Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XIX, South Asia

113. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State¹

New Delhi, September 28, 1978, 0449Z

14802. CINCPAC for POLAD. Subject: Janata in Disarray. Refs: New Delhi 7537,² 8656³ (Notal).

Summary. We are less sanguine now than we were on the eve of Desai’s Washington visit in June about Janata’s ability to stem the decline in its fortunes. Although the PM seemed to have emerged from the Cabinet crisis at the end of that month in a strengthened position, he was unable to maintain and consolidate his gains. His standing has been damaged by the long, eventually unsuccessful negotiations to work out a compromise with Charan Singh,⁴ by the way he has handled the allegations against his son,⁵ and by a series of other parliamentary blunders. Some have found that recent difficulties have brought forth in him traits associated with the “old Morarji” of the fifties and sixties.

We sense a growing disillusion with the old leadership in Janata and a heightened feeling that the Janata experiment in coalitional politics is a transitory phase which will eventually lead to new alignments. There is increasing maneuvering within party ranks as factions and individual leaders seek to preserve their political bases and to maintain options for an uncertain future. Expectations that a more effective administration can be managed under the present leadership appear to have declined. It seems doubtful if organization elections or the upcoming changes in the Cabinet will stem the decline in the party’s prospects. The opposition’s opportunities are limited by the fact that general elections are a long way off and by the generally satisfactory state of the economy following a fourth consecutive good monsoon. Mrs. Gandhi’s momentum seems to have been blunted, but this impression could quickly change were party to win more by elections in the crucial Hindi belt.

For all the disillusion and dissension in party ranks, few observers here believe that the Janata will break apart in the near-term. Desai also seems likely to continue. So does the present unsettled state of affairs in party and government. With both the government and individuals in it more vulnerable than before to criticism from within and without the ruling party, policymakers are likely to rely on courses of action which seem safe and popular. End summary.

1. Introduction. In May and June we submitted messages (reftels) evaluating the state of the Janata government and party on the eve of Prime Minister Desai’s visit to the United States. At that time, it was our view that the Janata was in a state of some disarray, that the party had squandered its first year in office, and that the absence of firm, decisive leadership at the top was the prime cause of Janata’s deteriorating credibility and viability. Nonetheless, we believed that there was still time to “turn things around”, provided that the Janata’s top leadership recognized the extent of the deterioration and took effective corrective action to stem it.

2. Today, eighteen months into the rule of the Desai government, we are less sanguine about Janata’s ability to “stem the rot”, the popular term here for the ruling party’s problem. The Janata Party and government now seem in a even greater state of disarray, their leadership more disunited and indecisive than before. This message, to which Consulate General officers have contributed, seeks to assess the sources of the further deterioration, its impact on US interests, and prospects for the near-term.

3. A good beginning . . . Prime Minister Desai seemed to have emerged from the Cabinet crisis at the end of June in a strengthened position. By acting in a swift and decisive manner in dismissing Charan Singh and Raj Narain, he appeared at last to have decided to crack the whip over his colleagues and take the decisive kind of steps many had been urging him to adopt. His summary treatment of his detractors was widely applauded here as an augury of more assertive leadership.

4. Is squandered. The PM was unable to maintain and consolidate this significant gain. Instead of following up the dismissals with new appointments to the vacated positions, he allowed himself to get caught up in a long and ultimately unsuccessful accommodation effort carried on in such a way as to suggest neither strength nor magnanimity on his part. The participation in this process of prominent second-tier Ministers suggested, not inaccurately, significant divisions in the Cabinet as to how to proceed. It also heightened suspicions about the motives of these Ministers and others, and caused friction with the PM, who questioned their loyalty. (Particularly important from our viewpoint is the report, which we have had from good sources, that the prominent role Foreign Affairs Minister A.B. Vajpayee played in the negotiations led to a cooling of his relations with Desai.) And, of course, the long effort inevitably sapped party and government energies which might have productively been put to other tasks. It strengthened the already widespread impression that the Janata is a do-little government whose leaders devote too much of their time to infighting and the promotion of their own narrow political interests.

5. Desai was also damaged over these same weeks by the continuing attention given the affairs of his son. For this, the PM seems as much to blame as his opponents. His stonewalling parliamentary tactics, interspersed with concessions both too little and too late, kept Kantibhai much more in the headlines than he need have been. The net results of the PM’s adamant stand on the issue of Kantibhai’s corruption has been to lend credence to the suspicion that the younger Desai is indeed implicated in questionable business practices. It has also lowered public esteem for the PM’s vaunted moral rectitude, and seemed to many to have personalized to Desai’s disadvantage the conflict within the party. To some observers, he and Charan Singh appeared a pair of angry old men prepared to ignore the good of the country while they pursued their personal grudge.

6. Other parliamentary blunders. The Kantibhai affair was only the most noteworthy instance of clumsy parliamentary maneuvering by Janata during the monsoon session. Its adverse impact on the image of the PM, the ruling party, and the government was heightened by the ineptitude displayed during the session by Janata Ministers in their handling of other controversial parliamentary business. Within the party, the overall outcome of this clumsiness was to prompt more of the by-now familiar backbiting in the ranks and to bring more opprobrium on the PM. It was he who was considered responsible for the Kantibhai strategy while the principal parliamentary managers mishandling their legislative tasks were regarded as “his” men, i.e. trusted loyalists from the Congress (O).

7. The long battles over Charan Singh and Kantibhai also seem to many of our contacts to have revived some of the traits associated with the personality of the “old Morarji”, i.e. the Desai of the fifties and sixties. Much more than during his first year or so in office, we now are told of a Desai again adamant, stubborn, uncompromising, and unwilling to be guided by the views and advice of his party colleagues. Yet at the same time, he continued to be scored for a continuing aloofness in many spheres of policy-making, for an insufficient sense of urgency, for a willingness to allow opposing factions to pursue their skirmishing and for continued delegation to his uneven collection of Ministers an unwarranted degree of freedom of action. Some have remarked that the old high-handed Desai has returned but without his earlier redeeming qualities of administrative decisiveness and skill.

8. Longer term consequences. The events of the monsoon session appear to have had other longer term consequences. One of the most striking trends we have detected is the growing disillusion of ordinary Janata MPs (and, presumably, of other lesser party lights) with the elder leadership. They seem, now much more than before, to wish somehow (but how?) to be rid of the old men at the top. This sentiment extends not only to Desai and Charan Singh, but also to Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram. Although Ram maintained a discreet silence during the troubled summer months, the well-publicized reports in August of his son’s extra-marital activities not only smeared Ram’s hitherto moderately good image (and perhaps ruined his chances for bigger things in the upcoming Cabinet reshuffle) but also further lowered esteem for the trinity of top leaders who have up to now been regarded as the only men of sufficiently senior status to be seriously eligible for the Prime Ministership.

9. A transitional arrangement. More important is what we sense to be a growing feeling that the Janata is not going to last, that the Janata experiment in coalitional politics is a transitory phase en route to new alignments. One thesis, now often heard, is that the party will break up on the eve of the next general elections as leaders and factions scramble to position themselves for the balloting. To many, the ruling party increasingly has come to resemble the SVD (Samyukta Vidhayak Dal, or United Legislative Bloc) experiments which were undertaken in many north Indian states in the late 1960’s. These SVD governments were short-lived, and are still cited as object lessons in the shortcomings of Indian coalition government-making. While the analogy is far from exact, the Janata of today does face many of the problems and contradictions which prematurely ended those SVD efforts.

10. Under these circumstances, there is increasing maneuvering within party ranks as factions and individual leaders seek to preserve their political bases and to maintain options for an uncertain future. Suspicions have inevitably grown among partymen about the longer term intentions of leaders and colleagues. Such an atmosphere of mistrust tends to feed upon itself, creating greater suspicions. It further lessens the chances of any real cohesiveness within the Janata and of the development of the Janata government into a more effective administration.

11. Expectations that a more effective administration can be managed under the present leadership appear, in any event, further to have declined in the past months. To growing numbers of observers, Janata appears incapable of pulling its act together. While it continues to receive high marks in the foreign policy field (though here too dissensions are beginning to surface), it appears to have earned limited popular credit for its handling of economic issues, law and order, and other domestic problems. Above all, the popular perception appears to be that despite its pronouncements, the government has been largely unsuccessful in establishing and implementing new domestic policies. This view, supplemented by the observation that whatever goes well nowadays does so in spite of Janata, not because of it, is ruefully repeated by Janata partymen themselves. It understandably adds to their apprehensions about the future.

12. Can the decline by reversed. Today there is certainly much less expectation than there was three months ago that the Janata can reverse its decline in popular esteem or become anything more than a loose coalition of divergent interests and individuals. Janata leaders have long claimed that the party’s organizational elections will put its house in order and pave the way for a truly unified ruling party. Such claims used to be greeted with some skepticism; now they are met with scorn. Indeed, it is still by no means certain that the elections will be held by the end of the year, as now scheduled, or, for that matter, that they will take place at all. The very fact that these elections have been repeatedly postponed over the past year on various pretexts is a telling commentary on the fragility of the coalition. The main reason for the delays has been the fear that previous party loyalties would come to the fore as each constituent element sought to maintain or bolster its position in the party, further exacerbating factional tensions. Indeed, the expectation that certain groups (notably the Jana Sangh) would dominate the organization following such elections seems to be the main obstacle to holding them.

13. In a similar vein, it was hoped that a major Cabinet reshuffle would improve the government’s sagging image and infuse a new sense of dynamism into the administration. We understand that many of the PM’s partymen have in fact been urging such a house-cleaning on him. Although Desai may well not yet have decided on which course to follow, most observers now seem to have concluded, ironically, that the Cabinet changes (expected in October) are likely to be limited so as not to disturb the current balance of power among the constituent elements.

14. The opposition. The opposition is of course watching the Janata disarray closely and making its own calculations as to how best to capitalize on it. Congress (I) and others were able to make political hay from the faltering parliamentary performance of the PM and his colleagues during the monsoon session. They can be expected to publicize further evidence of Janata shortcomings, though these hardly require outside agencies to call them to unfavorable public notice. But the opposition’s opportunities remain limited by the fact that the present Parliament and most state assemblies still have more than three years ahead of them. The chances of a national election or even of a series of state elections before then seem slim. While opposition groups, with the Congress (I) in the lead, may succeed in mounting campaigns based on local grievances and dissatisfactions with Janata performance, these may be blunted by the generally satisfactory state of the economy following a third consecutive good monsoon.

15. Mrs. Gandhi remains the pivotal figure among the oppositionists. She has been biding her time, and aside from occasional forays into the provinces has not been noticeably active in recent months. Her cause seems to have lost some of the momentum which stunned political India earlier in the year. The breakdown of the Maharashtra coalition government, the failure of her August 9 “Save India Day”,⁶ and reports of trouble in her party ranks, notably in the relationship between her and the two south India Congress (I) Chief Ministers, have created the impression that her juggernaut is slowing down. She is also weighed down in legal tangles, and though she has largely succeeded in politicizing the unfavorable findings of the Shah Commission,⁷ the possibility cannot be ruled out that the cases lodged in the courts against her will eventually lead to her disenfranchisement.

16. How real this loss of trust actually is may be questioned, however. Good showings in this winter’s series of byelections in the crucial Hindi belt could quickly revive the sense of alarm her opponents felt following her stunning state election and byelection wins. It might also lead to further accretions to her ranks from the official Congress. These Congressmen have been able to maintain their battered ranks more successfully than had been anticipated. Janata divisiveness and the expectations that they could be the beneficiaries of the eventual breakup of the ruling party (in a regrouping of past and present Congressmen minus Mrs. Gandhi) has helped keep them afloat in an otherwise unpromising situation.

17. Near term prospects. For all the disillusion and dissension in party ranks, few observers here believe that the Janata will break apart in the near-term. The cement of power is still too strong to make such a development likely. As we have said many times in the past year and a half, the risks of political oblivion remain too dangerous for any one faction to make a break for it. Even such fallen leaders as Charan Singh and Raj Narain still seem unlikely to strike out on their own for fear of finding themselves even more politically isolated. If they do go out, they appear likely to take only a fraction of their party followers with them.

18. Desai also seems likely to carry on in the top job. Despite the mounting frustration with the elder leadership, and the growing speculation within the party about a succession which would bring to the top one of the second rung leaders—Vajpayee, George Fernandes, and Biju Patnaik are the most frequently mentioned—the powers within Janata seem unable to decide on anyone other than Desai for the Prime Ministership. Desai may have his foibles and shortcomings, but he still represents the lowest common denominator in the Janata equation, the one figure in the coalition all can agree to lead the government—albeit with some increasing reluctance. This role of being the indispensable uniting factor has been, and apparently continues to be, a major source of the PM’s staying power (assuming that he remains in good health).

19. If a continuation of Janata rule under Desai seems the most likely prospect at this time, so too does a prolongation of the present unsettled state of affairs in party and government. As we have noted, the odds against Desai’s proving able or willing to turn things around have lengthened, and the prospect of increased infighting leading eventually to political realignment has grown. The weakening of the cohesion of the Cabinet, the decline in the PM’s political standing, and the uncertainty about Janata’s future have all become relevant factors in the decision-making process. In this atmosphere, the scope for bold and courageous initiatives in policy areas of interest to the US will be limited. With both the government and individuals in it more vulnerable than before to criticism from within and without the ruling party, there is likely to be a premium on the safe and what is assumed to be the popular. We should be prepared to take this into account as we chart out further approaches to India. We will be saying more about this in subsequent messages.

Goheen

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780430–0974, D780398–0913. Confidential. Sent for information to Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Islamabad, Dacca, Tehran, Kabul, Colombo, Kathmandu, Moscow, Beijing, Hong Kong, CINCPAC, and London.
2. Telegram 7537 from New Delhi, May 12, reported on the political climate in New Delhi, noting that “Desai’s government and party are in a state of some disarray. Popular dissatisfaction with both is mounting. Desai’s leadership is not under any serious challenge at this time and he may well carry on as Prime Minister to the end of his five-year term if his health permits. But significant changes in the factional composition of the Janata Party government now seem inevitable. The downward slide in the political strength and cohesiveness of the government and the ruling party has become most pronounced since the turn of the year. Mrs. Gandhi’s resurgence has dramatized the decline in Janata’s popular standing.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780203–0578)
3. Telegram 8656 from New Delhi, June 2, described the political instability in Desai’s Cabinet, noting that Indian Home Minister Charan Singh “has been active in defending his position against what he sees as attempts to denigrate him. His tough, outspoken tactics stem from his conviction that he is and must continue to be regarded as a force to be reckoned with in national politics. Yet, we do not believe that Charan Singh will make an outright bid to replace Morarji Desai as Prime Minister.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780232–0568)
4. In telegram 10126 from New Delhi, June 30, the Embassy informed the Department: “The chronic in-fighting within the Janata Party reached a showdown June 29–30 when Prime Minister Desai sought the resignations from the Cabinet of Home Minister Charan Singh and Health Minister Raj Narain. At last report the two Ministers have complied with the PM’s request.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780270–0935) After months of negotiations between Desai and Singh to mend the rift in the Janata tarty’s leadership, the Embassy reported that “the prospects for an ‛overall settlement’ being reached to resolve the Janata Party imbroglio diminished late on August 17 after an apparently inconclusive meeting between Prime Minister Desai and ex-Home Minister Charan Singh.” (Telegram 12604 from New Delhi, August 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780340–0094)
5. Telegram 12299 from New Delhi, August 11, reported Rajya Sabha’s August 10 resolution “‘calling upon’ the Janata government to inquire into charges of corruption against PM Desai’s son Kantibhai and the relatives of Charan Singh.” The Embassy explained that allegations against Kantibhai Desai included “the purchase of choice land at concessionary rates, construction of large mansions, doing favors for Gujarati business friends, ties with smugglers, amassing wealth through questionable means, and interfering in the appointment of persons to high positions in the Reserve Bank of India and the nationalized banks.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780329–0176)
6. Telegram 12201 from New Delhi, August 10, reported that Congress (I)’s “Save India Day,” a march and rally, was “Mrs. Gandhi’s protest movement against alleged failures and misrule of the Janata government.” It was disrupted by unusually heavy rain. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780329–1067)
7. The Desai government appointed the Shah Commission in May 1978 to investigate the excesses of the state of emergency imposed in June 1975. The Commission published its findings in three interim reports, the last in August 1978.