166. Letter From President Carter to Indian Prime Minister Gandhi1
When I last wrote to you, after the 1977 general elections, I observed that the essence of a democracy is its free electoral system.2 Now, nearly three years later, the people of India have again demonstrated to the world the strength and vitality of their democratic institutions—and have clearly shown their faith in you. I warmly congratulate you upon your assumption of office.3
I have asked Ambassador Goheen to carry this letter to you, with my hope that it marks the beginning of an active and candid dialogue. We have much to discuss with each other. Because India and America are democracies with a free and active press, the underlying policies each of our countries pursues may not always be clear to the other. By communicating directly with each other, I hope that there never will be any doubt about our actual positions. Should any concern arise, I hope that you will contact me or Ambassador Goheen directly.
Strengthening Indo-American relationships is a goal I set at the very beginning of my Administration. We engaged with the Government of India in continuing discussions on a wide range of international and regional issues. Beyond the ties of democratic philosophy that bind our two nations, we have striven to add flesh to our bilateral relationship. As you know, we have resumed both military sales and economic development assistance to India. The work of the Indo-US Joint Commission and its four subcommissions has expanded greatly, and our [Page 436] two countries are engaged in many cooperative projects in such areas as solar energy and agricultural and medical research. Trade between us continues to grow, as does cultural and scholarly exchange. I want to see this process continue in the years ahead.
With the exception of the tragic and dangerous situation in Afghanistan, I am struck by the improvement in relations among the nations of South Asia over the past five years or so. We have fully supported the major role that India has taken in bringing this about. I sincerely hope that this process—in which you have played such an important part—will continue, and that India will make further progress toward reducing tensions, resolving outstanding issues with its neighbors, and encouraging regional stability.
In this regard, America cannot help but look with grave disquiet and concern at the recent Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the overthrow of the Amin Government by Soviet troops. Soviet actions in Afghanistan and the continued presence there of Soviet military forces directly engaged in operations against the people of Afghanistan have serious consequences both for the region and the world as a whole. I know that as the leading power in the region, and as a nation that traditionally has opposed external interference in the affairs of the area, India too is concerned about developments in Afghanistan and their implication for the stability of the region. I am eager to receive your thoughts on this question.4
Pakistan is obviously and understandably concerned. We are prepared to respond to Pakistan’s needs in the context of the events in Afghanistan. I am fully aware of India’s concerns, but I feel the changed circumstances require understanding on both our parts. The U.S. also intends to be more responsive to Indian requests for military equipment, including high technology items that India cannot produce itself. I will ask Ambassador Goheen to keep in close touch with you on these questions.
We are seeking neither alignment with any nation in the region nor confrontation between any nation and the Soviet Union. I am firmly convinced that the nations of South Asia bear the responsibility for their own security. The United States seeks no position of special influence there. We welcome a non-aligned South Asia that seeks equally [Page 437] good relations with the Soviet Union and the United States, a South Asia free of all external manipulation. But I believe strongly that Soviet actions in Afghanistan—what is, for all practical purposes, their occupation of a sovereign member of the Non-Aligned Movement—strike directly at policies that both our countries have pursued in recent years. It is vitally important that we fully understand each other’s views and actions.
The most difficult bilateral issue we face is the future of our nuclear relationship. We are well aware of each other’s positions on this question. The resolution of our differences is a matter that we shall want to pursue further with your Government as soon as you find it convenient. In the meantime, I am prepared to issue an Executive Order authorizing the first of the two pending exports for the Tarapur reactors if the Nuclear Regulatory Commission does not act favorably and expeditiously. I shall also direct that the Executive Branch submit a favorable recommendation to the NRC on the second application. I have asked Ambassador Goheen to discuss with you the difficulties that we may encounter with these exports and ways in which they might be met.5 The nuclear issue is especially difficult because both of our countries base their positions on principles sincerely held. I hope this token of our good faith will be the first step towards a solution that satisfies all of our common concerns.
Finally, I would like to repeat my hope that this might be the first letter in a regular correspondence. I earnestly seek your views on the many concerns that our two nations share. I recognize that during the history of our relations with India there have been too many occasions when both nations talked but neither listened to what the other was saying. I am as eager to listen as to talk, and to build a future relationship of mutual trust and understanding between us.
Sincerely,
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 1–3/80. No classification marking. Telegram 9356 to New Delhi, January 12, directed the Embassy not to deliver this version of the letter to Gandhi because of complications caused by the Indian statement at the January 11 UNGA emergency special session on Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800021–0275) According to telegram 122 from USUN, January 12, the Indian representative, noting the Soviet assurances to India that the Afghan Government had requested Soviet military assistance, stated: “We have no reason to doubt assurances, particularly from a friendly country like the Soviet Union with whom we have many close ties.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800020–0439) Telegram 10597 to New Delhi, January 13, and telegram 10917 to New Delhi, January 14, directed the Embassy to revise Carter’s letter in view of the Indian statement at the UNGA; see footnotes 3, 4, and 5 below. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800023–0560 and D800024–0521, respectively)↩
- Carter’s 1977 letter to Gandhi was not found.↩
- Telegram 10917 to New Delhi, January 14, directed the Embassy to change the last line of this paragraph to read: “I congratulate you sincerely upon your assumption of office.” See footnote 1 above.↩
- Telegram 10917 to New Delhi, January 14, directed the Embassy to change the last two sentences of this paragraph to read: “I assume that as the leading power in the region and as a nation that traditionally has opposed external interference in the affairs of the area, India too must recognize the serious consequences of developments in Afghanistan and their implication for the stability of the region. I will be interested to receive your personal thoughts on this question.” The telegram also directed that the revised letter be dated January 14 and delivered to Gandhi. See footnote 1 above.↩
- Telegram 10597 to New Delhi, January 13, directed the Embassy to revise the preceding three sentences to read: “In the meantime, we would be prepared to issue an Executive Order authorizing the first of the two pending exports for the Tarapur reactors if the Nuclear Regulatory Commission does not act favorably and expeditiously and if your government would agree to provide the assurances which had been made available to us earlier. I would also direct that the Executive Branch submit a favorable recommendation to the NRC on the second application. I have asked Ambassador Goheen to discuss this with you.” See footnote 1 above.↩