206. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in India1
291464. Subject: Indo-US Bilateral Talks in Washington. Ref: New Delhi 204262 (Notal).
1. (Secret–Entire text)
2. Introduction and summary: The annual bilateral talks held in Washington October 27–29, provided a valuable and timely opportunity for us to conduct a candid exchange with the Indians about our positions on a broad range of bilateral and multilateral issues. The Indian side was led by Secretary Eric Gonsalves, second-ranking career official in the Ministry of External Affairs. Gonsalves met briefly with the Secretary and had longer talks with the Deputy Secretary (who hosted lunch) and Dr. Brzezinski.3 Under Secretary Newsom led the discussions. Although little new ground was broken in the presentation of positions, the talks were effective in bringing home to the Indians our strong sense of disappointment with their reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the influence that this disappointment has had on our view of the broader Indo-US relationship. They arrived in Washington with a more upbeat assessment of Indo-US ties than we had. The candid dialogue we had with them served to reduce this asymmetry and to encourage a sounder understanding of our differing policies and perceptions, and the elements on which they are based.
3. The Indians dealt with the nuclear supply relationship, our most important bilateral issue, in a restrained, low-key manner. They did not push strongly for immediate shipment of the second Tarapur fuel [Page 520] export authorized by the President (septel).4 On regional security issues, Gonsalves hewed to familiar GOI positions almost identical to those he adopted with DOD Under Secretary Komer in New Delhi in September (reftel). The Indians reiterated their familiar position on Afghanistan and again pushed the Babrak proposal for a dialogue between the DRA and Iran and Pakistan. They expressed apprehension at our increased security presence in the Indian Ocean and sought our participation in the Colombo conference next year on the IOZP proposal.5 Other issues reviewed included the Iran-Iraq war, the Middle East peace process, Indo-Pak and U.S.-Pak relations, the Soviet Union, relations with China, Kampuchea, and North/South issues. The latter three subjects, which involved separate sessions with EA and Under Secretary Cooper, are being reported separately. End introduction and summary.
4. Afghanistan: The Indians stuck to their familiar position on Afghanistan but, as in the past, failed to produce any specific ideas for resolving the problem. Gonsalves reiterated the GOI’s strong desire for a Soviet withdrawal, noting that Soviet troops were much closer to India’s borders than to the U.S.’ and that this was a matter of concern to New Delhi. However, he [garble] his remarks with the proviso that the Soviet presence cannot be isolated from the realities of the situation. Any resolution must take into account Soviet security concerns. Gonsalves believed that the Soviets are committed to an eventual withdrawal but only after they are certain that a friendly regime can survive in Kabul without their direct military support. Public pressure will not encourage a withdrawal. The Indians disclaimed having any special influence in Moscow and allowed that the Soviets were disappointed with the GOI’s position.
5. Gonsalves reiterated India’s preference for a political solution to the Afghan problem and its opposition to the Soviet effort to achieve a military solution. He found merit in the Babrak regime’s May 14 proposal for a dialogue between the DRA and Iran and Pakistan and expressed disappointment that this idea had foundered for what he described as semantic rather than real differences. We reviewed with the Indians the possibilities of a broad-based government in Kabul [Page 521] acceptable to both Moscow and the Afghan people. For the Indians, however, the bottom line was that there is presently no viable alternative to Babrak. Gonsalves speculated that once Afghanistan’s neighbors give pledges of non-interference through the dialogue approach there could be some form of self-determination leading to a phased Soviet withdrawal. He did not pursue this line in detail. We expressed our disappointment with India’s stance which tended to legitimize the Babrak regime and reviewed what we saw as the key elements in any resolution. Recognizing these divergences, the two sides agreed to remain in touch on this issue.
6. Southwest Asian security and Indian Ocean: We explained in detail the basis for our enhanced security presence in the region; the Indians predictably expressed their apprehensions. Gonsalves said that many Indian Ocean littoral states have fragile regimes which prefer to seek support from the great powers rather than address their own internal problems. This tendency introduced super power rivalries into what had been purely local conflicts and destabilized the region. Citing India’s own experience, he said a better approach would be for the regional states to cooperate among themselves to seek to resolve local disputes without great power involvement. Gonsalves speculated that perhaps the Non-Aligned Movement could play a key role in this approach, provided that the NAM returned to its original principles. India is developing its thoughts along this line and he thought that some progress could be made at the NAM Foreign Ministers meeting in New Delhi early next year. At the same time, he added, the super powers should sit down to resolve their differences and seek to return to their earlier code of conduct which provided for mutual restraint in regional disputes. (Gonsalves’ reference to a role for nonaligned regional countries in the Indian Ocean was very fuzzy, but it may foreshadow an Indian effort to counter big power presence in the Indian Ocean by promoting some regional consensus. This clearly bears watching. FonMin Rao also touched on this theme in his UNGA speech.)
7. Gonsalves took issue with our contention that our increased security presence was meant to counter-balance an existing Soviet presence. India viewed our naval presence as “lop-sided” compared to that of the Soviets. He said that Diego Garcia will be a full-fledged military base, rather than merely a communications/support facility. Gonsalves said that India was aware of Soviet activities in certain littoral states, but observed that there is a growing feeling among the Indian public that the U.S. presence is [garble] “somewhat menacing”. We responded that India must recognize the depth of U.S. public concern over Soviet intentions toward a region in which we had vital interests.
8. Referring to GOI support for the IOZP proposal, Gonsalves argued for U.S. and Soviet participation in the Colombo conference [Page 522] next year on the Indian Ocean, saying that the super powers had been taking actions in the region without consulting littoral states. We explained how difficult it would be to gain public support for our participation, since the conference would likely focus on U.S. naval forces and ignore Soviet land troops in littoral states.
9. Iran-Iraq war: We reviewed our efforts to end the war and our contingency planning to keep open the Straits of Hormuz. Gonsalves explained the dilemma facing the GOI arising from India’s good relations with both belligerents and characterized India’s role as “non-participatory”. He mentioned that India still faces a difficult oil supply situation due to cut-off from Iran and Iraq.
10. Middle East: Assistant Secretary Saunders reviewed the state of the Camp David peace process and observed that any forward motion on the Palestine problem would help ease our relations with the Gulf states. The Indians expressed hope for success but shared Arab skepticism that Israeli intransigence would block any real progress.
11. Indo-Pakistan relations: Characterizing India’s relations with its neighbors as satisfactory, Gonsalves said that the GOI remains committed to further normalization with Pakistan at a modest pace, largely because the Pakistanis themselves are reluctant to move too far too fast. A complicating factor is Pakistan’s habit of seizing issues sensitive to India (specifically India’s communal problems) for propaganda purposes. We [garble—expressed] our support for Indo-Pak normalization and reviewed our relations with Islamabad. The U.S. would consider military sales to Pakistan within certain limitations consistent with our concern for Pakistan’s security following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. While acknowledging Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns, Gonsalves said that India still has “some degree of unhappiness” about Pakistani military purchases. (See septel on nuclear relations for exchange on the Pak nuclear issue.)
12. Soviet affairs: We explained to the Indians our assessment of recent developments within the Soviet leadership and prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations. We predicted a tense and strained relationship with Moscow over the next year or two unless the Soviets show some sign of flexibility on Afghanistan. The Indians maintained that Soviet leaders see the U.S. and China as attempting to “encircle” the USSR. On Southwest Asia, Gonsalves said that Soviet actions in Afghanistan were taken to secure the USSR’s southern borders and that any great power would take similar action if faced with chaotic conditions in a bordering state. He agreed with our assessment that the Soviets had misread the situation and underestimated the difficulties they would encounter after the invasion. Gonsalves doubted that the Soviets would intervene in Iran over the next few years because the revolutionary situation there would offer no opening for Soviet meddling. Asked [Page 523] about Soviet policy toward Pakistan, Gonsalves thought the Soviets did not want to threaten Pakistan’s security, but might be tempted to destabilize the GOP if Islamabad continues to orchestrate an Islamic front against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The Indians had warned the Pakistanis not to create a situation they could not handle.
13. Minimize considered.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800522–0076. Secret; Immediate. Sent for information to Bangkok, Beijing, Bombay, Calcutta, Colombo, Dacca, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kabul, Kathmandu, Kuala Lumpur, London, Madras, Moscow, Singapore, Tokyo, and CINCPAC. Drafted by Walter Manger (NEA/INS); cleared in S/S–O and by Schaffer, Coon, and Deitz; approved by Newsom.↩
- Telegram 20426 from New Delhi, September 27, reported: “DOD Under Secretary Komer had a cordial and free-swinging discussion on September 26 with MEA Secretary Gonsalves which elicited a remarkable candid statement of Indian strategic thinking. Under Secretary Komer outlined for the Indians the rationale behind the US policy of deterrence in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, emphasizing the new departures in this policy. Gonsalves argued that cooperation among the regional powers was more conducive to stability than the efforts of a superpower. Under Secretary Komer stressed the linkage between oil and security, both to the West and to the littoral states. Gonsalves pushed the IOZP concept. He said India tended to see US actions as more threatening than Soviet actions, because of the impact of US relations with China and Pakistan. The meeting ended with a discussion of the overall balance of power between the US and the Soviet Union.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800465–1095)↩
- See Document 205.↩
- See Document 207.↩
- Telegram 4863 from USUN, November 5, which reported on the progress toward UNGA adoption of an Indian Ocean Zone of Peace resolution, summarized the proceedings of the meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee at Colombo: “On Oct. 30, at its final meeting in 1980, Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean unanimously approved an IOZP resolution which will be forwarded to the UNGA First Committee for adoption. Resolution accords with basic US and Western objectives. Ad Hoc Committee will meet next in February 1981.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800535–0893)↩