234. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
2028. For the Secretary from Byroade. Subject: Nuclear Reprocessing. Ref: Islamabad 1734.2
1. Our regular Embassy reporting is portraying the fact that Bhutto and his PPP party appear to be faltering to the extent that the election outcome here, with a week still to go, is increasingly in doubt. This message is to highlight that fact for your personal attention and make further comment as to how this situation may affect our nuclear problem with Pakistan.
2. In paragraph 12 of my round-up message referenced above, I referred to the fact that the Bhutto I have been dealing with up to now has been confident of his own political position, but that he could come out of this election with a mandate sufficiently reduced as to cause increased caution on his part in any quick and public solution to our nuclear dilemma. This is to state that the situation looks worse as of today. It is now fairly obvious that if Bhutto manages to stay in power it will be with only a slight majority. We must in fact begin to face up to the fact that he might lose out as Prime Minister.
3. If he wins by a slight majority we could predictably go into a period of ineffectual government with the primary emphasis being on political infighting to increase by the trade-off process Bhutto’s parliamentary majority. If the opposition should win, chaos in government would probably be even more apparent as there is little cohesion among the opposition and they are literally without plans for picking up the actual reins of power or sound substantive programs for running the country.
4. Of particular concern in this context is the very last paragraph of State 0420533 which indicates that the French have agreed to hold up sensitive transfers for at least three more weeks, which would seem to expire about one week after the national election here on March 7. Whether there can be an effective government in power here that could act this quickly is increasingly more in doubt. It would seem timely therefore to begin thinking now about the possibility of asking the French to give us more time. There may be a chance, of course, that [Page 580] commercial prudence itself would cause the French to want to delay in any event if a radical change should occur here which would cast prior commitments in doubt.
5. On a more general subject, violence here is increasing, and we cannot predict at this point how serious this could become in the week ahead. We are reporting this separately.4
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840077–2477, N770001–0707. Secret; Priority; Nodis.↩
- See Document 232.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 233.↩
- In telegram 2041 from Islamabad, February 28, the Embassy reported: “Law and order situation in Pakistan has taken turn for the worse during last four days. During past week-end, a number of deaths occurred during altercations involving police, PPP and PNA workers. New wave of violence began February 25, in Hyderabad, Sind, when police, according to official handout, ‛engaged in a gun fight with persons illegally carrying arms’. GOP claims three killed with numerous persons injured.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770068–0930)↩