Office of the Historian

259. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1

Washington, September 9, 1977

SUBJECT

  • Pakistan—Aid and Proliferation

State and AID are about to sign some $45 million worth of loans and grants to Pakistan. They are for reasonable, people-oriented projects ($25 million for fertilizer, $8 million for rural roads, $7 million for primary education are the main components). Under terms of the Glenn amendment2 this is all legal as long as the Pakistanis have received no prohibited nuclear technology since August 4. (They probably haven’t; confirmation of this fact is being sought in Paris.)3 State has informed Glenn, who seems relaxed, and they would preface the signings with a stern lecture to the Pakistanis that this did not indicate any softening in our determination to prevent them from getting a reprocessing plant. [Page 629] Hummel, in Islamabad, is of course all in favor of the idea, and failure to sign will be taken poorly by Pakistanis of all stripes.

Looked at from another way, however, what we are doing is exploiting something very near a loophole in our legislation. The government receiving this money has been notably unforthcoming in meeting our non-proliferation concerns. We will sign off a large amount of money with every expectation that the Pakistanis will in short order import some piece of equipment that will trigger Glenn Amendment sanctions. The money will continue to flow, however, since the sanctions apply to commitments, not expenditures. (I wonder if Glenn will stand by his relaxed attitude then!) The press will (with some little justification) claim that the Administration has pulled a fast one, and no matter how stern Hummel’s lecture to Zia, I doubt that Zia will be all that impressed.

This makes me frankly uneasy. I have no desire to punish the Pakistanis at this time, least of all in ways that will hurt some pretty poor people. Yet, going ahead as planned seems to offer a tempting target to critics of our proliferation policy and may even decrease our chances of getting the Pakistanis into line.

There should be some way of protecting our flanks on this one—perhaps by holding back on some of the projects, postponing action until there is an elected government in Pakistan, or some mixture of these. I don’t think that State has thought this through, and unless you have already discussed this matter with Vance, I believe that you should throw some sand in the machinery. The attached memo4 seeks to do this.

Tuchman concurs.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the attached memo to Secretary Vance.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 37, Pakistan: 1977. Secret. Sent for action.↩
  2. See Document 6.↩
  3. Telegram 207904 to Paris, August 31, requested the information. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850071–1751)↩
  4. Not found.↩