319. Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency1
Monthly Warning Report: Nuclear Proliferation
[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]
3. Pakistani Gas Centrifuge Development and Foreign Supply Acquisition Efforts
[Page 744]The Community continues to be concerned that Pakistan, if it has not already done so, may soon acquire all the essential components for a plant that could ultimately produce the fissile material for several nuclear weapons a year. Indeed, Pakistan may already have succeeded in acquiring the main missing components for a gas centrifuge plant and ancillary facilities that are probably being built to produce highly enriched uranium for weapons, perhaps even by 1982. Still, foreign suppliers, by limiting Pakistan’s access to specially suited materials and equipment, could at least marginally complicate Pakistani efforts to complete the plant and to make it fully and efficiently operational. However, Pakistan has probably already acquired all the technology—designs, plans, and technical expertise—that is critical for the eventual operation of this plant. [portion marking not declassified]
[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, National Intelligence Council, Job 83B01027R: Policy Files, Box 3, Folder 1: Monthly NIO Warning Memos. Top Secret; [codeword not declassified]. Despres sent the report under a January 18 covering memorandum to the Interagency Intelligence Working Group on Nuclear Proliferation. (Ibid.)↩