Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 3, North Africa

175. Memorandum From James Rentschler of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, July 18, 1979

SUBJECT

• VBB: Morocco (U)

I believe we are moving toward a moment of truth with Morocco. The main operational issue involves a long-standing request for OV–10 aircraft, and our long-standing reluctance to sell them. Dick Parker, in his valedictory recommendations from Rabat, strongly advised us to avoid the hassle we got into with the Chinook helicopter business and accede sooner, rather than later, to the Moroccan request for OV–10s.² Morocco increasingly views the issue as a test of our relationship. (C)

I agree with Parker’s point of view and urge you to raise this issue during your next VBB lunch (July 20, if possible).³ State has been divided, with PM favoring the sale, the human rights people opposing it, and the Bureau performing a masterful bit of fence-sitting—the net effect of which has been immobility (seen by Hassan as hostility). (C)

We should now use the time Charlie Duncan’s mission⁴ bought us not only to forestall some predictable bad effects (flowing from Moroccan perceptions that we are unwilling to help our friends) but, equally important, to influence the course of Western Sahara developments in a constructive way. In this connection, the following circumstances are particularly relevant: (C)

—continuing Polisario attacks on Morocco proper dramatize the dangerous turn of the Sahara conflict (and the deterioration of Morocco’s military position); (U)

—clandestine reports attest to increasing Moroccan disillusion, especially among middle-grade military officers, concerning prospects for a favorable outcome to the war;⁵ (C)

—the UN “debate” last month⁶ and the tenor of the OAU wisemen’s report point to Morocco’s deteriorating political position internationally;⁷ (U)

—the flap over what Guedira, the King’s counselor, was or was not authorized to disclose publicly is indicative of the turmoil inside the highest levels of the Moroccan government over next steps (especially vis-a-vis this week’s OAU summit in Monrovia); (C)

—Next week’s Congressional hearings on Morocco coincide with growing public interest in the North African situation and gives us a chance to make a helpful move vis-a-vis Morocco in particular and our interests in the area in general. (C)

In my view, the cumulative impact of these developments is bringing Morocco to a point where, more than any other time since the Western Sahara conflict began, the possibility of some meaningful compromise (i.e., willingness to negotiate a political solution) may exist. In order to negotiate, however, Hassan will have to do so from a position of perceived strength rather than weakness. (C)

The OV–10 could be a major factor in that perception. As Gary Sick has argued, we would have to accompany the provision of that equipment with a number of clear assertions, among them: (a) we do not believe Morocco can achieve a military solution, with or without the aircraft; (b) the aircraft are intended to improve Morocco’s negotiating position; and (c) we continue to care how Morocco uses the arms we provide (the misuse of which would be a hindrance to our good relationship). We would, of course, approach the Algerians and explain the OV–10 supply on the grounds of the Polisario’s more aggressive posture, reiterating the need for a negotiation between Maghrebian neighbors to resolve a no-win situation. (C)

In short, the sale of OV–10 to Morocco can be used to help nudge Morocco into a more favorable negotiating frame of mind. There are, of course, risks: Hassan, in refusing or simply ignoring our strictures, could get the idea that we are ready to help him fight to the bitter end, in which case the OV–10 would simply embolden him on his military course. Moreover, we should be very clear that these aircraft will perform no miracles, either militarily or politically; still less can they provide a solution to Morocco’s larger problems of economic management and leadership. At the very least, however, they can remove a major irritant in our relationship which has taken on some adversely symbolic value in a country where symbolism is all-important. The sale would provide a tangible and much desired earnest of our friendship and preclude (in the event of military catastrophe) any plausible claim that we denied Morocco, in its hour of need, the one piece of equipment they most required. (C)

I recommend a pitch to Cy Vance along the above lines, appropriate parts of which he could instruct Hal Saunders to include in his Congressional testimony.⁸ I feel confident that you would get strong support from Harold Brown. Gary Sick, Bob Kimmitt, and Madeleine Albright concur.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you raise during the next VBB lunch the question of providing OV–10 aircraft to Morocco and seek Vance’s and Brown’s agreement to approve such provision.⁹

LATE ITEM: Newsom has now scheduled a meeting for tomorrow at 10:45 to plot Saunders’ testimony. Unless I hear differently from you, I will peddle the above points as NSC input, which can help prepare the ground for your VBB.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 101, Meetings (President/V–B–B and Turner Breakfasts, Luncheons and Meetings Topics): 5–8/79. Confidential. Sent for action. Copies were sent to Sick, Kimmitt, and Albright.
2. In telegram 4319 from Rabat, June 22, Parker offered his “final thoughts” on U.S. relations with Morocco. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Morocco: 1–8/79)
3. No record of the lunch meeting was found, but see footnote 2, Document 176.
4. See Document 174.
5. Not found.
6. The Security Council convened on June 20 to consider this issue. For a summary of the four meetings, see Yearbook of the United Nations, 1979, pp. 1047–1048.
7. In telegram 2707 from USUN, June 26, the Mission summarized the Wisemen’s Committee report and recommendations. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790287–1083) See also footnote 4, Document 45.
8. See footnote 2, Document 245.
9. There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.