Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

191. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 18, 1980

SUBJECT

• India’s Foreign Policy (U)

I am getting increasingly worried about the tone and drift of India’s foreign policy. My concern is shared in the State Department. Specifics:

—The ill-timed recognition of the Heng Samrin regime, and lack of concern for ASEAN ties.²

—The poor Indian performance in connection with the Agha Shahi visit.³

—Reported Indian demands that the Chinese publicly disclaim any subversive activity in the Northeast as a prelude to normalization.

—Tough Indian posture towards Bangladesh and, probably, other neighbors. (S)

This has all developed in the past month or so, coming against a background of generally positive trends. The all-important (to us) Indian position on Afghanistan has not changed. But it certainly hasn’t gotten any better either. (S)

Probably this is a reflection of Indian self-confidence. The Chinese are coming abegging (as the Indians see it); we are bending over backwards on Tarapur; and the Soviets have just provided a really handsome arms package at virtually no cost. To the extent that the Indians continue to play all three ends against the middle—more power to them, I guess, although it is not comfortable. I am concerned, however, that the Hindu varient of chutzpah may become so egregious that (a) they will overstep themselves and cause a major foreign policy debacle, or (b) they will do something affecting us that will have serious repercussions. A negative outcome on Tarapur would increase the chances. (S)

In my usual inimitable fashion, I am telling you about a problem with little idea of how to cure it. (South Asia is like that). We had hoped that Muskie would be meeting with Foreign Minister Rao in the coming week, but the State Seventh Floor vetoed the idea of a meeting. Hence we will have no opportunity to get our concerns across that way. (C)

The ambassadorial situation is now worse than catastrophic. The competent Indian Charge is about to leave and will have all of three days overlap with his successor. When we raised this problem—no Ambassador here in over a year—with Indira recently, she noted it but said that everybody she had offered it to had refused.⁴ Just as well from what we have heard of the list. Bob Goheen is (quietly) being invalided back to the States for medical tests and will be gone for an indefinite period, perhaps quite long. The net result is that there is no possibility of a dialog through diplomatic channels. (C)

The one remaining possibility is a Presidential letter. I don’t like the idea for a number of reasons, but we may have to turn to it. I have asked State to start thinking constructively and will do the same. Probably it is wisest to wait for a few more indicators; no point in hitting Indira if we can avoid it. (C)

Should, however, the Indians do something in the near future that is counter to our interests, we should slap them hard. We don’t want to give them the impression that they will have things all their own way. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 7/80–1/81. Secret. Sent for information. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote: “OK, depressing, ZB.” Below Brzezinski’s comment, an unknown hand wrote: “7/22/80.”
2. India announced its recognition of the Heng Samrin regime on July 7.
3. During Shahi’s July 15–16 visit to New Delhi, Foreign Minister Rao “reportedly reiterated India’s commitment to seek a political solution of Afghan crisis. Referring to NAM’s failure to take initiative in this regard, Rao said that any NAM initiative would have to be ‛cohesive and unified’. He reportedly said that India had no inhibitions about joining Pakistan in helping it find a political solution. However, such a move must take all factors into consideration.” (Telegram 15072 from New Delhi, July 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800343–0883)
4. In a July 11 memorandum to Carter, Christopher reported that, in a July 10 meeting between Goheen and Gandhi, Goheen “mentioned our concern about the year-long vacancy in the Indian Ambassador’s slot in Washington, and Mrs. Gandhi indicated that she would try to resolve this problem soon.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Daily CIA Brief File, Box 29, 7/11/80–7/15/80.