Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

330. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State¹

Islamabad, March 22, 1979, 0915Z

3415. Military addressees for POLADs. Subject: (C) CENTO: Implications of Dissolution. Refs: (A) Islamabad 2980;² (B) Islamabad 2971;³ (C) Islamabad 3021;⁴ (D) Islamabad 3099;⁵ (E) Tehran 3115.⁶

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Summary: Pakistan’s March 12 announcement of its withdrawal from the CENTO Alliance (and the parallel Iranian and Turkish decision) effectively dissolves the 20-year old “garment of patches” and leaves Pakistan with only the 1959 bilateral agreement with the US as its remaining defense agreement with its former patron.⁷

—The GOP decision had been taken effectively long ago; CENTO has proved virtually useless in Pakistan’s confrontations with India (and more recently in assuaging Pakistan’s anxieties regarding Afghanistan). It stood, moreover, as a continuing obstacle to Pakistan’s affiliation with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The occasion for implementing the decision, however, was the appearance in Tehran of a government also willing now to shed its CENTO past. Many of the benefits of the alliance, especially in terms of regional cooperation, are still of value to the GOP, however, and we fully expect Pakistan to pursue, on a selective basis, the perpetuation of certain programs under bilateral or other (e.g. RCD) auspices.

—From the US point of view there also are aspects of the alliance worth salvaging, if the proper vehicle can be found. The dissolution of this alliance rids us of an irritant in US-Pak relations and may provide an opportunity for evolving a new approach to the region.

—Psychologically, the end of the CENTO—even with continuing Chinese support and a mutually-reaffirmed 1959 bilateral with the US⁸—will usher in a new era in Pakistan’s foreign affairs. Greater consideration of the views of the non-aligned and—as seems likely—of the views of the new leadership of Iran will increasingly come to dominate Pakistan thinking. In time, we would expect Pakistan to feel nonetheless more alone than heretofore, as the inadequacy of the NAM in security terms manifests itself. While many in Pakistan will argue that the new circumstance will impose on Pakistan a greater requirement for independence and self-confidence as a nation, the real pressures on Pakistan—from the massive Indian presence on one border, from a pro-Soviet regime in Kabul on another, and from the Soviet Union (refs)—may, in time, loom larger and more threatening without CENTO. End summary.

3. The Pakistani withdrawal from CENTO, announced March 12, came as a real surprise to few. It can, in simplest terms, be seen as a move by the GOP to shed an attachment no longer useful. Pakistan’s attachment to its CENTO tie had long since eroded, mainly the result of the alliance’s inability to assist Pakistan in coping with India, Pakistan’s major perceived threat, and in more recent times, as a result of the alliance’s impotence with regard to other regional developments, such as the Communist takeover in Afghanistan. Beyond that, Pakistan paid a cost for its membership in terms of its consequent exclusion from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The revolution in Iran, and the coming to power there of a non-aligned, Islamic Republic provided the catalyst for action, overcoming the last consideration of such positive aspects of the alliance as contact with Western and regional military services, joint military exercises, and a broad range of non-military activities.

4. In this message, we try to describe generally what the CENTO programs were, how they benefitted the GOP, and what their loss will mean to Pakistan and to the Western members of the now-moribund alliance. We will also comment on our initial views of how US-Pakistani bilateral relations may move to fill at least part of the vacuum created by CENTO’s demise.

5. CENTO activities in which Pakistan participated in the past few years were both military and non-military. In the former group, the most visible and energetic activities were military exercises. Less visible were programs under which CENTO members shared some intelligence and staged various conferences and visitations. In the non-military area Pakistan participated in numerous conclaves organized under the CENTO auspices (or that of its associated framework—RCD) which addressed civilian subjects from “land use” to “advanced technology.” These conferences and seminars brought into the CENTO–RCD milieu hundreds of private and public sector Pakistanis. A final category of CENTO activities—straddling the two outlined above—was the periodic political consultations held by the regional and non-regional members.

6. Military activities: In the past few years, much of Pakistan’s involvement in CENTO matters was broadly in the military area.

A. Military exercises—The most ambitious of these joint undertakings—and to the Pakistanis the most valuable—have been the military exercises included in CENTO’s annual calendar. Taking place primarily at sea or in the air, and hence of greatest value to Pakistan’s Navy and Air Force, these have included: Midlink (naval exercise); Nejat (search and rescue), Doost (military communications); Shabaz (air defense) and Nishan (small arms competition). In addition, the GOP has participated in annual Permanent Military Deputy Group (PMDG) meetings, visitations, and seminar programs.

—Major defects in the exercise programs have been their artificiality, the elementary level of the activity, the lack of challenge therefore to the Western participants, and the near total absence from the cycle of active participation by the Pakistan Army. This last has been a major limitation from the Pakistan side. Pakistan is a land-warfare oriented nation, and its army is its senior-most and most important service, but the army’s lack of involvement gave it never more than a lukewarm attachment to the alliance as a whole. For Pakistan, moreover, a land threat has always meant a threat from India, and for a variety of political reasons, the alliance could never plan around or—in 1965 and 1971—be responsive to that threat.

—Combined exercises have given the US (and the UK) an occasion to plan operations in the region; but just as our participation in the alliance was half-hearted, so was the priority we accorded, in our military and strategic thinking to the South Asian area. The main—albeit limited—advantage the exercises provided to the Western members was the occasion they presented for the deployment, support, and operation of armed forces for brief periods in this part of the world, remote from their normal operating areas. For Pakistan, the main value has been the shared operating experience and the exposure to “state of the art” procedures and equipment.

B. Joint planning—Some joint planning has been undertaken in connection with the preparation of exercise scenarios; it has been limited in nature, however, and has foundered on the CENTO alliance’s inability over the years to provide the type of political guidance—agreed to by all members—against which military planning can proceed. Part of this has been the result of the ambiguity of the threat perceptions of the members (beyond agreement on the threat from the USSR, that is); and part of this has been the lack of sense of unity of region.

C. Intelligence sharing—There has been some sharing of intelligence between US forces and the GOP but the flow is small and in one direction.

D. Military communications: During military exercises, the US and UK made available to the Pakistan military services communications equipment which has—at least in the context of the exercise—proven valuable to the GOP. In addition, the US has supplied some cryptographic equipment which allowed the GOP to maintain an “on line” capacity with other regional alliance members. This ad hoc arrangement was to be supplemented by the establishment of an extensive and expensive communications network, stillborn at the planning stage.

7. Non-military activities: A growing proportion of GOP time and money allocated to CENTO-related activities was expended in the non-military sector. These activities took various forms, including seminars and conferences under the general auspices of CENTO or within the Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD) framework. Conclaves with CENTO and RCD sponsorship have addressed subjects ranging from agricultural technology to socio-economic planning and have brought a wide range of Pakistanis from the public and private sectors into the CENTO/RCD cooperative milieu. Enthusiasm for these non-military activities has been generally high and in the first few days following the GOP withdrawal announcement we have been advised by various GOP officials and others of their hope that this type of activity will continue under some sponsorship other than CENTO. Pakistanis (and Iranians) at least, seem agreed that the RCD framework is at this point the most likely vehicle for a perpetuation of this highly-valued aspect of regional cooperation.

8. Periodic consultations, at the ministerial and lesser levels, represented a conduit for the exchange of political views and perceptions of the agreed threat from the north during the early days of the alliance. But almost from the departure of the Iraqis in 1958, this aspect of alliance membership waned. Meetings were held, but the content declined in real importance. From Pakistan’s view, the organization lost political value in direct proportion to its inability to satisfy Pakistan’s concern about the threat from India. The wars in South Asia in 1965 and 1971—whatever the causes and outcome—demonstrated to Pakistan’s leaders the utter futility of expecting CENTO to offer real security for Pakistan. Pakistani contribution to consultations in most recent years has consisted mainly of harping on the organization’s shortcomings, and under Bhutto, Pakistan’s flirtation with alternative international groupings, like the Non-Aligned Movement, began in earnest. And here, CENTO membership was an impediment to Pakistan’s acceptability.

—Thus we doubt that Pakistan will very much miss the consultative process of the erstwhile alliance system; they will, of course, continue to consult bilaterally with us on a variety of matters important to their security. For us, the demise of CENTO denies us a multilateral role in the area. It also clears away what might be properly called the CENTO irritant in our bilateral relationship with Pakistan.

9. Next steps: In our dealing with a Pakistan which has declared its affinity for the NAM and foresaken its multilateral security ties, we can—in some ways—begin with a slate wiped clean of all save our 1959 bilateral agreement. Many of the functions or irritants of the CENTO period will die a natural death and need no efforts at resuscitation. New patterns of bilateral cooperation, consistent with our interests and with Pakistan’s, realistically appraised, should now be anticipated.

10. All of this presumes that in taking its CENTO decision, Pakistan has not taken a step which will take it completely out of the US orbit, i.e. that the 1959 bilateral—repeatedly reaffirmed in the last year—will still be operative, will still provide even a non-aligned Pakistan some additional security consideration from Washington, and that the GOP will want that to continue. If the CENTO decision is the first step toward a more radical non-aligned status by Islamabad—a conclusion we are not prepared to reach at this point—then, of course, all efforts at bilateralization—even the 1959 bilateral itself—will pass into insignificance.

11. But we will be dealing with a Pakistan more assertive of its independence than heretofore, more jealous of its putative non-aligned credentials and of its G–77 interests than in earlier years. There will post severe limits on the kinds of bilateral cooperation which will survive, especially in the military/security area, however empty Pakistan’s new orientations may eventually prove in security terms.

12. Military activities:

—The continuation of certain aspects of joint military activities, such as exercises, may be seen—in time—by Pakistan’s leaders to be advantageous; we have no doubt that the Pakistan military especially the leadership of the air force and navy, will remain favorably disposed to future cooperation. The political leadership of the nation, and we must include within that President Zia ul-Haq as well as any likely elected successor, will be very slow to take advantage of any opportunities afforded in this area. Small-scale exercises, before or after US ship visits to Karachi, may be possible in the short term, as a way of keeping some military cooperation alive. And it is also possible that the GOP will, in time, express its interest in expanding its bilateral military exercise activities to include such non-CENTO-era partners as Saudi Arabia and France, as well as the UK (from CENTO and other days).

—We must avoid too hasty an initiative in this delicate area, because any increase in U.S./Pak bilateral military activities may be perceived as a reward to the Pakistanis for withdrawing from CENTO. Nevertheless, we should not be too hasty in cutting back our current levels of bilateral military activities outside the CENTO forum. In line with this, perhaps our best course will be to continue regular US Navy ship visits to Karachi, combined with the offer of occasional [garble]. Apart from resupply activity by MAC aircraft, we doubt that there will be an early opportunity to contemplate combined activities by US Air Force units with the Pakistan Air Force. To keep alive our contacts and ties with the Pakistan Air Force, as with the Army, we will have to look to our present forms of contact, through arms sales and advice, IMET, visits, etc. (such as those of MGens Thompson and Wolfe), to keep our lines open.

13. Non-military—As we see it from Islamabad, it is the non-military area which offers the most hope for post-CENTO collaboration, but even here the US role is likely to be minimal. In the first place, our overall bilateral relationship with Pakistan covers many areas of mutual cooperation and activities; they remain unaffected by the CENTO dissolution. More important, however, is likelihood that as Pakistan and its regional partners convert CENTO/RCD to a new organization, there will be little role for us to play in it.

14. True, our expertise in many areas will be missed, especially by Pakistan collaborators in various CENTO–RCD technical or scientific endeavors. But if we read the regional tea leaves correctly, the new RCD will be an organization—at the start at least—which has little place for a US hand or role. We should be prepared to be supportive when asked, just as we have been in the case of ASEAN. But a US role which is too direct or too assertive would, we believe, be the kiss of death to even this minimal form of CENTO/RCD follow-on. We should quietly encourage Pakistan to play a leading role in this activity, but we should also accept with grace the death of CENTO, the end of an era, and our consequent exclusion from regional affairs in Southwest Asia as an inevitable consequence of the broader changes now underway. And in this, we need to look to the preservation of both our global and our regional interests through hard-working bilateral diplomacy.

Constable

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790135–0748. Confidential. Sent for information to Bonn, Rome, Ankara, Colombo, Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, Kathmandu, London, New Delhi, Paris, Tehran, Peshawar (pouch), Lahore (pouch), CINCPAC, CINCEUR, and USDOCOSouth.
2. In telegram 2980 from Islamabad, March 12, the Embassy reported to the Department that Shahnawaz informed the Chargé that Pakistan had decided to withdraw from CENTO. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790114–0848)
3. In telegram 2971 from Islamabad, March 12, the Embassy reported the March 11 return to Islamabad of a Pakistani delegation to Iran headed by Shahi. Speaking to reporters, Shahi “described his meetings with Ayatollah Khomeini and Foreign Minister Sanjabi as ‛further strengthening the already excellent’ relations between Pakistan and Iran. Shahi said that Islam represents the ‛new element’ in Pak-Iranian relations and quoted Sanjabi as saying it will further strengthen the fraternal ties.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790114–0459)
4. See footnote 4, Document 329.
5. In telegram 3099 from Islamabad, March 14, the Embassy reported an account by a Pakistani official of Agha Shahi’s March 9–12 visit to Iran. According to the report, the trip was a “get-acquainted session aimed at establishing initial contact with new Iranian leadership at high level, exchanging views on bilateral and regional matters, and setting the stage for a close bilateral relationship in the future. Pakistan’s decision to quit CENTO, made before the visit, had been held in abeyance until it was possible to discuss the question with the new Iranian leadership, and it was natural that the two nations would have discussed this step in their very first high-level contact.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790117–0910)
6. In telegram 3115 from Tehran, March 20, the Embassy reported a discussion between the Embassy and a Pakistani Embassy official in Tehran regarding “Shahi visit to Iran last week, Pakistan’s withdrawal from CENTO, and Pakistan’s position on continuation and possible expansion of the RCD.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790131–0251)
7. The text of the Pakistani statement announcing Pakistani withdrawal from CENTO, given to Constable by Shahnawaz on March 12 (see footnote 4, Document 329), is in telegram 62521 to Valleta, March 14, which quoted telegram 2982 from Islamabad. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790118–0145)
8. In his March 2 meeting with Zia, reported in telegram 2569 from Islamabad, March 3 (see footnote 2, Document 325), Christopher again “reaffirmed 1959 bilateral agreement with Pakistan and added that U.S. will also look for tangible ways to help that will maintain and earn Pakistan’s friendship.”