Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XVII, Part 2, Sub-Saharan Africa

59. Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, May 7, 1980, 10–10:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Relationship with the New Government of Liberia

PARTICIPANTS

• STATE

  • Acting Secretary Warren Christopher
  • Under Secretary David Newsom
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary William Harrop

• OSD

  • Deputy Secretary Graham Claytor
  • Deputy Assistant Secretary Robert H. Pelletreau, Jr. (African Affairs)

• JCS

  • Lieutenant General John Pustay

• DCI

  • Mr. Gray Cowan
  • Mr. Clair George

• ICA

  • Director John Reinhardt
  • Ms. Mary Betterman

• NSC

  • Mr. Jerry Funk
  • Colonel William Odom

SUMMARY

The meeting focused on our relations with the new government. It was noted that while the new regime had, in response to our strong demarches, moderated its original harsh policy on executions and had begun to establish some internal stability, its inexperience had made its viability far from certain.² We remain concerned about our political, economic and strategic interests in Liberia, including important communication facilities, considerable economic investment, access to air and port facilities, and some 4,000 American citizens. It was recognized that while we have not received requests for large-scale assistance as yet, the likelihood is that the Liberian economy will deteriorate badly rather quickly, and such appeals for economic aid can be expected in the coming months. (S)

CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—We should augment our present relationship with the new government (while maintaining enough distance to allow for criticism of any further excesses), by taking a range of actions including:

• Sending Chairman Gray and perhaps one or two others of the Commission on U.S.-Liberian Relations to examine the new situation,—as a “special mission” while holding the Commission itself in abeyance.³

• Recommencing a small temporarily suspended military training team activity.

• Considering ways of being responsive to requests for military re-supply and for non-lethal equipment, (principally trucks), within the present $1.2 million FMS program.⁴

• Indicating a willingness to explore the possibility of modest economic assistance, perhaps including a PL–480 program,—all contingent upon our ability to reprogram funds.

• Taking steps to encourage sound economic advice on a technical basis, perhaps through the IMF or World Bank, and to encourage commercial banks to assist in maintaining an orderly economy insofar as they are able to do so.

—We should maintain a public policy of muted public criticism of the new regime, while continuing to express privately in direct terms the necessity for a policy of respect for human rights and a maintenance of a rule of law.

—We should continue our present low-profile voluntary evacuation of dependents and non-essential people, and maintain this posture until the situation is entirely normal. At the same time, JCS and OSD should continue quiet contingency planning for military evacuation in the event of a serious deterioration.

—We should reaffirm our present policy of not granting asylum requests within a foreign jurisdiction, but granting temporary refuge for humanitarian reasons in extreme or exceptional circumstances, where the welfare of American citizens is not put at risk. (S)

RECOMMENDATION: That you approve the general course of action suggested by the PRC including:

(1) Augmenting our present relations with the Liberian Government by offering modest assistance and good faith advice, along the lines set forth above. (S)

(2) Maintaining our present policy of muted public criticism coupled with strong private admonitions. (S)

(3) Continuing our present low-profile voluntary evacuation of dependents. (S)

(4) Reaffirming our present policy on asylum.⁵ (S)

Minutes of the Meeting

Christopher opened the meeting with a brief statement concerning our obvious political, economic and strategic interests in Liberia, noting the extensive communication facilities, the military access, the substantial commercial investment, and the presence of some 4,000 U.S. citizens. He said that it was his personal judgment that the position of the Doe Government remains somewhat precarious and tenuous. He asked CIA for its evaluation. (S)

Cowan said that he agreed with Secretary Christopher’s general assessment, and had little to add to the information set forth in the short brief which had been distributed to the participants,⁶ except to note that there was recent evidence to suggest a growing interest in Liberia on the part of both Ethiopia and Libya. He judged that Doe would respond to this interest in a manner dependent upon our ability to be responsive to his requests to us for assistance. (S)

Christopher said that the principal issue to be dealt with was that of our relationship with the new regime, and he briefly outlined the three basic options,—to distance ourselves from the Doe Government, to maintain the present relationship, or to augment the present relationship. He noted a preference for option three,—augmentation, but pointed out that this was easier to state than to fund, given our scarce resources. (S)

Claytor stated OSD’s preference for option three, and made particular reference to the desirability of responding to requests for some $600,000 in transport equipment, under the $1.2 million FMS program. (S)

Pustay stated—JCS preference for option three. (U)

Funk said that NSC supported option three, within the limits of our ability to reprogram funds at the present time. (U)

Reinhardt said that ICA would prefer option three. He went on to point out that we were faced with a terribly weak leadership in the new government, but that it was all we had to work with. (S)

Newsom spoke of the severe limitation of resources in trying to implement option three. (U)

Pustay noted that an imaginative use of presently funded programs, such as the military training team, will do much to put things on track. (S)

Christopher asked for opinions on the desirability of continuing with the Presidential Commission on U.S.-Liberian Relations. (U)

Harrop said that the Commission had been “put on hold” for now, but that Chairman Gray had expressed an interest in going to Liberia with one or two others,—perhaps Assistant Secretary Moose and NSC staffer Jerry Funk. (S)

Newsom supported the Chairman’s idea, but pointed out that this would require much groundwork with the Doe people so as to avoid raising false expectations. (U)

Funk agreed with Gray’s suggestions, as well as Newsom’s caveat, but also pointed out that in his discussions with Chairman Gray, Gray had expressed a desire to have at least one other Commission member go along,—perhaps Andrew Brimmer. (U)

Christopher said that there being no disagreement, Gray and a few select people should travel to Liberia, but as a “special delegation” rather than as a Commission. (S)

Christopher then turned to the question of the military training team and other temporarily suspended military programs. (S)

Pustay reported that an advance party of the present team group was in transit. (S)

Claytor said that should the presently moderating policy of the Doe Government remain in effect, it would seem appropriate to lift the present ban on lethal items, but that while the Liberian army was requesting resupply of ammunition, this request should be answered only after a thorough research of actual needs. (S)

Pelletreau noted the urgent request for $500,000 in transport equipment, especially trucks, and said that the need was apparent. (S)

Harrop said that it was possible to fund these truck purchases through the present FMS program. (S)

Christopher noted that it was the consensus that we proceed with this major truck purchase program, subject to availability of funding. (S)

Christopher then took up a suggestion that we might now reprogram $670,000 from Nicaraguan FMS, but stated his strong reservations. (S)

Newsom noted that we should not rush to do so, as we could expect to have increasing claims put upon these dwindling resources in the months ahead. (U)

Claytor said that it was inevitable that the Doe Government would slip into severe economic difficulty, and would be back for much more. (S)

Christopher then said that the Nicaraguan FMS reprogramming idea should not be pursued. He then asked for general ideas about the prospects for finding available funds for developmental and ESF programs within the 1981 budget. (S)

Harrop spoke of the possibility of finding some funds for a PL–480 program for 1981, and suggested that we should explore the idea. (S)

Funk noted the desirability of such a program for Liberia, given the continuing basic “rice crisis” facing the country, but said that such a program would have to be weighed carefully on other African claimants to a dwindling PL–480 reserve. (S)

Christopher then noted that we seemed in general agreement on the desirability of trying to be responsive to what can be expected to be increasing requests for aid, subject to the availability of reprogramming which would not do serious harm to other vital programs. (S)

Newsom suggested that it would be useful to encourage the availability of sound economic advice, on a technical rather than a political basis,—perhaps through the World Bank or the IMF. (S)

Harrop said that such advice and guidance would be helpful in sending reassuring signals to the business community, and that we should encourage the commercial banks to be helpful in this regard. (S)

Christopher directed Harrop to follow through on these ideas. (U)

Christopher then raised the question of our strategy with Congress, suggesting that we should continue to keep Congressman Gray and Congressman Solarz and other key members of the House and Senate fully informed. All agreed. (U)

Christopher asked for ideas on evacuation, stating a preference for continued low-profile voluntary evacuation of dependents and non-essential people. (S)

Claytor supported this continuation of this present policy, and noted that OSD and JCS were, of course, continuing contingency planning for any possible military evacuation. (S)

Pustay said that JCS had a special group updating contingency planning on a continuing basis, and noted that a helicopter ship would remain in the Western Mediterranean, within 6–8 days of Monrovia. (S)

Newsom asked that the possibility of direct sea evacuation, in cooperation with commercial lines, not be overlooked. (S)

Pustay said that JCS would review such an option. (U)

Christopher next raised the question of what our public stance should be. He said that since public condemnation was clearly not useful in this case, we should stay with our present policy of muted public criticism, coupled with direct and forceful admonitions to the Doe regime to initiate and maintain a policy of respect for human rights and rule of law. There was complete agreement on this point. (S)

Christopher moved to the question of asylum policy. (U)

Harrop outlined the concerns which had been raised on the Hill, particularly by Congressman Solarz, with respect to the late Foreign Minister Dennis,—in which case Solarz had been misinformed, as Dennis had not requested asylum, probably because he was well aware of our long-standing policy. (S)

Funk stated a preference for maintaining our present policy of not granting asylum in a foreign jurisdiction except for temporary refuge in extreme circumstances. There was a consensus on this position. (S)

Newsom then noted that so far there was a general coolness to the Doe Government on the part of other African governments, and asked if there might be some impact on our relations with these other Africans, should we aid Doe. (S)

Harrop said that he felt there would be no serious problem unless we went very far in support of a government which was obviously bringing more chaos to the nation. (S)

Funk said that as long as our aid and guidance was perceived by other Africans as being directed toward the promotion of stability,—internally and in the region,—our intervention would be welcomed, and more, expected. (S)

Cowan noted that there seemed to be an excellent opportunity to give good advice in the creation of a new constitution. (S)

Christopher asked that Harrop and Funk coordinate the preparation of the minutes and conclusions to be presented to the President, and adjourned the meeting. (U)

1. Source: Carter Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 80, PRC 139 Liberia 5/7/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.
2. See footnote 3, Document 56. In telegram 106677 to Monrovia, April 23, the Department instructed Smith to make another démarche to the Government of Liberia conveying the concern of the U.S. Government that the accused members of the former government be “assured due process,” that “executions have shocked the American public,” and that “such acts will certainly have serious repercussions” on how the world views the new Liberian government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800201–0234) In telegram 3702 from Monrovia, April 25, the Embassy reported on Smith’s meeting with Doe to deliver the démarche. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800205–0886)
3. See Document 62. The Commission was established after Tolbert’s visit. See Document 50.
4. In telegram 3784 from Monrovia, April 28, the Embassy reported that the Liberian Ministry of Defense had requested military training teams, vehicles for military transport, and assorted items of ammunition. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800213–0307)
5. There is no indication of Carter’s approval or disapproval of the general course of action. However, in a May 7 memorandum to Brzezinski, Funk forwarded the Summary of Conclusions, on which Brzezinski wrote, “P. approved ZB,” dated May 8. (Carter Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 80, PRC 139 Liberia 5/7/80)
6. Not found.