91. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
17. Department for Hodding Carter Jr. Department pass NSC for David Aaron and Jessica Tuchman. Subject: Press Pool Report on Presidential Quotes in Nuclear Talks With Desai January 2, 1978.
1. FYI Following was dealt with by Jody Powell in pool report and at briefing at three p.m. today Delhi time:
2. Begin text of pool report
At expanded bilateral talks at Rashtrapati Bhavan this am,2 Carter chatted with Vance during photo session. Sound techs got barely audi [Page 238] ble tape from which this is drawn. Carter refers to previous talks with Desai, the second of which had just concluded before this photo session began.
“We had a good talk,” Carter told Vance. “He’s pretty adamant about the nuclear fuel thing,” Carter said, referring to Desai. “I pointed out we put him in the same category as the great nations like Germany and Canada and he agreed with that,” Carter continued.
“He said if we could sign a comprehensive test ban, that might be enough of a change to warrant some modification of their position. He didn’t give me any commitment but I told him I wanted to avoid any complications in the future because our Congress is going to pass a law I supported after 18 months.”3
The tape is bad and there are unintelligible passages. Carter said Desai pointed out that there is an agreement presumably about U.S. fuel for Tarapur power station.
Then, Carter talked about what the U.S. was willing to do in the way of supplying nuclear fuel.
“I told him I would authorize transfer of fuel now . . . it didn’t seem to make an impression on him,” Carter said in a very rough passage on the tape.
Then, Carter very clearly told Vance that “when we get back, I think we ought to write him another letter, just cold and very blunt.”
Jody Powell was made aware of the contents of this pool report and information became available which attempted to place the obviously sensitive quotes in the perspective seen by the American side. The information was on deep background.
There is also an on-the-record comment from Powell below.
On deep background, it is understood that the President would like to see as many questions on Indian acceptance of international safeguards tied down as possible before legislation he referred to passes Senate. It has already passed House.
There is a belief that there might be technicalities in the legislation that could add to difficulties in dealing with Indians. The U.S. side feels it would have more flexibility while still satisfying the needs of controls if it moves faster.
The Indians and the U.S. have a contract for the supply of fuel to the Tarapur power plant near Bombay. The Indians feel they have lived up to it, thus the adamant attitude on the part of Desai to which Carter referred.
[Page 239]Carter, as you probably know, freed a shipment of fuel to India early in his administration. The U.S. has another application pending, one to which the President apparently referred.
But for the awkwardness of the way it all came out, the Carter administration is known to think that the India situation could represent a case history for its policy of exporting nuclear fuel in order to have influence with nuclear nations in pursuit of non-proliferation.
Officials are known to be concerned that the U.S. actions demonstrate to other nations that it does not intend to use duress as a negotiating tool, and that it can be relied on as a supplier.
These officials believe that any conflicts can be worked out in a way that reconciles both the U.S. interest in imposing safeguards and the Indian sensitivity to infringement on sovereignty and any curtailment of its research or power development program.
Insofar as Carter’s “cold and very blunt letter” is concerned, Powell had this to say on the record:
“The President’s use of that term in a situation in which he was unaware he was being taped was not in any sense a reference to the tone of the relationship or the discussions on the issue, but simply a statement of his feeling that following the visit, there ought to be a written communication which set down the facts of the situation, including the imminent possibility of legislation which the administration supports, which would restrict the transfer of technology and material. We have complete confidence the Indian Government shares our concern on non-proliferation and that we also understand and sympathize with their desire not to have international controls which would in any arbitrary fashion constrain legitimate development, particularly of power and research by their scientific community. We believe that these two concerns, ours and theirs (safeguards and development), can be resolved. It’s our desire the discussions be conducted between equals without any perception of duress from either side.”
Pooler’s note:
Room was full of people when President made his remarks. He, Vance and Brzezinski sitting together on U.S. portion of round table. Cameras opposite, people milling on all sides. As pictures taken, President said these words to Vance. On either side and behind his head, apparently beyond reach of his peripheral vision, were mikes of sound techs, including NBC pool who got tape. End text.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780004–1224. Limited Official Use; Immediate.↩
- See Document 90.↩
- The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. See Document 6.↩