297. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
7947. Subject: Reprocessing: Newsom Discussion With Agha Shahi. Ref: State 205550.2
1. We have following comments on Agha Shahi’s conversation with Under Secretary Newsom, August 11 (reftel):
—As previous Embassy reporting has indicated, no Govt of Pakistan can make public assurances it has renounced reprocessing.3 We had once thought it might be possible, albeit very difficult, for GOP to give us private assurances but events of past ten days make that option extremely unlikely.
—Publicity generated here by Reuters story on suspension of new aid commitments4 has forced all political leaders to go on record uncompromisingly in favor of reprocessing plant and in opposition to U.S. pressure on this issue. No govt official or political leader associated with the govt would now dare run risk of offering private assurances which might subsequently be made public.
—As economy continues to falter and Gen. Zia fails to generate any widespread support for his military regime, it is inconceivable that he or his associates will contemplate public or private assurances. Zia’s efforts to generate new support by formation of a civilian cabinet have yet to yield any appreciable results and are unlikely to do so in foreseeable future.
[Page 702]—As Zia faces his greatest challenge in weeks ahead, e.g., his decision on the fate of Bhutto, he cannot be expected to weaken his internal position further by giving any hint that he is less dedicated to reprocessing than his arch rival Bhutto.
—In these circumstances the most we can hope for are public statements that leave options open (i.e., are not rpt not categorical that reprocessing plant will be completed). Such statements will at least leave option open to us of persuading GOP that benefits of rejuvenated relationship with U.S. outweigh advantages of positive steps toward proliferation.
—Shahi was quite right in noting that whatever our political contacts may say privately about foolishness of GOP reprocessing caper (and a few have acknowledged it as a mistake) none can be counted to say anything publicly that would question importance of reprocessing facility for Pakistan.
—We recognize difficulties flagged by Zablocki and Glenn in persuading Congress that renewal of assistance is valid in the absence of assurances from Pakistan.5 Major point which we believe should be made is that in absence of viable relationship with us, GOP will almost certainly try to pursue a nuclear option. However, if we renew economic assistance and expand our relationship in meaningful ways (e.g., more military sales), we at least stand a chance of convincing GOP that a non-nuclear future is in its own best interest. And we of course retain option of again curtailing assistance if we are convinced subsequently that GOP is nevertheless moving toward proliferation.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850103–2255. Secret; Nodis.↩
- In telegram 205550 to Islamabad, August 14, the Department reported on Newsom and Shahi’s August 11 discussion in New York about the reprocessing issue and how to resume U.S. aid to Pakistan. Shahi asserted: “It would be politically fatal to the government to provide public or private assurances regarding future plans on reprocessing.” With this in mind, Shahi then inquired into what programs might be affected if Congress took a negative view on the restoration of U.S. aid to Pakistan. Newsom replied that development assistance, military sales or credit, as well as debt rescheduling could be endangered, but P.L. 480 and aid already in the pipeline would not be affected. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2279)↩
- See footnote 2, Document 296.↩
- Not found. In telegram 198367 to Islamabad, August 5, the Department explained: “On August 2 Under Secretary Newsom backgrounded Reuters correspondent in general terms on trip to area. Subsequently, Reuters pieced together situation on status of aid to Pakistan and put out story (sent to you USINFO) which contains no new elements, but we agree that the timing is unfortunate.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780321–1218)↩
- See Document 296. In telegram 204785 to Islamabad, August 12, the Department summarized Newsom’s August 11 discussion with Zablocki and Glenn regarding the Pakistani reprocessing issue and the resumption of U.S. aid. In the meeting, Zablocki and Glenn “stressed that many in Congress remain deeply suspicious of Pakistan’s nuclear intentions and that, even if the French withdraw, Congress will probably wish public assurances from the Pakistanis that they will not proceed on any other basis with reprocessing.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 113, 8/12–31/78)↩