Office of the Historian

137. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting1

Washington, September 18, 1980, 3–4 p.m.

SUBJECT

  • Libyan Actions Directed Against U.S. Reconnaissance Aircraft and U.S. Exercise Plans

PARTICIPANTS

  • State

    • Under Secretary Matthew Nimetz
    • Morris Draper, Deputy Assistant Secretary for NEA
    • William McAfee, Deputy Director for Coordination, INR

  • Defense

    • David McGiffert, Assistant Secretary, ISA
    • Leonard Hildebrandt, Country Director, North Africa, ISA

  • JCS

    • Lt. General John Pustay, Assistant to the Chairman

  • CIA

    • Robert Ames, NIO for Near East and South Asia
    • [name not declassified], OSR

  • White House

    • David Aaron

  • NSC

    • General Jasper Welch
    • Captain Gary Sick
    • Captain Chris Shoemaker

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

The meeting was convened as a follow-up to Tuesday’s discussion of Libyan actions directed against our reconnaissance flights and probable reactions to our naval exercise.2 Qadhafi’s speech on Tuesday increased awareness of Libya’s threats to challenge us in the region.3

From the discussion, four basic issues emerged to be discussed by the MBB lunch meeting.4

1) Which option for the exercise should be selected?

a) Continue the exercise as planned, with limited naval and air surveillance in the area claimed by Libya.

b) Modify the exercise so that only air surveillance in the Libyan-claimed area is conducted.

c) Keep all naval and air activity out of the area.

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There are potential costs to manning the area under threat from Qaddafi as well as possible costs from an incident that might be charged to a deliberate U.S. provocation—particularly in the light of the current Senate investigations.5

2) What is the most detailed and accurate assessment of the incident in which the Libyans allegedly fired two missiles at our reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace?

3) Should we instruct our embassies in Syria and Libya to make demarches on Qaddafi’s recent threats as they relate to the exercise?

4) What are the specific rules of engagement for aircraft and naval vessels located in the Libyan-claimed area? If we pick the aircraft only option (b), should they break off if Libyan aircraft approach or should they stay and plan to defend against any hostile actions?

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled Files, Box 141, Luncheon Meetings: MBB: 8–9/80. Secret.↩
  2. See Document 135.↩
  3. See Document 136.↩
  4. No record of the lunch meeting of Muskie, Brzezinski, and Brown was found.↩
  5. See Document 133.↩