Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

260. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, September 10, 1977

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

5. Franco-Pakistan Nuclear Cooperation: The French have told Ambassador Hartman that DeGuiringaud conveyed to Pakistani Foreign Secretary Agha Shahi on September 7² the proposal previously outlined to us on restructuring the French reprocessing plant so it could not produce pure plutonium.³ Agha Shahi noted the danger of the reprocessing plant becoming an election issue if Bhutto in particular should sense any change in the current status of the project. He would, however, be willing to recommend to General Zia further discussions with the French after the Pakistani elections if, in the meantime, (1) both sides reaffirmed publicly that the present agreement will be carried out; (2) some equipment could be approved by the French for shipment; (3) the US remains opposed to the deal.⁴ The French agreed to delay discussions on the restructured plant until after elections, but told Agha Shahi there was no possibility of early transfer of the key equipment, a chopping machine. They asked our Ambassador about the effect of transfers of other “non-sensitive” equipment on application of the Glenn Amendment.⁵

On Thursday,⁶ Joe Nye discussed with Glenn the application of his amendment to Pakistan. Glenn confirmed that so long as no French equipment for the reprocessing plant had been shipped after August 4, the effective date of his amendment, he had no objections to our signing new AID agreements with Pakistan. We have asked the French for assurances that this is the case.

While we understand the Pakistanis’ need for a public “the deal is still on” stance during the election campaign, we would be legally required to apply the Glenn Amendment whenever any future transfers of machinery or equipment take place.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Pakistan.]

1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Subject File, Box 38, State Department Evening Reports, 9/77. Secret. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Carter wrote: “Cy, J” at the top of the memorandum.
2. In telegram 26348 from Paris, September 10, the Embassy reported that the French briefed Hartman on September 9 regarding de Guiringaud’s discussion with Shahi about the Franco-Pakistani reprocessing deal. During the conversation, Shahi purportedly “felt it was most necessary that both sides publicly declare that the agreement will be carried out as originally contemplated and that this public posture be maintained at least until the election.” According to the report, de Guiringaud indicated that France “would look into the matter to see if a few non-sensitive contracts could be released without jeopardizing the French position on the issue.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840083–0254).
3. In telegram 22983 from Paris, August 8, Hartman reported on the August 8 discussion during which de Guiringaud informed him of the French proposal to modify the plans for the reprocessing plant so that it would only create reactor fuel that could not be—without significant effort—repurposed into weapons grade plutonium. According to Hartman: “Irrespective of how the Pakistanis might really feel about that—and whatever the internal pressures might be from the military or other elements of the power structure in Pakistan—the Pakistanis would have to limit their outward protest: otherwise they would be, in effect, admitting to the world that they want the reprocessing plant in order to obtain plutonium.” The revised reprocessing plant would cost, according to de Guiringaud, an additional $10–12 million, which the French expected the United States to help cover. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840083–0297) For the full text of the telegram, see Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVI, Arms Control and Nonproliferation, Document 350.
4. According to the French, Shahi insisted to de Guiringaud that “the United States must not appear to publicly alter its posture vis-a-vis Pakistan directly or indirectly since this would look as though secret deal had been made.” (Telegram 26348 from Paris, September 10; see footnote 2 above)
5. In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “What is election date?”
6. September 8.