304. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
8939. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: Zia’s Ascension to the Presidency. Ref: (A) Islamabad 8911 (Notal)2 (B) Islamabad 75093 (C) Islamabad A–84.4
1. Summary: Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) General Zia ul-Haq’s decision to assume the presidency on September 16 appears to be a decision thrust upon him by the absence of any other acceptable alternative solution to the President’s apparent determination to step down (ref A). It will have important ramifications for Pakistan politics and possibly, for Zia’s own future. The negative impact of the General’s ascension to the presidency—fear that he is moving Ayub Khan-like, a sentiment already being expressed—will be determined, however, in large measure, by the way in which President Zia ul-Haq plays the all-important issue of national elections. End summary.
2. CMLA General Zia’s decision to accept President Chaudhry’s resignation and take over the presidency (now scheduled for 1700 September 16) comes as a minor surprise. There has been speculation for some months that President Chaudhry, whose term officially expired August 14, 1978, would resign and rumored candidates for his replacement were numerous (ref B). Chaudhry is old (74), reported often to be in poor health, tired of the office, and with no taste for the decision on Bhutto’s fate which might in time be taken in his name. That Zia has [Page 714] finally decided to take the largely ceremonial office himself probably reflects the CMLA’s judgement that he had no real alternative.
3. Once Zia accepted the fact that Chaudhry would not remain, some of the following arguments may have led him to grasp the presidential mantle:
A. Dearth of serious contenders:
—Zia’s rumored first choice to replace Chaudhry, Law Minister A. K. Brohi, had been indiscreet about the issue (ref B), and Brohi’s recent remarks about Pakistan’s important Christian community, which caused a great stir, had already forced Zia to punish Brohi with the loss of the religious affairs portfolio in the new Cabinet. The other rumored candidate, Pakistan Muslim League President Pir of Pagaro, never was a serious contender. The Chief Justice was also a possibility but his appointment would have upset the ongoing Bhutto appeal before the Supreme Court.
—Zia probably felt that even if no civilians were acceptable, he could not appoint another military man. Besides running the risk of creating an alternative power center—a pitfall Zia has quite successfully avoided up until now—Zia would lay himself open to charges that the military has no intention of ever relinquishing power.
B. National goals and Zia’s program:
—Zia may believe that he can use the presidency as a legitimating force with which to build national unity, and to help him pursue the other goals, such as Islamicization, that he desires for Pakistan.
4. The General’s ascension to the presidency, however, will cause him political problems.
A. Legitimacy:
—His takeover will further weaken the “legitimacy” of the government (refair), as all of those in high office (save the Chief Justice) occupy them extra-constitutionally. Initial negative reactions to Zia’s announcement have focussed on this issue. Yahya Bakhtiar, former PM Bhutto’s lawyer, has said that Zia’s decision “proves that the constitution is in abeyance.”
B. The Bhutto problem:
—Zia will lose the last fig-leaf in the upcoming decision on Bhutto’s fate. If the Supreme Court upholds Bhutto’s conviction and death sentence, Zia will be faced squarely with the ultimate life and death decision in his own name, as his new office is the point of last appeal.
C. Credibility:
—By taking the presidency for himself, Zia may further aggravate opposition to him in the Army. DAO reports (septel)5 that several [Page 715] senior officers have already expressed their disappointment with the General’s decision. While we doubt Zia’s move into the presidency will spark Army coup plotting, the Army’s self-conception as the nation’s temporary arbiter will be further shaken, and there will be comparisons made to Ayub Khan’s reign.
—Zia will have a much tougher time now convincing the people that his administration remains a temporary regime, intent on cleaning up the Bhutto mess and then turning the nation back to the people’s elected representatives. His move will be interpreted by many as the latest in a long series of actions he has taken toward making permanent his role at the top. Since his “temporariness” has, in fact, been a continuing source of strength—by denying the opposition politicians an issue on which they all could rally—his credibility on this score is important to his future. Opposition parties and politicians, already using the more liberalized political atmosphere to step up their demands for elections, will have now a new issue on which to assail the General and his regime. He may even have difficulties with those politicians who are already in his government.
—In foreign affairs, we doubt these factors will prove a problem; Zia has been dealt with as the man in power by all outsiders since he ousted former Prime Minister Bhutto in July 1977; the additional trappings of office will make no change. We would not be at all surprised if he discussed his plans on this matter privately with the Shah during his visit last weekend.
5. Most important, however, is how the new President plays his oft-repeated commitment to elections. Neither he nor his government has issued any statement other than the brief announcement of September 14th (ref A) to clarify their intentions or the background to the decision. Until now, it had appeared to most observers that the General was moving more and more directly toward a commitment to hold elections in 1979, with October as the likely time. He will need to reassert this commitment forcefully and promptly if he is not to face a radically changed political situation as he gazes down from the presidency.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780375–1091. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Ankara, Colombo, Dacca, Kabul, Karachi, Lahore, London, New Delhi, Paris, Tehran, and CINCPAC.↩
- In telegram 8911 from Islamabad, September 14, the Embassy reported: “Radio Pakistan announced early evening 14 September that President Fazal Elahi Chaudhry will step down from office at midday on Saturday 16 September. He will be succeeded as President by Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) General Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, who will be sworn into office by the Chief Justice. Announcement also indicated Gen. Zia will retain all of his present responsibilities as he assumes the presidency, meaning that he will continue as Head of Government/Chief Martial Law (de facto Prime Minister), as Chief of Army Staff, and as Foreign Minister, inter alia.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780374–0171)↩
- In telegram 7509 from Islamabad, August 2, the Embassy speculated on the future of Chaudhry’s presidency, the term for which was set to expire on August 14, amid rumors that Chaudhry had submitted his resignation repeatedly. The Embassy also noted: “Renewed speculation on Chaudhry’s future has been sparked by an August 1 statement by A.K. Brohi, Minister for Law and Parliamentary Affairs, that the constitution would ‛probably be amended by the authority of martial law to appoint a new President.’”(National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780318–0301)↩
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