Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

98. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India¹

Washington, April 9, 1978, 0058Z

91105. Subject: April 7 Call on Secretary by Indian Ambassador Palkhivala.

1. Indian Ambassador Palkhivala accompanied by DCM Gokhale and First Secretary Rajan called on Secretary April 7. NEA Assistant Secretary Atherton and Country Director Lande (notetaker) also sat in. Lengthy meeting covered nuclear cooperation, Desai visit and possible purchase of DPSAs by GOI.² Highlights follow.

2. Meeting opened with general review of June 13–14 Desai visit. Ambassador noted Desai would address SSOD on June 9 and then travel to San Francisco, return to New York and arrive in Washington June 12. Initial planning meeting with Ambassador Dobelle was scheduled for April 17 and arrangements seemed to be going well.

3. On the nuclear fuel issue Ambassador expressed concern about postponement of April 7 NRC decision.³ Further delays were being interpreted by Indian press, public and some Members of Parliament as a deliberate pressure tactic. The GOI knew that the NRC was an independent body but the GOI was having difficulty in explaining the delays to the Parliament particularly in view of attacks by Mrs. Gandhi on the GOI as “selling out” to the US.

4. The Secretary explained that if the NRC had voted on April 7 the result would have been a 2–2 vote. This would have left the decision to the President who would have approved the export license. However, a significant delay would have ensued since the President’s decision would have had to lay before Congress for 60 days. Instead we submitted additional material to the NRC which the NRC is currently considering. We are hopeful that a positive vote will follow. NRC now scheduled to meet on Indian application April 17. (Lande subsequently told Ambassador that this information was highly sensitive and it was agreed that the Indian press would simply be told that the Indian Ambassador had expressed concern about NRC delays and that the Secretary had told him that the administration continued to support the license application and hoped for early approval.)

5. The Ambassador then raised the DPSA issue noting that he was aware of some US apprehension about this possible purchase. The Secretary stated he was concerned that such a purchase would cause an arms race in South Asia. We had refused to sell DPSAs (A–7’s) to Pakistan⁴ but if India bought such aircraft Pakistan would also try to do so. The USG would refuse to sell DPSAs to Pakistan but they could be obtained elsewhere.

6. The Ambassador gave a lengthy exposition of the Indian case for a DPSA purchase. He asserted that the relative Indo-Pakistani aircraft balance had been reduced from the historical 3–1 ratio to 2–1. India did not want to increase the number of its aircraft but wished to replace older Hunters and Canberras with a DPSA. Pakistan had introduced DPSAs to South Asia and had 60 such aircraft (Mirages). India presently had no DPSAs but planned to purchase only 30 aircraft at a cost of $8 million each. The GOI needed such aircraft in order to be able to reach Pakistani air bases if Pakistan started a new war and in the case of possible hostilities with China. The Secretary concluded the discussion by stating that he would take another look at this problem and would request an analysis of the situation. However, he repeated his concern about a further spiralling of arms purchases in South Asia. The Ambassador offered to provide additional data if there were any discrepancies between USG and GOI data.

7. At Ambassador’s request, Secretary reviewed status of our current efforts with respect to Middle East and Southern Africa, and explained Presidential decision on deferring work on enhanced radiation weapons.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N780004–0355. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Bombay. Sent for information to Islamabad, London, Paris, and Stockholm. Drafted by Lande; cleared in S/S; approved by Atherton.
2. A more detailed April 7 memorandum of conversation of this meeting is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance Nodis MemCons, 1978.
3. Telegram 90251 to New Delhi, April 7, reported Nosenzo’s April 6 discussion with an NRC Commissioner who said that the NRC’s “key concern” was “the applicability of existing no-nuclear explosive and safeguards assurances on U.S. nuclear fuel supplied for Tarapur in the event India fails to meet full-scope safeguards requirement of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978 (P.L 95–242) in the allotted time and the U.S., as a result, terminates further supply.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780151–0630)
4. In the right-hand margin of an April 2 memorandum from Christopher, Carter indicated his decision to exclude A–7’s from a potential aid package for Pakistan. See footnote 4, Document 240.