Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

280. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Iran and France¹

Washington, May 15, 1978, 1957Z

123149. For Ambassadors Sullivan and Hartman. Subject: Pakistan Reprocessing Plant. Refs: (A) Tehran 4355;² (B) Tehran 4016;³ (C) Tehran 4356;⁴ (D) Tehran 4521.⁵

1. For Tehran—The French MFA is preparing an options paper for Giscard on the reprocessing plant sale to Pakistan. We understand that one option—the only one consistent with our non-proliferation policy—is cancellation of the contract. We obviously want to see the French choose that route, and are looking at ways we can encourage them to do so.

2. We believe that now is a propitious time to seek greater Iranian involvement in the reprocessing plant sale. Your frank comment to Khalatbary on this issue, reported reftel C, hit right on the mark. We find the Shah’s negative comment on the plant reftel D especially encouraging. We have also noted your assessment that the Shah would like to play a role in our attempts to have Pakistan forego reprocessing. Although the Shah’s views may not be a major consideration in the way Giscard chooses to go on reprocessing, an expression to Paris of Iran’s concerns and its willingness to help find an acceptable solution, might help tip the balance toward cancellation of the contract. We want to avoid, however, any appearance that we are encouraging the Shah to pressure the French, and would prefer that any approach to GOF be positive in tone and content. We should not reveal privileged conversations between US and the French including the fact that study on the subject is being now prepared for President Giscard.

3. You should consequently seek an appointment at an appropriately high level and make the following points on the reprocessing plant:

—We share the Shah’s deep concern that Pakistani insistence on the reprocessing plant is ill-advised and contains the seeds for further instability in the region.

—Following the recent events in Afghanistan, we face a different and disturbing situation in the area, one in which Pakistan’s security and well-being take on even greater importance.

—If the GOP persists in its attempts to obtain a reprocessing capability, it will have a continuing direct and negative impact on our ability to help meet Pakistan’s needs.

—A key to the resolution of this issue is France, which now must determine how to proceed in this matter.

—We want the Shah to know that we are actively considering what positive inducements we and others could offer to Pakistan after it agrees to renounce the reprocessing option. If the Shah is willing to undertake a candid exchange with Paris on the reprocessing issue, we hope he would be able to express Iranian willingness to work closely with us and Paris to find a way which is in our mutual interests out of the reprocessing dilemma.

—We believe it would be very useful if the Shah would express his concerns, and his willingness to work with the US and France on the reprocessing issue, to President Giscard in the near future. We think it is in our mutual interest if Paris is fully aware of Iranian views in this matter.

4. If the Shah asks what steps we plan to take to encourage cancellation, you can note that we are engaged in continuing talks with the French on this issue. We have expressed our views forcefully to Pakistan. We will continue to consult closely with the Shah to have the benefit of his views. (FYI. We are actively working on a proposed package which could include economic, political and military sales components. End FYI.)

5. For Paris—We want to avoid any feeling in Paris that we are orchestrating a campaign to bring pressure on France. You may, if you believe it desirable, inform Soutou or Jacomet that we hope to involve the Iranians in supporting our mutual goal of finding an alternative to the reprocessing plant, perhaps in terms of support for the package we would offer Pakistan after it gives up the plant. We have initiated discussions with Iran to that end. We will keep GOF fully apprised of the course of our talks in Tehran.

Vance

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780205–0919. Secret; Exdis; Priority. Sent for information Priority to Islamabad. Drafted by Raphel; cleared by Coon, Greene, Dobbins, Nosenzo, Nye, Oplinger, and in S/S–O and S/AS; cleared and approved by Lande.
2. In telegram 4355 from Tehran, May 8, Sullivan reported the Shah’s opposition to Pakistan’s plans to build a nuclear reprocessing plant. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780197–0333)
3. In telegram 4016 from Tehran, April 27, Sullivan argued that the Shah should be included in efforts to persuade Pakistan against continuing its efforts at acquiring nuclear reprocessing technology. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780182–0334)
4. In telegram 4356 from Tehran, May 8, the Embassy reported Khalatbary’s request for a statement containing the “U.S. view of situation resulting from events in Afghanistan,” an estimate of Soviet intentions in the region, feasible responses to “prevent further Soviet exploitation of situation,” and “what actions U.S. would be prepared to support, both in Pakistan and in Afghanistan.” Responding to Khalatbary’s inquiry regarding assistance to Pakistan, Sullivan “pointed out again that we could do nothing, either in the military or economic fields, if the Pakistanis insist upon acquiring their reprocessing plant. I suggested Iran make this point clearly and bluntly to their Pakistani friends.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780194–1064)
5. In telegram 4521 from Tehran, May 11, the Embassy reported Sullivan’s discussion with Khalatbary regarding the Communist takeover in Kabul and its possible threat to the CENTO region. Khalatbary raised concerns about Afghan intentions in Pashtunistan and Baluchistan, noting U.S. reluctance to offer aid to Pakistan until the nuclear reprocessing issue was resolved. Sullivan learned that Khalatbary raised the nuclear reprocessing issue with the Shah, who discussed the problem on several occasions with Agha Shahi during his May 7–10 visit to Tehran. Later, “at airport upon his departure, Agha Shahi asked Khalatbary to propose to Shah that reprocessing issue might be neutralized if Iran would join with Pakistan in the enterprise and could act as guarantor that plant would not be used for weapons purposes. Khalatbary had relayed this to Shah, who told him to tell Agha Shahi that Iran wouldn’t touch the plant with a ten-foot pole.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780200–0389)