Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

257. Telegram From the Embassy in Morocco to the Department of State¹

Rabat, August 2, 1980, 1237Z

5436. Subject: Reported Moroccan Policy of Pursuit Across International Borders. Ref: (A) State 202300,² (B) State 202281.³

1. (S)–Entire text.

2. Summary and introduction: Ambassador Duke delivered message (ref B) and carried out instruction (ref A) with Royal Counselor Guedira afternoon August 1; DCM accompanied him. Guedira received us at home, alone. Meeting lasted an hour and was cordial throughout.

3. Ambassador opened with presentation of Deputy Secretary’s message (second reftel) which Guedira received with pleasure, asking for copy to show to King (later same day).

4. Ambassador, noting he was speaking under instruction, then moved to question of Moroccan policy with respect to pursuit across international borders. He rehearsed points made in para 4 first reftel ticks (except fourth, on Polisario dialog, which inopportune in light Guedira’s replies—see below) eliciting firm response from Guedira along following lines:

A. King, from outset, has been concerned to contain conflict with Algeria at lowest possible level. As consequence, when Polisario began to attack incontestably Moroccan territory from Algeria and to retreat into Algeria (which, from the point of view of international law, places responsibility squarely upon Algeria), King wrote Boumediene a letter, which Guedira said he drafted. Letter stated that Morocco had not heretofore exercised right of hot pursuit (droit de suite) and did not now intend to do so, but should not be pushed too far.

B. Guedira, in response Ambassador’s question, said he knew King’s mind and will on this issue and could affirm unequivocally that Morocco’s policy had not rpt not changed. What had triggered these representations from a friendly government?

C. Ambassador, having adverted to June/July RMAF penetration of Algerian airspace and possible recent incursion into Mauritanian air,⁴ Guedira nodded and said that Algiers had protested at the time through Tunisian Ambassador here (Tunisia is Algeria’s protecting power in Morocco since rupture between Rabat and Algiers). Moroccans had responded that incident was inadvertent (“border is hard to determine at jet speed”), aggression against Algeria was not rpt not intended, and Morocco’s posture on droit de suite remained unchanged.

D. Ambassador, Guedira continued, had been present when King had received US UN PermRep McHenry.⁵ King had told McHenry that he wanted Morocco and Algeria as well as other parties to the Saharan dispute to talk. King’s attitude had been constant. It was unchanged. King would not do anything vis-a-vis Algeria, particularly now (read in the post-Freetown summit phase)⁶ which would make it harder, or even impossible for Algerians to sit down with Morocco.

E. Guedira went on to express “our” deep preoccupation with the trend of Mauritanian policy towards Morocco. “They are worse than the Algerians”. He denied any Moroccan incursion and pointed to incoherence of Mauritanian allegations of Moroccan attacks first on this town then on that one etc. He asked whether we knew that population of Nouadhibou had demonstrated July 31 “against GIRM’s lies”? Ambassador responded that Boulanouar admittedly very close to border; Mauritanians had, however, shown our Charge American-made ordnance which, they asserted, was used by Moroccan aircraft in the alleged incident.

5. Ambassador closed this part of conversation by presenting Guedira with copy of HFAC (Zablocki) July 8 report on CODEL’s recent visit to North Africa.⁷ While GOM would not agree completely with contents of the report, Ambassador said, it nevertheless reflects authors’ understanding of Morocco’s interest in moving towards a negotiated solution of the Saharan problem, a crucial point.

6. Conversation then moved to subject of Morocco’s post-OAU Freetown Summit intentions, a topic we will cover in septel. It ended with request by Guedira that we supply informal copy of talking points Ambassador had used to carry out his instructions, and this was subsequently done.

7. Ambassador has not had opportunity clear this message but is aware of its transmission.

Sebastian

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800370–0874. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information to Algiers.
2. See Document 256.
3. In telegram 202281 to Rabat, July 30, the Department transmitted a message from Christopher to Hassan regarding the release of political prisoners: “It is bound to have a positive impact on a variety of civil rights and other groups in the U.S. and lend increased weight to your declared intention to strengthen democratic institutions in Morocco. Those of us in the U.S. Government with a special commitment to strengthen existing ties of friendship and understanding between our two countries find this development particularly heartening.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800365–1030)
4. See Document 256.
5. In telegram 4739 from Copenhagen, July 17, McHenry reported on his July 14 meeting with Hassan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900073–1957)
6. See footnote 3, Document 255.
7. Zablocki met with Moroccan officials on April 7 to discuss a negotiated Saharan settlement. (Telegram 2479 from Rabat, April 8; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800181–0015)