Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

135. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, April 23, 1979

SUBJECT

• Your Meetings with Indian Foreign Minister Vajpayee (U)

The Setting

We are at a critical stage in our relations with India. The personal relationship that you have established with Desai has had to carry the main burden of the relationship. In more specific areas, it is not in very good shape and the prospects are for further, possibly drastic, deterioration.

—Our inability to convince India to accept full-scope safeguards is likely to lead to a cutoff of fuel for Tarapur next Spring. The Indian press purveys almost daily anti-American pieces on this theme, and Desai is under intense pressure because of the “failure” of his relationship with you to produce benefits for India in this area. If we cut off the Tarapur supply there is a good chance that the Soviets will replace us and the Indians may assert unilaterally their right to reprocess the spent fuel that has been produced at Tarapur. On top of this, pressures on Desai are already nearly irresistible to change his no-bomb policy in light of the Pakistani program.²

—Desai’s (and especially Vajpayee’s) initiative in opening to China has been substantially discredited by the Chinese attack on Vietnam which many Indians see as proof that the Chinese will someday renew their attacks on India. Our normalization with China, meanwhile, is seen as a threat, presaging a further decline in US interest in India. In specifics, the Indians see China getting the investment, technology and weaponry that India should be getting from the West.

—The Indians are acutely concerned that we may be about to tilt again towards Pakistan as a result of our concern over the Soviet regional threat and our need for intelligence facilities. They are particularly sensitive to US arms sales to Pakistan; even more worried that we will have joint security arrangements that would once again embolden Pakistan to behave aggressively towards India. The Indians also fear that our preoccupation with the Soviet threat will lead to US military buildups in the Indian Ocean.

—Although the Indians and Soviets have their differences, Kosygin’s recent visit made a favorable impression and the Desai Government has been made increasingly aware that the Soviets are their only reliable support against China; their only viable source for sophisticated arms; and potentially their fall-back for supply to Tarapur. The Soviets’ inability to provide much in the economic area weighs little in light of large Indian foreign exchange reserves and the inability of India to attract Western capital.

—Domestically, Desai’s Government has been a disappointment. It is under heavy fire from Mrs. Gandhi and others, and the pro-US tilt that Desai sought to introduce is a particular target of attack—especially as it is seen as having been unproductive.

There are certainly positive developments in the relationship, notably in trade and in general civility of tone. Also, we are reintroducing an aid program.³ These, however, are not the focus of attention.⁴

Seen from our perspective, the situation is also less than optimal. There have been very few changes in the substance of Indian positions in multilateral fora; Desai has remained rigid on nuclear matters; and India has not opened up to US investment much more than was the case under Mrs. Gandhi. Principally we still benefit from something India is doing in its own interest—keeping the Soviets at arms length and its keeping South Asia quiet, coupled with genuine attempts to cement good relations with all of its neighbors including Pakistan. The Indians have been unwilling, however, to engage in frank discussions of South Asian security matters with us (notably during Warren Christopher’s visit), or to recognize that we have any security interests in Pakistan.

Main Themes

The attached State Department briefing memorandum⁵ sets forth a series of issues that you might want to raise with Vajpayee. The time available is short, however, and I recommend that you focus fairly narrowly along these lines:

—We are concerned with two sets of developments in South Asia. The first is the real change in the Soviet potential for involvement in the region following the coup in Afghanistan. The other is the threat of a nuclear arms race in the Subcontinent. We know what the Pakistanis are doing, and we know the pressures that will build up in India if the Pakistanis move close to a nuclear capability.⁶

—The United States has no desire to play a leading role in South Asia. It is clear that India is the only country that can appropriately do that. That is why we look to India to provide the kind of leadership that will keep South Asia stable and reduce the temptation for outsiders to become involved. We too are the largest power in our region and know how difficult it is to provide leadership without causing resentment. It is a task, however, that cannot be avoided.

—On the nuclear front, what ideas does India have about removing the pressures that have impelled Pakistan to develop a nuclear explosive capability? This is a global problem of great concern to us. It must be of even greater concern to India in the regional context. A regional solution must be found. I suggested to Prime Minister Desai that direct contacts might be of use.⁷ Would he be interested in pursuing this and could I be of help?

—On the broader issue of regional stability, how does India propose to deal with Pakistan’s legitimate security concerns? The extension of Soviet power into Afghanistan cannot be ignored, and repeated false Soviet allegations of Pakistani backing for the Afghan insurgency can only be seen as threatening. Military equipment is only a small part of the answer. Pakistan needs a broader sense of security. We are trying to contribute to that, but again, India’s role is much more significant. We do not think that there is enough time to wait until generations pass and Pakistani distrust of India subsides. We, for our part, will continue to make clear to the Pakistanis that we do not share their belief that India is a threat to them.

These are the main themes that you should pursue. You may want to touch on the following points, but I suggest that you do so by working them into the main lines of your presentation. Cy and I will cover them in detail in our private discussions with Vajpayee:

—We are pursuing SALT and CTB vigorously.

—We do not foresee any massive military buildup in the Indian Ocean region.

—We were disappointed by India’s negative attitude on the Israel-Egypt treaty.⁸

—We have a positive attitude toward the Non-Aligned Movement but are concerned at attempts to push it towards the Soviets. We hope India will be successful in defeating these attempts.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 94, Vajpayee Visit: 3–5/79. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed at the top of the memorandum
2. [text not declassified]
3. Despite some protests from Congress (see footnote 11, Document 96), the United States resumed aid to India, which, according to telegram 320064 to New Delhi, December 20, 1978, was set in the amount of $135 million for FY 1980. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780526–0593)
4. In an April 17 memorandum to Brzezinski, Thornton addressed the issue of the U.S. relationship with India, noting, “What does not need to be done is more aid money. The Indians are totally uninterested.” In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, Brzezinski wrote: “I agree.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 10/78–12/79)
5. Attached but not printed is an April 21 memorandum from Christopher to Carter. A copy is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton Country File, Box 94, Vajpayee Visit: 3–5/79.
6. In his April 21 briefing memorandum to Carter on Vajpayee’s visit (see footnote 5 above), Christopher reported: “We understand from intelligence sources that Vajpayee’s primary objective will be to get US assurances that we will not support Pakistan’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons. He will say that India’s policy not to develop nuclear weapons remains firm and Pakistan has no cause for concern. Unfortunately, this position does not deal with the safeguards issue which Pakistan will certainly raise if it is prepared to negotiate at all.”
7. See footnote 8, Document 133.
8. Telegram 5690 from New Delhi, April 3, reported Vajpayee’s statement in the Lok Sabha criticizing the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790158–0749)