Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

193. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, August 8, 1980, 0746Z

16537. Subject: Prime Minister’s Letter to the President. Ref: State 204661.²

1. Secret–Entire text.

2. We see Mrs. Gandhi’s July 16 letter to the President³ as one more bit of evidence of the recrudescence of her deep-seated suspicions about the U.S. This notion also [1 line not declassified] here (USNATO 5567).⁴ [1 line not declassified] and me, Mrs. Gandhi’s strictures against the U.S. were considerably broader and stronger than conveyed by [less than 1 line not declassified]. Furthermore, we know now that the demarche made by the MEA to the British, French, Germans and ourselves about India’s hawkish image (New Delhi 15616)⁵ was directly attributable to Mrs. Gandhi’s pique. And, let’s face it, the emotional wrench of Sanjay’s death has probably reenforced the lady’s paranoic feelings.

3. When I saw FonSec Sathe on August 4 about the hostages in Iran,⁶ I mentioned that we had seen a copy of the Prime Minister’s July 16 letter and were completely puzzled by her reference to groups and prestigious institutions in the U.S. which were hostile toward her. I asked Sathe if he could throw any light on the matter. He seemed genuinely surprised to learn of the existence of the letter, saying it must have come directly from the Prime Minister’s office. Sathe thought the concerns expressed in the letter were part and parcel with her unhappiness at the tough, sabre-rattling image of herself projected in the Western press. He said that Mrs. Gandhi had been extremely upset when she directed the MEA to call in the four Western representatives and register a complaint.

4. The Embassy is at a loss to identify any specific critical remarks to which Mrs. Gandhi has taken issue. It strikes us that press treatment of her government has been, on the whole, rather favorable. If the President and the United States could receive in India as good a treatment as Mrs. Gandhi and India get in the U.S., we would be congratulating ourselves on a great PR success.

5. It will be very difficult to dispel Mrs. Gandhi’s apprehensions, except over time. Despite a generally good press in the U.S. she can always seize upon some insignificant critical remark to fuel her suspicions of us. The dialogue at the Presidential level offers some possibilities, but even here the possibilities seem limited. The argument that the USG does not and cannot control press and academic utterances will only further antagonize Mrs. Gandhi. Perhaps the best approach would be the simple and direct one of (1) expressing concern over her unhappiness and her perception of hostile U.S. institutions; (2) underlining the President’s strong attachment to the strengthening of Indo-U.S. relations, viz. Tarapur; and (3) suggesting that Ambassador Goheen, upon his return to New Delhi, talk over these concerns of hers in detail. The President’s reply might also usefully pick up the theme of the last paragraph of Mrs. Gandhi’s letter.

Blood

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800379–0297. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
2. Telegram 204661 to New Delhi, August 2, requested the Embassy’s interpretation of Gandhi’s July 16 letter to the Carter and noted that, “in particular, we are troubled by her allusion to ‛certain prestigious institutions’ which are centers of activity against her party.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800369–0981)
3. See Document 190.
4. Telegram 5567 from USNATO, August 1, reported an account given to Bennet at a July 29 NATO Political Committee meeting in Brussels [text not declassified] of a conversation between [text not declassified] and Gandhi. According to the account, Gandhi argued that “the ‛unnecessarily tough’ US stance in reaction to Afghanistan had contributed to a toughening of the Soviet attitude. The USSR had wanted to withdraw early on, but had to stay, the Soviets had told her, when security conditions worsened. The PM did not believe the Soviets would advance to the Indian Ocean, but the situation in Pakistan was dangerous and could cause them to retaliate against the Pakistanis for security reasons. She criticized the US rescue attempt in Iran and suggested that the real objective of the aborted mission may have been to take Khomeini and use him as a counter hostage.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800369–0314)
5. Telegram 15616 from New Delhi, July 26, reported that Gonsalves called in Blood on July 25 in order to express “concern that India was being erroneously projected by academics, press and politicians in some foreign countries as moving toward a nuclear weapons capability and throwing its weight around with respect to its smaller neighbors.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy, D800358–0766)
6. In his August 4 meeting with Sathe, Blood asked if Indian Ambassador to Tehran Akbar Mirza Khaleeli had been in contact with Iranian officials concerning the U.S. hostages. Sathe informed Blood that Khaleeli had spoken with the President of the Iranian Parliament, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, arguing “that it would be in Iranian interests if they could free themselves of the burden of the hostage issue.” Sathe also reported: “According to Khaleeli, Rafsanjani was non-committal, but Khaleeli gleaned the impression that there could be some ‛give’ in the Iranian attitude.” (Telegram 16156 from New Delhi, August 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800372–0794)