173. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter1
[Omitted here is material unrelated to India.]
5. Consultations with Indians on Afghanistan: In meetings in the Department today,2 senior Indian Foreign Ministry official Eric Gonsalves said India agrees with the US that the Soviets should withdraw promptly from Afghanistan. He stressed the importance of maneuvering the Soviets into a position of having to honor the commitment to withdraw that Gromyko and Brezhnev had offered. In the Indian view, it is important to convey to the Soviets that the US, China, and Pakistan would not support intervention.
Gonsalves argued that what the Soviets want in Kabul is a government which would not threaten them, not necessarily a Marxist one. The Soviets did not want to keep their troops in Afghanistan since this would inevitably mean that in a few years the US would also build up forces in the area. Gonsalves recognizes the great difficulty of finding a leader acceptable to the Soviets and to international opinion as well as to the Afghans.
Gonsalves expressed apprehension that we might provide Pakistan with large amounts of the kind of military equipment which could be used by the Paks only against India. However, he said India could live with a $400 million package of US assistance, although it would protest this publicly. He asked that we continue to consult closely with India on the Afghan crisis.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 22, Evening Reports (State): 2/80. Secret. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum.↩
- Telegram 55448 to New Delhi, March 1, reported on Gonsalves’s February 26 meeting with Christopher, Saunders, Coon, and Schaffer, during which Afghanistan and possible arms supplies to Pakistan were discussed. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800107–0541) Telegram 52786 to New Delhi, February 28, summarized Gonsalves’s February 26 discussion with Pickering on nuclear issues, in which Pickering reiterated the need for assurances from India “that existing agreement for cooperation and related understandings continue in force,” as well as “on forbearance regarding nuclear explosive development” in order to facilitate approval of the pending nuclear fuel requests by India. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800101–0973)↩