255. Telegram From the Embassy in Spain to the Embassy in Portugal1
9702. For Dr. Brzezinski and Under Secretary Newsom only from Todman—No other distribution should be made. Subject: The President’s Meeting With Prime Minister Suarez: North Africa and the Western Sahara.
1. (S–Entire text)
2. Following is an uncleared draft memorandum of part of the conversation between the President and Prime Minister Suarez at the Prime Minister’s office, with Spanish Ambassador Llado and Ambassador Todman present, on June 25. A separate cable reports the other main subject discussed.2
3. The President asked for Suarez’s views on North Africa and Western Sahara. He was aware that there were many who did not believe that Hassan intended to negotiate and he understood that the Spanish Government also thought that Hassan might threaten the Spanish enclaves on the African continent. In view of the Spanish special interests in this issue he wondered what possible solutions the Spanish saw.
4. Suarez said it was a very difficult situation with no good solution in sight. The official Spanish position was in favor of self-determination for the Saharoui people. Spain recognized the Polisario as representing the Saharoui people in struggle but not as representative of the whole of the Saharoui people. However, the Polisario does have full support from Libya and Algeria, and recently it reportedly has obtained support from Mauritania where it might find territory for establishing a state. The creation of a Saharoui republic was included on the agenda for the OAU meeting in Sierra Leone and there was a good chance that the Polisario might receive the necessary additional recognition for the admission of the Saharoui state. In that case, Morocco would leave the OAU.
5. Ambassador Todman said his information from some Africans was that other OAU members might also leave the organization in that case, thus causing a split which most members wished to avoid. He [Page 625] understood that an effort would be made to establish another study commission in order to postpone the issue while attempts continued toward a negotiated solution.3
6. Suarez said that Morocco also wished to see the issue postponed and had just proposed that a two-thirds majority be required to approve the recognition of a Saharoui state. He believed that the majority of the African states favored postponement while seeking some arrangement between Morocco and Algeria.
7. Suarez said he had been pleased to learn from the President during their Washington meeting that the U.S. intended to provide arms to Morocco only in an amount sufficient to defend itself and give it the strength and confidence to negotiate but not enough for a military victory.4 The problem, as he saw it, was that Morocco wanted the entire former Spanish area and of course that was impossible to achieve especially without some understanding with Algeria. Libya was now exacerbating the situation by working closely with the Soviet Union and providing increased assistance to the Polisario. This worried Algeria to a point where it was anxious for a political solution. The difficulty was that Hassan seemed unwilling to negotiate. Hassan wants Spain to side fully with Morocco over this issue while Algeria wants Spain to side with the Polisario. Spain’s efforts are aimed at seeking a reasonable balance in the area. Spain wished to see Hassan continue in power and believed that Algeria shared this view, but unfortunately there did not appear to be any way to get Hassan’s cooperation. The Algerian President had expressed willingness to hold talks with Hassan and other Arab leaders, including Fahd, and had agreed to assist in arranging for the meetings but Hassan had refused.
8. Suarez added that Spain had an additional problem with Morocco over a fishing agreement which had been signed in 1977 and ratified by the Spanish Parliament only after a prolonged and bitter debate on grounds that the agreement had appeared to recognize Moroccan sovereignty over the entire area. Nevertheless, Morocco has still not ratified the agreement. There have been temporary agreements, the last of which is due to expire on June 30. The Spanish offer to Morocco has been very generous in terms of credits offered and assistance to modernize the Moroccan fishing fleet. However, in the negotia [Page 626] tions Morocco has been pressing as well for the right to transport citrus and other fruits and vegetables through Spain to Europe. This poses very serious problems since Morocco has to pay only a 4 percent duty while Spain must pay 12 percent. Spanish producers were totally opposed to allowing transport of the Moroccan produce and had threatened direct action to prevent it. At the same time, the people of the Canary Islands, who are interested in fishing, wish to see a fishing agreement signed as soon as possible.
9. Suarez said the Spanish Government had the impression that Morocco was prepared to exert pressure on Ceuta and Melilla in order to try to force the Spanish hand in the negotiations. If Morocco were to do that then he could assure the President that Spain would react violently. Spain realized that the two small enclaves were difficult to defend; therefore, Spain would have to take offensive action. Plans were ready for such action but he prayed that he would never have to put them into effect. The President said that would mean war and Suarez replied, “exactly.” Suarez said a delegation would be leaving on June 26 for negotiations with Morocco. He hoped it would succeed in reaching some agreement to permit continuation of normal relations after June 30.
10. Suarez said the matter of Spanish exports was further complicated now because of the problems that France was creating for Spain by stopping or even burning trucks carrying Spanish produce. He expected to receive French Prime Minister Barre next week to try to reach some agreement on several outstanding issues, including agricultural trade, the Common Market and terrorism.
11. Suarez said that Spain had also had problems with Algeria which had been supporting the Basque terrorist group, ETA, as well as the Canary Independence Movement led by Cubillo. However, that stage seems to have passed and relations with Algeria were getting better. A major project exists now for the construction of a pipeline for Algerian gas to pass through Spain to Europe.
12. The President said it appeared that Hassan was becoming increasingly isolated and that he should realize that he needed Spain. It was difficult to see how Hassan could expect to obtain transport rights under the conditions which Suarez had described or what Hassan could expect to gain by exerting pressure against Ceuta and Melilla.
13. Suarez said that in six to seven months, after Spain had been able to make some new arrangements with the Common Market and to deal with the special situations in the Canaries and in Valencia, it might be possible to work out an arrangement for the transport of Moroccan produce, but it was not possible right now.
14. The President asked Ambassador Todman what he thought we could do to help and the Ambassador suggested that in view of the [Page 627] gravity of the situation as described by Suarez and the action he indicated he was prepared to take, it would be well for us to advise Hassan.
15. Suarez said Spain could always sign a fishing agreement with the Polisario, which would in fact be to Spain’s advantage since the best fishing grounds were off the parts of the Sahara claimed by the Polisario. However, Spain did not want to go that far since it still wished to be as helpful to Hassan as possible.
16. The President said maybe we could let Hassan know of the Spanish fears and of our own view that any attack against the Spanish enclaves would be a very serious matter and would not be looked at favorably by the United States.
17. In answer to a question by the President on how long had Ceuta and Melilla belonged to Spain, Suarez replied for more than 500 years and certainly well before the creation of Morocco as a country. Spain had been trying very hard and will continue to try to deal with Hassan but they find him to be a very clever, astute person who cannot be trusted to keep his word. Hassan’s actions over the next few days on the fishing agreement would greatly influence the future course of Spanish-Moroccan relations.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 38, Memcons: President: 6/80. Secret; Immediate. The telegram was repeated to the Department of State for S/S only on July 1. Carter visited Yugoslavia, Spain, and Portugal after attending the G–7 Economic Summit in Venice.↩
- Telegram 9701 from Madrid, July 1. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880031–0106)↩
- At the OAU Summit in Freetown July 1–4, the issue of Polisario admission, which divided the member nations, was postponed. (Leon Dash, “Angry Debate on Western Sahara War Dominated Meeting of African Leaders,” Washington Post, July 5, 1980, p. A8)↩
- Carter and Suarez met in the Cabinet Room at the White House on January 14 from 12:39 to 2:20 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) For the text of the White House statement released that day, see Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 82–83.↩