153. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State1
16687. Subject: Ambassador’s Meeting With Charan Singh—Primarily on the Nuclear Problem. Ref: (A) State 240341;2 (B) 223448;3 (C) 205835.4
1. (S)–Entire text
2. Summary: In a half-hour meeting with PM Charan Singh today, I found him well briefed on the nuclear problems and distinctly pessimistic about the ability of both sides to resolve their differences. I emphasized our hope that ways to achieve a mutually acceptable resolution could still be found in the months that remain, our desire to continue discussions with the GOI on this matter, and the desirability of foregoing as far as possible public statements that would further complicate an already difficult set of problems. He dwelt at some length on the issue of the contract and then the danger that would be posed to India if Pakistan develops nuclear weapons. Basically, he stood on [Page 407] his Red Fort statement,5 but in doing so he twice underlined the word “perhaps” in the last sentence of that statement. (This would have that sentence say, “If Pakistan sticks to its decision—I and my colleagues will perhaps be forced to reconsider the entire question.”) We closed on his nodding assent to my repetition that we should not give up hope of some way being found to permit continued nuclear cooperation and that both sides needed to try to avoid foreclosing that possibility by either precipitous statements or actions. End summary.
3. Charan Singh gave me a half-hour’s appointment this afternoon. Others present were Dr. Sethna, Eric Gonsalves, Krishnaswamy Rao Sahib (who seems to be acting as Principal Secretary), and Prakash Shah (notetaker). Since the PM will only receive Ambassadors to discuss predesignated and pressing subjects, our talk was confined almost entirely to the questions of nuclear proliferation and nuclear cooperation, and I could not raise any of the other topics suggested in reftel A. I found the PM well informed, alert, articulate, firm in his views, but not at all abrasive. He did all the talking for the Indians, and seemed to reflect more a resigned disappointment about U.S. nuclear policy and supply than any marked antagonism.
4. I began with some remarks about the importance which my government attaches to India, our mutual values and interests, and our gratification in the qualitative and quantitative improvement in Indo-US relations in the recent years. His reply was, “I echo every word you have said.” And then he spoke about our shared democratic values and the existence in India of much goodwill and understanding toward America. The remaining 25 minutes or so were all on the nuclear questions.
5. I began by laying out quite closely the guidance offered by the Department in ref B, but I perhaps emphasized rather more that we are eager to maintain nuclear cooperation with India if at all possible and that we are taking a hard look at what we, and not only India, can do in order to assure it. I also noted that uncertainty in Washington about India’s future nuclear policy was an obvious complicating factor, but I hoped it might perhaps be overcome by further discussions. Charan Singh’s initial reply was to lecture me (gently) on the fact that we have a contract to supply Tarapur and that Indians could not [Page 408] understand how so large and respected a country as the USA could think of unilaterally cancelling a contract. He turned next to the situation posed to India by the evidence that Pakistan is working to build a nuclear bomb. He maintained that such a development would alter the balance of power in the subcontinent and pose a serious threat to India. Moreover, the Indian people were already much troubled by the reports that had been published on Pakistan’s nuclear efforts; many were dissatisfied by the kind of response Morarji Desai had given; he himself felt a responsibility to meet the concerns of the people.
6. After I had offered some rebuttal to the seriousness of the threat to India posed by one or two Pakistani bombs and had urged that the situation should be looked at in terms of the possible global spread of nuclear weapons, not simply as a regional affair, Charan Singh (without acquiescing) took a somewhat different tack. He pointed out that he had made a qualified statement at the Red Fort, one which went no further than Vajpayee had gone on the floor of Parliament in saying that a Pak bomb might call for a reappraisal of Indian nuclear policy. In fact, Charan Singh pointed out, in his Red Fort statement he had carefully said his government might perhaps be forced to consider the no-bomb policy, if Pakistan went ahead to develop one; and he had said that for now the policy remains not to join the race for nuclear weapons.
7. The PM spoke with feeling about the tolerance India had toward Pakistan and the impropriety of Zia’s having raised the Kashmir issue at Havana.6 He asserted that India had no desire to expand its territory, and claimed that he could not comprehend why Pakistan seems always to be so distrustful of India. We also talked about the continuing need for Indian restraint toward, and where possible reassurances to, Pakistan if efforts to dissuade it from a nuclear course were to have any chance of effect.
8. Near the end, in a manner not unlike Morarji’s, Charan Singh turned to the greater responsibility and the greater influence which the US and USSR have to bring about a world not endangered by nuclear weapons, and we exchanged views briefly on SALT II, the CTB, and the dangers also inherent in horizontal proliferation.
9. As the meeting ended, I tried to sum up the message I had brought as follows: We have not given up trying to preserve US-India nuclear cooperation. We are exploring whether there are steps we can [Page 409] take on our part within the allowances of our law which we have perhaps not adequately considered before. We are not simply asking for concessions from India, as in the past, but the degree of uncertainty that attends India’s future nuclear policy must be recognized as a potentially serious impediment. Nor in any case can we be sure of success. In these circumstances we need patience on both sides, care to avoid doing or saying things that will prematurely foreclose all chances of a solution, and a readiness to continue discussions. Charan Singh nodded, and said, “Hope must spring eternal.”
10. Postscript: At various points in this conversation, the Tarapur license applications were brought up. Our failure to clear them drew various expressions of uncomprehending impatience and begrieved disappointment.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790418–0462. Confidential; Immediate; Stadis. Sent for information to Islamabad and Bombay.↩
- Telegram 240341 to New Delhi, September 12, conveyed instructions for Goheen’s meeting with Singh. In particular, it directed Goheen to highlight growing U.S. concerns over developments in Afghanistan, reassure Singh that Sino-U.S. relations would not develop at the expense of Indo-U.S. relations, and inquire into India’s views on the future of the NAM. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790417–0192)↩
- Telegram 223448 to New Delhi, August 25, delivered instructions to Goheen for his discussion of nuclear matters with Singh, which focused on facilitating the pending nuclear export license before the NRC by seeking non-proliferation assurances. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790387–1170)↩
- Telegram 205835 to New Delhi, August 8, instructed Goheen to meet with Singh in order to discuss bilateral issues, even though the “life of the Singh government may be short, but we still believe we have something to gain by initiating discussions at this time.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790358–1221)↩
- Telegram 14495 from New Delhi, August 15, reported Singh’s August 15 Indian Independence Day speech at the Red Fort. According to the English translation of the statement issued by the Indian Government, Singh said: “It has been our decision and remains our decision so far that we do not want to manufacture nuclear bombs or join the race for nuclear weapons. However, if Pakistan sticks to its decision and continues in its efforts to manufacture the bomb or the stockpiling of these bombs, I and my colleagues will probably be forced to reconsider the entire question.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790371–0314)↩
- According to telegram 16280 from New Delhi, September 8, which reported Zia’s remarks at the Non-Aligned Movement Summit, held September 3–9 in Havana, Zia discussed Kashmir and took a “particularly hard line. He asserted that there was a secret agreement between Mrs. Gandhi and Bhutto at Simla, and that Bhutto had in effect sold out Kashmir to India.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790411–1030) For the Simla Agreement, see footnote 6, Document 126.↩