306. Article in the National Intelligence Daily1
[less than 1 line not declassified] apparently is still trying to develop a nuclear explosive capability [9 lines not declassified; portion markings not declassified]
The Pakistanis established a group of scientists [1 line not declassified] shortly after the Indians tested their nuclear device in 1974. The group apparently completed the theoretical phase of its studies in mid-1976 [5 lines not declassified]. The group’s current work appears to be a continuation of its earlier studies.
[2 paragraphs (19 lines) not declassified]
[less than 1 line not declassified] probably would not be able to develop even a prototype uranium enrichment capability in less than five years. [4 lines not declassified]
The Pakistanis probably have limited uranium ore reserves, but they should have no difficulty obtaining enough ore for a few nuclear explosives.
The Pakistanis may also attempt to finish work on a reprocessing plant [3 lines not declassified]. The Pakistanis may hope to obtain weap [Page 718] ons-grade plutonium from this plant by the early 1980s. It is very unlikely that they could complete it to [less than 1 line not declassified] but they may be able to contract a facility that meets lower technical, environment, and safety standards.
[1 paragraph (9 lines) not declassified]
[less than 1 line not declassified] will not in the foreseeable future be able to obtain spent fuel that is not under safeguards. Its safeguard agreements with Canada, the US, and the International Atomic Energy Agency are complicated, however, and it is unclear how [less than 1 line not declassified] interprets its obligations with regard to reprocessing and peaceful nuclear explosives [2 lines not declassified; portion markings not declassified].
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Support Services (DI), Job 79T00748A: National Intell Daily Publication (1977–1978), Box 4, Folder 2: National Intelligence Daily. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].↩