Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

121. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 19, 1979

SUBJECT

• Trip Report: India² (U)

(You already have my report on Pakistan;³ the Afghan one will be delayed until I receive some materials from Kabul that I could not carry with me.) (C)

Domestic. The Janata party is increasingly unimpressive. Nobody expects it to be a viable contestant at the next elections (1982) yet the chances are good that it will hold together and continue to govern until about then. (This assumes that Morarji will live on or that another leader “above the parties” can be found. Jagjivan Ram is the most likely.) (C)

Indira, in my view, has a good chance of being Prime Minister again in 1982. This is a minority view; most observers see her making a comeback, but not as Prime Minister. I don’t see how she can do one without the other, and in any event there is no alternative leader for the Congress Party. Perhaps she can be sidetracked by the various legal cases pending against her, but given the Indian system I think she will gain as much as she loses in the legal process. (C)

Nuclear. I was very impressed by the depth of concern on the nuclear issue; specifically, that a U.S. cutoff would be seen as proof that the U.S. is not to be trusted and, more importantly perhaps, that Morarji had bet on the wrong horse in moving away from the Soviets. One senior Foreign Office official implored me to at least find an alternate, non-Soviet source of supply for Tarapur if we have to pull out. Nobody seemed very optimistic about the experts committee coming up with a solution. I have asked CIA to look into the question of where an alternate supplier could be found.⁴ (France?) Jagat Mehta asked me very specifically if we could guarantee that Pakistan would not develop a nuclear explosive capability. Probably the Indians know as much as we do about what the Paks are doing in this direction. If they have such knowledge, it is hard to see how they could accept safeguards. (S)

Eastern Waters.⁵ I reminded the Foreign Office that we remain interested in this topic. They expect that they will have their own thinking in order (and their neighbors brought into line) in a year or two. This would be quite satisfactory from our point of view. That will be just about the time that our Indian aid program will be getting large enough to be relevant to the problem. (C)

Aid. The subject never came up except in the Finance Ministry where I raised it with M.M. Singh. He was polite but made clear that the sums we are providing are pretty trivial in the Indian context. In the Embassy, only AID and Goheen want to have an aid program. My best (and very pro-American) contact in the Foreign Ministry said he thought bilateral aid was a poor idea. (C)

UNCTAD. The Indians see trade as the main issue at UNCTAD V, assuming that the common fund is out of the way. They will probably float a proposal for an international adjustment fund that would compensate nations whose industries were adversely affected by reductions in tariffs. This sounds cumbersome; it could be interesting, however, as a mechanism from which the U.S. could benefit to some extent. Otherwise they want UNCTAD to deal with technology transfer. They were massively disinterested in the common fund and COW. (C)

Iran and Afghanistan. The Indians are very worried about Iran;⁶ they had a profitable economic relationship with the Shah and are always concerned about resurgent Islam that would tend to support Pakistan and perhaps stir up their own otherwise inert Muslim minority. They have clearly fallen off their earlier view that the new Afghan government is a bunch of amiable third world nationalists. The Foreign Ministry is still hesitant to say much but their concern over the growing Soviet role in South Asia is clear. In the Defense Ministry, concern is much more outspoken.

China. The upcoming Vajpayee visit to Peking and the US-China normalization focussed great attention on China. Most of all, Indians betray a concern that the U.S. will now turn away from them towards China. This concern is in the economic field (our technology will go to China, not India; trade will be shifted to China, etc.) and political/security (we will connive in supply of arms to China and this will force the Indians to arm more heavily.) They take our acquiescence in the French reactor sale to China as a first evidence of a double standard.⁷ Most of all, however, it is an undifferentiated, whining inferiority complex. They have no great expectations of the Vajpayee visit but claim to be willing to move beyond their long list of traditional bilateral problems to serious discussion of the border and regional security if the Chinese are so inclined. Mehta, for example, said it would be interesting to see whether the Chinese would discuss Pakistan with them in a serious way. We should encourage Teng⁸ to do so. (S)

Regional Security. I told the Indians that we were of course reassessing our views of the regional security problem in the light of events in Afghanistan and Iran and hoped that we could have fruitful discussions on the subject with them. Their responses were tentative, but I think they got the idea. Now it needs to be followed up. Most important is to reschedule as soon as possible the Indo-US bilaterals that were postponed from January. You should take this up directly with Vance and Christopher.⁹ (S)

The Embassy. Mostly at Delhi but also elsewhere I found the Embassy staff poorly informed and generally hostile to our approach on global issues. (They see few benefits and many costs in bilateral relations with host governments.) It is very useful to address a staff meeting and get some of the broad picture across. NSC staff members should do this whenever possible when they are visiting one of our posts, especially the more remote ones. Also it is good public relations given the hostility towards the NSC that permeates the lower reaches of State.¹⁰ (C)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 10/78–12/79. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Brzezinski saw it. Copies were sent to Mathews, Oksenberg, Sick, and Erb.
2. In connection with the Chiefs of Mission meeting that took place in Colombo on January 8, Thornton visited Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan January 1–14. Telegram 323530 to New Delhi, December 23, 1978, relayed his schedule. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780533–0498) For his report on his visit to Pakistan, see Document 320.
3. See Document 320.
4. In a January 24 memorandum to Evans, Thornton requested a report from the CIA on the “availability, quality, price and other relevant factors” of potential suppliers. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 77, Sensitive X: 1–3/79) In an April 20 memorandum, Brzezinski informed Vance of the outcome of the CIA’s study on alternate fuel suppliers for Tarapur. The study showed [text not declassified] alternate supplier of enriched uranium. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 28, India: 10/78–12/79)
5. See Document 3.
6. Revolutionary forces in Iran, led by Khomeini and the Revolutionary Council, forced the Shah to leave Iran on January 16.
7. Telegram 324623 to Paris, December 27, 1978, announced that the Carter administration would not oppose France’s sale of two nuclear reactors to China. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780534–0670)
8. Deng Xiaoping.
9. At the end of the sentence, Brzezinski drew a line to the bottom of the page where he wrote: “will do, ZB.”
10. In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Brzezinski drew a vertical line and wrote: “good job.”