196. Interagency Intelligence Memorandum1
[Omitted here are a title page and table of contents.]
TUNISIA’S STABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL ORIENTATION
PRINCIPAL JUDGMENTS
Recent developments in Tunisia, including the 26 January rioting in Tunis and other cities that accompanied the country’s first general labor strike,2 are part of the evolving contest to determine who will run Tunisia when ailing 74-year-old President Habib Bourguiba leaves the scene. A group of conservative, pro-Western Bourguiba loyalists—[Page 467]headed by Prime Minister Nouira and including Habib Bourguiba, Jr.—has consolidated its control of the government and can be expected to quell forcibly any further disorders.
The Nouira government clearly intends to use the recent outbreaks of violence to bring the labor movement back under the effective control of the party and government. Labor leader Achour will be made the scapegoat, but the political and economic discontent basically responsible for the recent disturbances will remain.
The January disorders reflect strong currents of discontent which have been building over the years as a result of rapid economic, social, and cultural changes. These changes have increased popular expectations beyond the government’s capacity to satisfy them.
We expect that Nouira will continue as Prime Minister and will succeed Bourguiba. Given his control of the government and party apparatus, Nouira will become Tunisia’s president and would have a considerable advantage over other contenders in a subsequent presidential election.
The departure of Bourguiba will be the acid test of Tunisia’s political stability. Greater reliance on repressive measures over an extended period of time would erode the successor leadership’s legitimacy and increase the risk that some group within the military might eventually step in to form either a conservative authoritarian regime or a reform-minded military government.
We believe the military, whose support will become increasingly important in the post-Bourguiba era, will remain loyal to Nouira or any other legitimately constituted government. Although we lack good information on the attitudes of junior officers, we judge the likelihood of a Qadhafi-style coup attempt by young officers espousing radical Arab sympathies as very remote.
We believe Nouira and most leaders of the political establishment probably recognize the dangers of a long-term policy of repression. Over time, these leaders are likely to seek a compromise with other moderate interest groups to preserve Tunisia’s civilian-dominated political system.
Barring a sustained deterioration of the economy and/or prolonged civil disorders, we believe that a moderate, pro-Western government is likely to remain in power for the next three to five years.
Over the longer run, Tunisia could see the emergence of a regime that would be less overtly pro-Western and more dogmatically nonaligned. Such a regime probably would accelerate Tunisia’s drift away from close identification with the United States.
We do not expect Tunisia to align itself with the USSR, although the Soviets may be permitted greater access to ship repair facilities. It is unlikely that Tunisia would accord Moscow base rights.
[Page 468]DISCUSSION
End of the Bourguiba Era
1. President Habib Bourguiba, the ailing 74-year-old leader who has dominated Tunisian politics since the struggle for independence against France, is nearing the end of his rule. The government, the ruling Destourian Socialist Party (PSD), and the national labor confeder[Page 469]ation have begun the contest for power, which was not expected to erupt until after Bourguiba’s death.
2. Bourguiba’s genius has been his ability to make Tunisia’s closed one-party system work for nearly 22 years behind a democratic facade. He is the father of his country and still enjoys a high level of popular support. The fruits of his leadership have been a relatively high degree of political stability and economic well-being. Under Bourguiba’s leadership, Tunisia has maintained a moderate, flexible approach in foreign policy.
3. His ruling style has been paternalistic, highly personal, and autocratic. His stranglehold on power [6 lines not declassified].
4. President Bourguiba’s age and failing health increasingly prevent him, however, from exercising tight control over the government and party. He suffered a massive coronary attack in 1967 and has developed a progression of medical ailments, [2 lines not declassified]. As a result, the country’s day-to-day affairs are now largely the responsibility of Prime Minister Hedi Nouira. Bourguiba still provides some general policy direction, however, and he continues to assert his authority to resolve critical situations, such as the dispute with Libya last summer over the continental shelf.3 (See accompanying map.)
Succession Politics
5. The overriding political issue in Tunisia is presidential succession. For more than a decade Bourguiba has vacillated over what procedures should be used to choose his successor. This vacillation has encouraged political maneuvering by those who see themselves as presidential material.
6. Tunisia’s constitution provides that in the event of a vacancy in the presidency, the prime minister automatically assumes the office for the duration of the then current five-year term of the National Assembly. Presidential candidates must then be nominated by one or more elected officials, approved by a government commission, and run in a nationwide popular election. The next Assembly election is slated for November 1979. The timing of Bourguiba’s departure from the scene could therefore be an important factor in his immediate successor’s ability to consolidate control over the party and governmental apparatus.
7. The 66-year-old Nouira has been a trusted adviser of Bourguiba since the struggle for independence and Prime Minister since 1970. He is a conservative on domestic issues and a proponent of Tunisia’s moderate, pro-Western foreign policy. Although widely respected for [Page 470] his management of the economy, Nouira lacks a political following [5 lines not declassified].
8. Over the past year a feud between the Tunisian labor movement—headed until recently by Habib Achour—and the government-party establishment led by Nouira has grown into a major political contest.4 Achour has attempted to use recurring labor unrest to discredit the Nouira government. [4 lines not declassified]
9. The labor-government confrontation produced serious splits in the Cabinet in 1977 over whether to negotiate with striking workers or to suppress labor agitation forcibly. Nouira and other hard-line ministers were allied against Belkhodja and other officials who favored a conciliatory approach.
10. Late last December, Nouira took his case to the President and threatened to resign if the Interior Minister was not dismissed. Belkhodja and the Surete Chief were promptly relieved of their duties, and within a few days the Foreign Minister and several other Cabinet and sub-Cabinet officials either resigned in protest or were fired.
11. As a result of these personnel changes, Nouira now exercises greater control of the government and directs a Cabinet of political conservatives more in keeping with his—and Bourguiba’s—outlook. Moreover, Bourguiba’s reaffirmation of his confidence in the Prime Minister has strengthened Nouira’s hand, at least in the short run. The leadership changes also constituted a warning—since fulfilled—to Achour that the government was prepared to deal forcefully with labor unrest.
12. The most significant change in the government lineup was the addition of Habib Bourguiba, Jr., who was given the title of Special Adviser to the President. He is even more hostile than Nouira to labor agitation and is likely to counter the influence on the President of Madame Bourguiba, his stepmother, who has been a supporter of Belkhodja, Achour, and former Foreign Minister Masmoudi.
13. The younger Bourguiba’s reemergence in politics, after seven years of semiretirement, has led to speculation that he is being groomed to succeed his father. Although the President has repeatedly raised this idea, we doubt that the younger Bourguiba aspires to the post or that he has altered his objection to creating what might look like a hereditary presidency. [3 lines not declassified]
[Page 471][Omitted here is a detailed discussion of Tunisia’s social and political situation.]
US Interests in Tunisia
74. Tunisia has four good Mediterranean Sea ports—in an area which has relatively few such facilities. The importance of Tunisia’s ports to the US 6th Fleet should not be minimized. Tunisia is one of the few Mediterranean countries which permit routine port calls by the 6th Fleet, including its nuclear-powered ships.
75. Perhaps more important to US strategic interests is the denial of Tunisia’s naval facilities to the Soviet Union. If the Soviets are allowed to undertake frequent and extensive servicing of their submarines or establish a permanent floating base of auxiliary ships in port, US strategic interests would be significantly affected.
76. US political interests are served by the generally moderate approach to international problems Tunisia has taken in the various international political forums of which it is a member (the Organization of African Unity, the Arab League, the United Nations, and the nonaligned movement). While Tunisia’s size and wealth preclude leadership roles, it has consistently used its influence to encourage dialogue and compromise in conflict situations. Tunisian moderation has generally been supportive of US policy objectives, especially in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In international organizations, Tunisia has typically worked against gratuitous criticism of US and Western policies and has sought to promote cooperative relationships between the Third World and the Western democracies.
77. Direct US economic and commercial interests in Tunisia are modest (US-Tunisian trade in 1977 was only about $150 million; US private investment in Tunisia is roughly $85 million). The US economic stake could, however, increase if Tunisia’s petroleum and gas resources prove to be as extensive as recent exploration suggests. Nonetheless, Tunisia’s small population and its lack of significant national wealth preclude its becoming economically significant to the United States.
78. Perhaps more important to the United States is Tunisia’s potential role as a model for Third World economic development. Tunisia’s economic performance since 1970, in part the result of foreign and domestic private capital, demonstrates the benefits of a relatively free mixed economy. It is in the US interest to see Tunisia’s experiment in economic development succeed.
Tunisia’s Perception of the United States
79. The overall image of the United States in Tunisia remains positive, and most members of the Tunisian elite believe their country’s close association with the United States since independence has been [Page 472] beneficial. They are well aware that roughly one-third of Tunisia’s total foreign economic assistance has come from the United States. The United States has also been a major source of military aid, and President Bourguiba has often referred to the US 6th Fleet, whose visits the country accepts virtually on request, as Tunisia’s “shield in the Mediterranean.” Indeed, Tunisian leaders perceive that US power has contributed to the country’s security against outside interference. Ideologically and culturally, most of the elite and much of Tunisia’s population prefer the West over the Communist world.
80. On the other hand, since the late 1960s the United States has become relatively less important to Tunisia economically, politically, and, to some extent, militarily. US influence and the US “privileged” relationship with Tunisia has slowly eroded as US aid has declined in importance. Economic aid from the World Bank, France, various Arab states, the Soviet bloc, and China have lessened Tunisia’s dependence on the United States. Politically, close US identification with Israel has been a sensitive subject in Tunisia’s domestic politics. It risks becoming more so if Egypt’s peace initiative falters and the Arabs blame the failure on the United States.
81. In a strategic sense the Tunisian leadership also may have perceived a shift of international power relationships in the Maghreb and the Mediterranean. The Soviet Union has provided vast amounts of military equipment to both Algeria and Libya. Tunisian leaders continue to be aware of the activity and increased capability of Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean. The Tunisians reportedly have been disturbed by what they consider signs of US inability to defend US interests in the Third World. Their doubts about US resolve stem from their perceptions of the failure of the United States in South Vietnam, the US decision to opt out of the Angolan civil war in the face of the Soviet-backed Cuban intervention, and the apparent inability of the United States to take action in the Horn of Africa. As a result, it appears that the Tunisian leadership has concluded that it would be prudent to become more visibly nonaligned in the East-West context, while remaining pro-West in outlook and sympathy.
[Omitted here is a detailed outlook for Tunisia’s near-term future.]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, History Staff Files. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A note on the first page reads in part: “This memorandum—at the request of the Department of State—was prepared by Mr. Brian Flora, of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, and [name not declassified], of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis, National Foreign Assessment Center.” The note continues: “The memorandum was coordinated at the working level among representatives of CIA, DIA, State/INR, NSA, and the Armed Forces.”↩
- In telegram 631 from Tunis, January 27, the Embassy provided a preliminary assessment of the riots in Tunisia during a planned nationwide labor strike. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780040–0984)↩
- See Documents 3–5 and 9–13.↩
- The dispute began when party director Mohamed Sayah attempted to undermine Achour’s position. Subsequently, union leaders decided to abandon a labor-government agreement calling for austerity measures, including a wage freeze, during the current five-year plan. [Footnote is in the original.]↩