a summary of discussions and major recommendations.

3. Indochina—The Ambassadors were concerned to note that Vietnamese forces, with Soviet assistance in transportation and other fields, have been able to organize a major offensive in western Kampuchea. This has already pushed some 3,000 refugees over the border into Thailand, and tens of thousands more may well arrive during the next few weeks. (Note: This is already occurring). Due to the continuous fighting and the inability of the Heng Samrin regime effectively to administer even the area under Vietnamese control, the orderly planting of this year’s rice crop is in danger, and a major famine is a very real possibility in the next few months. Thailand’s political stability is increasingly threatened by the dual pressures of hungry Kampuchean refugees on the borders and Vietnamese charges that Thailand is aiding the Pol Pot forces. More worrisome from a U.S. strategic standpoint is the continuing growth of Soviet military presence in Vietnam, including both naval and air elements, which could be accelerated by a not-unlikely second round of Chinese-Vietnamese hostilities.

4. In the face of these developments, the Ambassadors concluded that Thai political stability and ASEAN unity were seriously threatened, with Thailand willing to seek Chinese support to counter Vietnamese thrusts while other member states tended to look on Vietnam as a possible buffer against Chinese expansionism. They agreed that the U.S. therefore risked important strategic interests in the region if it did not step up efforts to achieve a solution to the Kampuchean conflict (see Ref B).

5. ASEAN—The Ambassadors believe ASEAN has made real progress in both the political and economic fields. The ASEAN states have demonstrated increasing political solidarity in adopting joint positions on such major issues as the Indochina conflict, and they have shown a growing degree of self-confidence as a regional organization. While their perceptions of the threat posed by the Indochina situation differ somewhat, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia share a grave concern over the Kampuchean problem and the possible increase in the Soviet military presence in Vietnam. The Philippines supports ASEAN initiatives on Indo China but seeks to avoid any criticism of Hanoi, Moscow, or Beijing. All five nations recognize that ASEAN must play a role in the resolution of the Cambodian crisis but are in some disarray over just what that role should be. The Ambassadors believe ASEAN would welcome a U.S. initiative to get things off dead center.

6. ASEAN leaders have recognized the need to work closely together in the face of external threats. The bilateral meetings among Kriangsak, Suharto, and Hussein Onn held during the last few months to discuss the implications of the Indochina situation, for example, have been publicly associated with ASEAN solidarity. Similarly, the ASEAN states have increased the number of bilateral joint military exercises, such as the recent naval and amphibious exercises among Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. While the five states have reassessed their defense needs, and, except for the Philippines, begun an expanded program of acquisition of military equipment, there is still no sentiment for any formal military pact as a part of ASEAN.

7. The Ambassadors were encouraged by the progress in U.S.-ASEAN relations since the August 1978 dialogue in Washington.³ An array of well-designed economic and cultural projects are now under discussion between the U.S. and ASEAN and have been moving along well. These projects are most important as symbols of U.S. concern for ASEAN and to help strengthen ASEAN cohesion. Any delays and difficulties at this point are due primarily to administrative problems on the ASEAN side, which have made it difficult for ASEAN to digest the projects as rapidly as they are proposed. The Ambassadors concluded that the U.S. Government was moving ahead effectively in this area and progress to date serves our basic interests in the area.

8. North-South issues were noted as a very important factor in U.S.-ASEAN relations. Indonesia and Malaysia in particular see these issues as a benchmark of U.S. attitudes toward the developing nations in general and ASEAN in particular. The Ambassadors were gratified that at the last meeting on the Common Fund in Geneva some of the major difficulties were overcome, and the U.S. no longer risks isolation at UNCTAD V⁴ as a major obstacle to agreement on this issue. The recent rubber accord⁵ was also seen as encouraging progress in the area of commodity agreements, which are of great importance to ASEAN. At the same time, ASEAN members are disturbed by what they see as a growing trend toward protectionism in the U.S. market.

9. The Ambassadors discussed in detail and strongly welcomed the forthcoming trip of Secretary Vance to the ASEAN area.⁶ They believe this visit comes at an extremely important time, that it will underscore our continued interest in the area and that it will carry forward the momentum begun last year by the Vice President’s visit⁷ and the ASEAN-U.S. Dialogue.⁸ The Ambassadors do not believe the Secretary needs to offer additional projects or other assistance to ASEAN; the organization needs to digest what we have already offered. The main objective of the meeting among the Secretary and the five ASEAN Foreign Ministers should be to show that we take the organization seriously and are willing to consult with it in a straightforward and truly candid manner. The Ambassadors believe the centerpiece of the meeting should be the situation in Indochina, including the refugee problem, and what we and ASEAN might do about it (Ref B). It would also be useful for the Secretary to review the considerable development of U.S.-ASEAN relations this past year, including progress on the Common Fund and the rubber agreement, and what needs to be done next. ASEAN would also welcome the Secretary’s views on U.S. relations with the Soviets (including SALT), China, our view of the energy situation and what all of us might do about it, and prospects for peace in the Middle East.

10. The Ambassadors commended the visits to the ASEAN states in late 1978 by the OPIC investment mission and by EXIM Bank President Moore, and urged that additional visits of this type be scheduled in the near future. The $100 million line of credit granted by EXIM Bank to the Philippines was hailed as an excellent example of the positive fall-out of the Moore visit to ASEAN. The Ambassadors hope this type of constructive initiative may also apply to other ASEAN nations.

11. It was noted that serious bilateral problems exist with several of the ASEAN states in the field of security assistance. The urgency these countries feel to build up their defenses in the face of the Indochinese threat has heightened their dismay with the continuing reductions in FMS credits and IMET training programs to several ASEAN nations and what they see as undue delays and postponements in the processing of this assistance. The Ambassadors strongly agreed that the most important item in our security relationship is the provision of military hardware. Next in priority is IMET training. They concluded that it was essential for Thailand and Indonesia to receive adequate FMS credits, for continued strong support for the Philippines to ensure continued use of the bases, and for all ASEAN members to be allowed to purchase additional needed military items from the US through commercial channels.

12. In addition, the Ambassadors recommended the following:

A) Continued and expanded political briefings for the ASEAN Ambassadors in Washington on SALT, the Middle East, U.S.-China policy, the Indochina situation, and other key topics of interest.

B) The establishment of a full-time position for an ASEAN affairs officer in EA to handle and coordinate the political, economic, cultural and development assistance aspects of U.S. relations with ASEAN.

C) Demonstration of the regional usefulness of the U.S. bases in the Philippines by encouraging their use for joint exercises or for training military personnel or units of other ASEAN member states. The invitation for such activities should come from the Government of the Philippines.

D) Periodic briefing of the ASEAN nations in the field by visiting USG experts on matters of common interest such as Soviet capabilities.

13. Refugees—The Ambassadors expressed their pleasure at having the opportunity to discuss refugee problems with Ambassador Clark during this crucial period. They welcomed administration proposals to increase the number of refugees to be admitted to the United States to 120,000 for FY 1979, including 7,000 per month from Indochina, as well as to provide greater flexibility in the allocation of these numbers. They expressed the hope that the United States Government will continue to seek ways to reduce the time required to process these refugees.

14. At the same time the Ambassadors expressed their grave concern that the refugee situation in the region is worsening rapidly. The facilities and the patience of local governments are strained, making it increasingly difficult for us to persuade them to accept refugees and to support U.S. policies and initiatives. The avalanche of Kampuchean refugees which has fallen on Thailand has made it even more imperative that immediate action be taken to meet this situation. The Ambassadors strongly endorsed the concept of a special processing center for refugees from Indochina, and believe it essential that we, the UNHCR and the international community generally support and move ahead quickly to implement this proposal. They expressed particular concern over the UNHCR’s seeming lack of real interest in the SPC. Recent events belie the view that the flow of refugees is decreasing or that Hanoi will necessarily handle the problem in an orderly manner through family reunifications. The Ambassadors urge we do everything possible to get the UNHCR to move rapidly and to play a more active role in working out the details of the proposed center. (Note: Late reports in Jakarta indicate the UNHCR may not plan even to survey the proposed island before the May 15–16 Jakarta Refugee Conference).⁹

15. Pan-Islam—The Ambassadors noted that the Ayatollah Khomeini’s takeover in Iran had accelerated the revival of Islamic social and political activity throughout the area. In Malaysia, there has been an upsurge in Islamic social comment, and many pictures of Khomeini are seen in the villages. The Malaysian Government is seeking a middle-of-the-road policy which will satisfy radical Muslims without provoking a reaction from the Chinese community. Malaysian relations with the Philippines, probably the least satisfactory among ASEAN nations, have been complicated by the Muslim rebellion in the Southern Philippines which the Malays of Sabah view with considerable sympathy. In south Thailand, GOM-RTG differences over the Malay separatist movement are being resolved, with no GOM support for the separatists. The Islamic resurgence is not a serious threat to the stability of the GOM, but it will keep the GOM reluctant to stick its neck out on any international issue related to Islam.

16. An Embassy survey in Indonesia showed little sign of a potential Iran-type situation in the making, and a far greater danger there would be the rise of an ultra-nationalist regime at some future point. President Suharto is seen to be stronger and more confident than ever, and might well run again in 1983. He is moving ahead on development projects, and only a major economic collapse is likely to endanger his completion of a full five-year term. Islamic activity has been peaceful and generally nonpolitical.

17. In the Philippines, President Marcos has been actively trying to get Muslims to participate in the elections to be held in the areas affected by the rebellion. He hopes thereby to wind down the Muslim rebellion. Marcos has reportedly irritated Khaddafi and the Libyans, however, by his handling of the districting for the elections which the Libyans had desired.

18. Human Rights—The Ambassadors noted with satisfaction that there had been a general improvement in the human rights climate in the ASEAN region. While problems remain in many areas, the human rights policies of the Carter administration, backed by quiet but consistent diplomatic efforts, have had a significant and beneficial impact on ASEAN.

19. In Singapore, many political prisoners have been released and only eight prominent Communists are still being held. The human rights situation there has improved to the point that Amnesty International has largely dropped its attention to Singapore during the last year. The situation in Indonesia is much improved, with political detainees down now to about 12,000, all of whom are due to be released or tried this year. U.S. human rights policy in the Philippines has sparked an internal GOP crackdown on human rights abuses. About 450 political prisoners, whom the GOP terms “hardcore subversives,” are now believed to be under detention. Although complaining that they are menaced by Communist subversion, the Malaysian Government has made progress in the human rights area recently and has just released International Transport Workers Federation representative Donald Uren, held since February 15 in connection with the MAS strike.

20. Narcotics—The Ambassadors discussed the narcotics production and trafficking situation in the ASEAN region and expressed satisfaction that bilateral and regional cooperation in narcotics control enforcement and demand reduction is continuing to grow. They were particularly encouraged by the fact that the nations of the region have become more aware of the problems created by narcotics abuse and trafficking within their societies, and have begun to play a greater role themselves in local and regional narcotics control. It will be necessary for the USG to focus more on the building of institutions and attitudes, and this should be a major component of DEA’s role. The Ambassadors agreed that it was necessary to maintain pressure on all five governments to continue to build on the groundwork already laid.

21. The Ambassadors felt this exchange of views was most useful and, subject to Washington’s concurrence, agreed to meet again in Manila in October.

Masters

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790187–0885. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Bangkok, Beijing, Canberra, the Mission in Geneva, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, Rangoon, Seoul, Singapore, Tokyo, Vientiane, Wellington, and CINCPAC.
2. Telegram 95706 to Jakarta, April 16, posed questions regarding ASEAN and the future. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790175–0990) Telegram 6144 from Jakarta, April 18, relayed the recommendations on Indochina of the five U.S. Ambassadors to ASEAN countries. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790178–0437)
3. See Document 131.
4. The meeting took place in Manila May 7–June 3. Documentation on the U.S. position on the Common Fund is in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy.
5. The UN Conference on Natural Rubber, meeting in Geneva in April, had achieved agreement on an international rubber accord, which was concluded in October.
6. Vance traveled to Bali July 1–2 to meet with ASEAN Foreign Ministers after their Ministerial session. For his statement to the Foreign Ministers and press conference after the meeting, see Department of State Bulletin, September 1979, pp. 35–39.
7. April 29–May 11, 1978. See Document 129.
8. See Document 131.
9. Oakley represented the United States at the conference, which was attended by 24 nations, including Vietnam. See footnote 8, Document 136.