Office of the Historian

432. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting1

Washington, March 25, 1980, 9–10:10 a.m.

SUBJECT

  • Iran and Afghanistan

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • Secretary Cyrus Vance
    • Harold Saunders

  • OSD

    • Secretary Harold Brown
    • W. Graham Claytor*

  • JCS

    • Lt. Gen. John Pustay*

  • CIA

    • Admiral Stansfield Turner*

  • Justice

    • Attorney General Benjamin Civiletti*

  • Treasury

    • Robert Carswell*

  • White House

    • Zbigniew Brzezinski
    • David Aaron
    • Lloyd Cutler*
    • Ray Jenkins*
    • Henry Owen*

  • Office of the Vice President

    • Denis Clift*

  • NSC

    • Gary Sick
    • Alfred Friendly*

*Present only for discussion of item 1

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

4. Pakistan. Secretary Vance had some reservations about the sequence of events in our next steps for Pakistan. He was concerned that we not force the pace of events faster than the Pakistanis can accept and thereby risk another embarrassment. He was concerned that we do not have the necessary money on the economic side, and there is no agreed position within the U.S. Government on debt rescheduling. Secretary Brown noted that all we had agreed on was debt rescheduling, and that will take a long time so we have time to work out the budgetary aspects. It will not involve the current budget. Dr. Brzezinski noted that we are in a position of being damned if we do and damned if we don’t. The two elements which need to be explored are debt rescheduling and reaffirmation of the security commitment. [Page 988] Is it possible to get the reaffirmation without tying it to a specific piece of Pakistan-related legislation? All agreed that we first need to be clear in our own minds exactly what we can do, which includes consultations with key members of Congress, and then quietly approach the Pakistanis. The SCC agreed on the following sequence of steps:

(1) Henry Owen will convene a working group to develop an agreed U.S. Government position on debt rescheduling.

(2) Then informal and quiet consultations will be undertaken with key members of Congress concerning debt rescheduling and a possible formula for reaffirming the security commitment to Pakistan.

(3) After those steps have been completed, we will talk to the Pakistanis. The SCC discussed various channels of communication which could be used, and concluded that it would be best to work through Ambassador Hummel, with a carefully prepared set of talking points which relate our efforts to those of the allies and others. Dr. Brzezinski thought the Pakistanis still did not understand the role we had played and were playing in encouraging others to support Pakistan.2 (S)

Approve the sequence above.3

Other.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 32, (Meetings—SCC 293: 3/25/80). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter wrote “Zbig, J” in the upper right-hand corner of the Summary of Conclusions.↩
  2. In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “Do this w/out any press.”↩
  3. Carter checked this option. Beneath the options, he wrote: “A Senate resolution may be possible. J.”↩