Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in France and the United Kingdom¹

Washington, November 1, 1978, 2321Z

278243. Subject: Pakistani Reprocessing Plant. Ref: (A) Paris 31540;² (B) Paris 31663;³ (C) New Delhi 15633;⁴ (D) London 16951;⁵ (E) Vienna 8200.⁶

1. Reports that the Paks are moving ahead to acquire sensitive nuclear facilities, including reprocessing and enrichment capability, and that work on high explosives continues, is raising serious concern here regarding Pakistan as a major proliferation risk. The USG intends to bring our concern to the attention of governments of potential supplier countries, including Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Japan, Canada, West Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK on the basis of the following talking points and non-paper.

2. We would like to brief the French first on our plans to approach other capitals in order to bring the GOF up to date on our latest intelligence. We hope this continuation of our dialogue with the French on the Pakistan problem will also encourage reciprocal sharing of information.

3. Embassy Paris is requested at the earliest opportunity to approach appropriate French officials (e.g., Jacomet) and review the intelligence information at para 5 and present the talking points and text of non-paper in paras 6 and 7. Please report any French reactions and comments soonest, but do not suggest that we are clearing this proposed approach with them.

4. In introducing this subject, you may say that the U.S. has, from its own sources, received information [2 lines not declassified] add that the USG has decided at least initially to share some of our information with key potential supplier countries and alert them to our concerns regarding Pak intentions as the UK has recently done regarding Pak gas centrifuge activity. We express the hope that particular attention be paid to Pak efforts to acquire materials and equipment to complete a reprocessing plant. Stress that we are drawing on U.S. or public information only, [5 lines not declassified]

5. As background information for the GOF, Embassy should relay the following noting that this intelligence is for the GOF and is not being fully shared with other capitals receiving our proposed non-paper.

A. In August 1977 a Departmental officer briefed Quai officials on information about the work of four subdivisions within the “technical development division” of the PAEC. The activities were: Implosion hydrodynamics; neutronics probably including initiators for nuclear explosives; high explosive testing; metallurgy including packaging of high explosives. [5 lines not declassified]

B. In addition to that activity recent intelligence indicates that at the Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Technology (PINSTECH) a “hot laboratory” is under construction which includes a laboratory scale reprocessing operation.

C. In addition, recent news indicates that the GOP is pursuing the development of a gas centrifuge enrichment facility. A large order of inverters is being sought from a UK firm. This topic recently was covered in Indian and British press reports (reftels C & D). The British have taken steps to prevent the proposed export of the inverters, and to alert other potential suppliers to these activities. (see septel)

Please stress for the French that this information is highly sensitive and closely held with the USG; we ask similar protection within the GOF. [2 lines not declassified]

6. Our anticipated approach to other governments comprises the following talking points and text of a non-paper at para 7. Begin talking points:

—I have been asked to raise with you a matter of deep concern at the highest levels of the USG. You are aware that for the past two years or more we and others have been troubled by Pakistan’s efforts to acquire a nuclear reprocessing facility which we believe could be an important step in the development of nuclear explosive capability.

—In addition we are increasingly concerned about the geopolitical situation in South Asia, as a result of the Afghan revolution and growing instability in Iran. We believe it is critical to stability in the region and to our non-proliferation objectives to inhibit Pakistan from moving closer to the threshold of nuclear explosive capability.

—There are news reports that former Prime Minister Bhutto recently claimed that before he was deposed, Pakistan was on the verge of “full nuclear capability”. He pointed out in this context that only the Muslim world was without nuclear capability and said Pakistan would share the technology with Islamic states. We do not necessarily accept Mr. Bhutto’s claims of imminent success in this field, but we do find this statement of intentions to be disquieting.

—We are under no illusion that Pakistan’s motivations or intentions have changed with respect to development of the nuclear explosive option. We believe that Pakistan is exploring the feasibility of completing construction of a nuclear reprocessing plant as a national project. To do so, Pakistan may attempt to obtain technical expertise, materials, and equipment from individuals and firms in various foreign countries, including yours.

—Also the United Kingdom has recently advised that it has firm information that the Paks are pursuing the development of a gas centrifuge enrichment facility. The U.K. has stopped export of inverters for such use and has asked other potential suppliers to be in a position to take similar action.

—[2 lines not declassified]

—Acquisition of a nuclear fuel reprocessing or enrichment capability would, and we believe is intended to, complement these activities. If Pakistan were to succeed in its efforts, we believe a particularly dangerous risk of nuclear proliferation would arise in Pakistan, with profound implications for the Middle East as well as the subcontinent. It is for this reason that my government has asked that your government be made aware of this information on a highly confidential basis. We are in close touch with other concerned governments on this matter: Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, Spain, Japan, Canada, West Germany, the Netherlands and the U.K. End of talking points.

7. Begin non-paper: The USG has reason to believe that Pakistan is seeking to complete the Chasma reprocessing plant—and perhaps build an additional facility at PINSTECH that may be capable of reprocessing—neither of which would necessarily be subject to international safeguards. If completed, either of these reprocessing facilities might produce sufficient plutonium annually for several nuclear explosive devices. We believe Pakistan is seeking materials, equipment, and technical assistance for these facilities from European countries and Japan. The Pakistanis may try to establish contact with relevant firms perhaps resorting to the use of indirect representatives and “dummy” purchasing agents to circumvent potential government controls.

The U.S. believes that your government should be in possession of these facts in order that it may exercise vigilance and appropriate control to deter Pakistan from acquiring sensitive facilities which would permit them to develop nuclear explosive capability. In addition, the US would appreciate receiving any additional information on this matter which may come to the attention of your government. The U.S., for its part, intends to permit no exports of materials, equipment, or technology from the U.S. which might contribute to completion of sensitive nuclear facilities in Pakistan. End text of non-paper.

8. Please report GOF reactions ASAP. We would be interested as well in any indications as to whether the French intend to raise this matter with other governments, although we do not propose pressing them to do so.⁷

9. For Islamabad: The information in para 3 above is in line with your suggestion contained para 2 and 3 of Islamabad 9753.⁸

10. For London: Advise Moberly that we are proceeding with above approach of talking points and non-papers to capitals of countries listed and note that we are passing US-origin information in para 3 above to Jacomet. Please confirm that UK has no objection to fifth talking point in para six above taking into particular account fact that we will be approaching two capitals, Madrid and Brussels, which were not recipients of British note.⁹

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2294. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to Islamabad. Drafted by Coon; cleared in OES/NET, P, S/AS, S/S–O, and EUR/RPE, and by Humphries, Van Doren, Coon, and Gallucci; approved by Nye.
2. See footnote 4, Document 305.
3. Telegram 31663 from Paris, September 25, relayed information that “Paks have decided to approach Belgian, Italian, and Japanese firms in an attempt to buy covertly necessary materials and equipment to complete the plant.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780393–0468)
4. In telegram 15633 from New Delhi, October 10, the Embassy discussed Indian press reports about British investigations into an alleged Pakistani purchase from a British firm of electrical equipment that could be used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780414–0610)
5. Not found.
6. In telegram 8200 from Vienna, September 13, the Embassy reported on Smith’s September 11 meeting in Paris with Jacomet. [text not declassified] (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840156–2451, N780007–0523)
7. In telegram 36143 from Paris, November 2, the Embassy reported that Jacomet planned to call in the Italian and Spanish Ambassadors in the near future to express concerns about supplying Pakistan with sensitive equipment that could be used to make nuclear weapons. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–1897)
8. In telegram 9753 from Islamabad, October 8, Hummel suggested that the Embassy in Paris be informed of intelligence relating to Pakistani plans to build nuclear weapons. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–2268)
9. Telegram 18055 from London, November 2, transmitted minor British alterations to the talking point. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840139–2181)