317. Memorandum of Conversation1
PARTICIPANTS
- Ambassador Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan of Pakistan
- Hayat Mehdi, Minister, Pakistan Embassy
- Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Thomas P. Thornton, NSC Staff (Notetaker)
SUBJECT
- U.S.-Pakistan Relations; Southwest Asian Security (U)
Dr. Brzezinski had asked Ambassador Yaqub-Khan to pay a call before going to his new post in Moscow. The discussion opened with comments on Brezhnev’s health (both sides agreeing that he probably had good and bad days) and the prospects for change in the Soviet leadership. Brzezinski suggested that there is a 12–13 year generation gap in the Soviet Union, and that we are going to be seeing a transitional leadership situation for some time to come. (C)
In response to a question, Yaqub-Khan noted that his assignment to Moscow was the opposite of the usual progression (Moscow-Washington) for Asian ambassadors, and that it probably did reflect a Pakistani desire to reach a better accommodation with the Soviets. Pakistan would not be jumping into the Soviet camp nor harming its ties with the U.S., but the Soviet presence in South Asia is a reality that is making itself felt and Pakistan would be unwise to offer provocations.2 (C)
Brzezinski said that this was a very sensible approach. He stressed our continuing interest in the independence of the countries of the region, including Pakistan. We are also concerned with the stability and independence of Iran. Our improved relations with India are helpful to all parties including Pakistan. We are gratified also by the recent turn in Sino-U.S. relations and expect these to develop further. We see in this pattern of relationships the makings of long-run regional stability. These countries must think in regional terms for their security. We [Page 741] know, of course, of Pakistan’s problems with India but there is a larger historical convergence of interest in independence and stability. Changes in any of the four countries involved would increase the vulnerability of the other three—albeit least so in the case of China. India, Iran and Pakistan all have problems; great political and social stress inevitably has a foreign affairs impact. We want to assist in promoting stability and regional independence. Our arms offers were a token of this—but the critical issue is how Pakistan handles your domestic problems. (C)
Yaqub replied that the normalization of U.S.-Chinese relations was warmly received in Pakistan and, responding to Brzezinski’s observation, said that Pakistan indeed took special pride of having played an important role at the beginning of the process. Turning to relations with India, Yaqub said that there was less tension in the relationship than for many years past. Pakistan was doing its best to move towards normalization. Kashmir remained a problem, however, that had been aggravated by Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee’s recent statements.3 The Pakistanis have sought to minimize the impact of that and there have been good exchanges of sports teams, etc. Pakistan is also seeking to maintain normal relations with Afghanistan as evidenced by the recent visit of the Pakistani Commerce Minister. Responding to a question by Brzezinski, Yaqub said the Kabul regime was not stable. There had already been a coup in the army; there were widespread resentments against the regime; and it could not deliver the short-term economic benefits needed to retain popular support. The Soviets are propping Taraki up—through treaties and physical presence. The regime can be kept in power, however, only by force majeur (i.e. Soviet.) (C)
Brzezinski told Yaqub that the U.S. would continue to seek to dissuade Pakistan—and India—from going nuclear. We recognize that there are differences of opinion, but feel that we must pursue our long-term non-proliferation concerns for the greater security of all. Pakistani nuclear explosive development would greatly complicate our bilateral relations. (Yaqub did not respond.) Otherwise, Brzezinski said, we have no clouds on our bilateral horizon. (C)
Yaqub noted the unstable situation in Iran where the signs and portents are unfavorable. Pakistan had been glad to see George Ball play a role. (C)
Brzezinski reiterated our support for the Shah. We are trying to help set a framework for dealing with the immediate problem and to [Page 742] set things in motion for dealing with deeper problems over time. We think we are doing well in the former. Turning to U.S.-Soviet relations, Brzezinski said he looked for improvement. We have created a framework that excludes mindless confrontation on the one hand, and global condominium on the other. (C)
Yaqub noted misgivings on the Soviet side about the opening to China; despite what they say, they are very sensitive about the potentialities. (C)
Brzezinski closed the meeting by saying that we have sought to reassure Moscow on this point; we do not intend to exploit Sino-Soviet differences. In our dealings with the Soviets we look for mutual restraint—e.g., by the Soviets in Africa. (C)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 34, Memcons: Brzezinski: 9/78–2/79. Confidential. The meeting took place in Brzezinski’s office.↩
- According to a November 13 Memorandum for the Record by Turner, Vance told Turner: “The Paks recently transferred Ambassador Khan from Washington to the Soviet Union. He is a first-class Ambassador and was giving the impression that his transfer was because they thought they ought to explore whether they should have better relations with the Soviets.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 80M01542R: Executive Registry Subject Files, Box 22, Folder 10: Memo of Conversation w/Sec of State)↩
- According to telegram 18920 from New Delhi, December 8, which reported his December 6 comments in the Lok Sabha, Vajpayee “warned Pakistan that it would be playing with fire if it talked of self-determination in Kashmir.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780510–1041)↩