278. Editorial Note
On May 1, 1978, Ambassador to Pakistan Arthur Hummel reported that, due to the events in Kabul, the Government of Pakistan was “intensely worried” not only about the general insecurity caused by a pro-Soviet Afghan regime, but also about the possibility of instability in Pashtunistan and Soviet efforts to secure a port on the Indian Ocean. While acknowledging that there was little the United States could do, and seeking to avoid unrealistic expectations, Hummel recommended that President Jimmy Carter send a letter to Pakistani Chief Marital Law Administrator Zia-ul-Haq in order to reassure the Pakistanis of the United States’ “continuing interest in and dedication to the stability and well-being of South Asia, and the central role Pakistan plays in that area.” (Telegram 4264 from Islamabad, May 1; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780185–0567) The day before, on April 30, as reported in telegram 3372 from Kabul, April 30, Radio Afghanistan announced that Nur Mohammed Taraki, leader of the pro-Soviet Communist Khalq Party, was named President and Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780185–0099) Telegram 3372 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, volume XII, Afghanistan, Document 10.
In a May 1 memorandum, National Security Council Staff member Thomas Thornton brought Hummel’s request for a Presidential letter to the attention of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski. Thornton argued against sending a Presidential letter (a draft of which was provided by the Embassy), stating: “I thought the letter vacuous and see no reason to elevate the matter to the level of personal correspondence. Since, however, Hummel wants an excuse to go in and hold Zia’s hand, I told State to do talking points for a personal oral message that Hummel can deliver to Zia in the President’s name.” Brzezinski approved Thornton’s recommendation. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 59, Pakistan: 1–12/78)
In telegram 112361 to Islamabad, May 3, the Department communicated the decision not to send a Presidential letter because it “might enhance Pakistan’s concerns, as well as raise unrealistic expectations.” However, the Department—forwarding the personal oral message cleared by Brzezinski—authorized Hummel “to inform General Zia that the President has asked you to personally convey his interest in the possible implications of developments in Kabul and that he would welcome General Zia’s personal assessment.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780188–0749)
Before learning of the decision not to send a Presidential letter, Hummel informed the Department of State of Pakistani de facto Foreign [Page 666] Minister Agha Shahi’s “strong bid for a face-to-face meeting” between Carter and Zia. According to Hummel, Shahi argued: “The ‛historic events’ which have taken place in Afghanistan now make it ‛imperative’ for there to be renewed consideration of the possibility of a meeting between General Zia and the President.” Hummel commented: “A very significant event to the future of this region has occurred in Kabul, and I believe it gives a new importance to our careful handling of the Paks during the next few months. I would remind the Department, for instance, that refusal in 1965 of a previous President of the United States to meet the urgent desire for a meeting by a former military ruler of Pakistan was a contributing element in the subsequent deterioration of regional relations in South Asia.” (Telegram 4351 from Islamabad, May 3; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780188–0740) Citing Carter’s busy schedule, the Department of State denied the requested meeting, adding: “Apart from scheduling problems, we believe such a high level meeting might raise unrealistic expectations with respect to possible US support, particularly in light of the impasse on the reprocessing issue.” (Telegram 117630 to Islamabad, May 9; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780196–0666)